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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Barbara A 11 en Kuzio for the Master
of Arts in History presented December 5, 1996.

Title: President Abelardo Rodriguez (1932-34): From
Maxi ma to to Carden i smo.

The 1920s and 1930s in Mexico were character1 zed by a
per1 od of soc i a 1, po 1itica1 and economic reconstruction
following the military phase of the Mexican Revolution from
191 O to 1920. The Sonoran Dynasty, dominated by mi 1i tary
generals Alvaro Obregon and Plutarco Elias Calles, ruled the
Mexican government from 1920 to 1934. More specifically,
dur·ing the period known as the Maximato ( 1928-34), Calles,
U-1e Jef e Maxi mo, attempted to contro 1 three different
presidents from behind the scenes. It was not until December
1934, when Lazaro Cardenas began his six year term as
President of Mexico, that the Sonoran Dynasty off i c i a 11 y ended.
This thesis focuses on Abelardo Rodriguez, the third
president of the Maximato from September 1932 to December
1, 1934. Historians have written little about Rodrlguez's
presidency because he is viewed strictly as a puppet president
under Ca 11 es. The 1ntent of this research is first to extract
Rodr\guez from obscurity and shed some light on his

substantial contributions to Mexico's post revolutionary
economic and social reconstruction as interim President. And
second, to reveal his role not as puppet number three of the
Maximato but as a political leader with his own agenda.
Rodriguez was chosen by Calles to be Interim President.
However, while in office he gradually shifted his allegiance
from Calles to Cardenas as Cardenas wielded more power,
replacing Calles collaborators in his administration with
Cardenas proponents. From that perspective the Rodriguez
administration became a transitional government which
peacefully shifted power from the Maximato to Cardeni smo.
The Mexican Six Year Plan developed in 1933 reflected
this new shift in power. My research will show that Abelardo
Rodriguez aggressively pursued the implementation of the Six
Year Plan during 1934. More importantly, he interjected his
own interpretation, which included federal policies that
reflected a mix of capitalist economic philosophy and New
Deal social policies, learned from his U.S.-Mexican border
relationships while governor of Baja California. As a result,
this research concludes that Rodriguizmo, acting as an
independent force, laid most of the foundations for the
successes President Cardenas achieved between 1935 and
1937, something historians totally credit to Cardenas.
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Introduction

The 1920s and 1930s in Mexico \"/ere characterized by a
period of social, political and economic reconstruction
f o 11 O\N i ng the military phase of the Me xi can Revolution from
191 O to 1920.

The Sonoran Dynasty, dominated by military

jenera ls Alvaro Obregon and P1 utarco El 1as Ca 11 es from the

1

State of Sonora, ruled tr1e Mexican government from 1920 to
1934. Pre=,1dent of Mexico from 1920 to 1924, Obregon handed
over the presidency to Ca11es from 1924 to 1928 and returned
for a second term in 1928. His assassination, the day after
takin1j office, created a political vacuum for the Sonoran
power

Rather than reassume the presidency himself, Ca1les

filled Obregon's six year term from 1928 to 1934 with three

CJlf f erent pre=.1 dents-- Portes Gil, Ortiz Rubio, and .A.be l ardo
Rodriguez-- a 11 whom he attempted to contra l

fr~om

behind the

scenes. Because General Ca 11 es was ref erred to as the "Jef e
ivlaximo c1e la Revoluci6n" beginning with the Rubio
administration, the period became known as the

Ma~'.imato.

It

was not until Decernber 1934, when Lazaro Cardenas from the
central state of M1choacan began his six year term as
President of Me xi co, that the Sonoran Dynasty officially ended.

My research focuses on Abelardo Rodriquez, tr1e third
presi\jent of the Maximato from September 1932 to December
1, 1934. The standard textbook currently used in teaching a
course on Me xi can h1 story, Michael Meyer's and Wi 11 i am

2
Sherman's 781 page volume, The Course of Mexican History
rnent ior:s Abelardo Rodr·i guez three ti rnes, twice in a 11 st rng of
presidents of the period, and once as "a man with 1ess
adrnrn1strat1\1e talent than relish for power, as puppet number
niree of the Maxi rnato." 1 The pur·pose of my researcr1 is first
to extrac.t President Rodriguez frorn obscurity and shed some
l 1gr1t on his substantial contributions to Mexico's post
revo 1ut1 onarv econorn i c and social reconstruction as i nter1 m
President A.nd second, to reveal his role not as puppet number

trwee of the ivia/1mato tiut as a political leader with his own
a1;ienda
Unknown to the larger vvorld, Abelardo Rodriguez was
vve 11-knovvn to NorHwvestern Mexico, California businessmen
along the US -fvlexican border and Me.xi can President Plutarco
Ca 11 es rn tr1e 1920s. A.s Governor of Baj a California from 1923
to 1930, Rodri(;iuez acquired adrninistrative skills and
f mane i a1 e><pert i se that a 11 owed him to survive future
political challenges. He provided Baja California with six
years of po 1it1ca1 stab i 1i ty and econorn i c deve 1opment and
brou1;iht th 1s isolated periphery of Me xi co under tighter control
of the Me:xican government During these years, he
,.

'

(jernons trateij consistent loyalty to the Jef e Maxi rno which
earned r, i rn Ca 11 es' trust and free reign to adrn in i st er BaJ a
Ca11forn1a. A.long the way, r1e established himself as the
1M1cr1ae1 C Meyer and \villiam

Histor-y 0-~ew York

L. Sherman, The Course of r'1e/ican
Oxford University Press, 1991 ), p 591.
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Caudillo of Mexico's West and accumulated enormous personal
\/\!ea 1tri.
Rodriguez reproduced tJ·1 is f ormu 1a when he became
interim President of Mexico in September 1932. By cr1oosing
to work within the party system, Rodriguez demonstrated
loyalty to Cal1es and the National Revolutionary Party (PNR),
11\iho reciprocated by giving him the freedom to administer
Mexico's centra 1 government. Yet within this parameter,
Rodr1guez developed his own distinct brand of economic and
socia1 policies He created federal policies that reflected a
mix of capital 1st economic philosophy and New Deal social
policies, something he had learned in his U.S.-Mexican border
re 1at1ons.h1 ps To that, he added the 1deo1 ogi ca 1 prescription of
Obreg(5n 's and Ca 11 es' Sonoran dynasty.
Rodriguez was insta11ed as third president of the
l'··1ax i mat o. However, wh i 1e in office tw gradually shifted his
allegiance from Calles to Cardenas, as Cardenas wielded more
pow·er. From tJ1at perspective the Rodr1 guez adm mi strati on
became a trans it i ona 1 government which peacefully sr1 i fted
power from the Maximato to Cardenismo. The Mexican Six Year
P1an deve 1oped in 1933 ref 1ected this new shift in power. My
researcr1 w i 11 st·rnw that Abe 1ardo Rodr1 guez aggressive 1y
pursued the implementation of the Six Year Plan during 1934
More importantly, he interjected his ovvn interpretation, and
laid rnost of tJ1e foundations for the successes President
L8zaro Cardenas achieved between 1935 and 1937.

4

The research for my thesis is primarily taken from the
u.~; State Department Mexican Internal Affairs documents.2

Little r1as been written by historians concerning Rodriguez's
presidency. While Lorenzo Meyer has written him off as simply
anotrier puppet of the Maxi ma to, 3 tr1e State Department sources
reveal his importance from the U.S. diplomatic viewpoint.
Tr·1ese primary documents and tr1e John F.W. Dul les4 book paint a
very favoratJle picture of Rodriguez as an administrator,
confirmrng tr1at Rodriguizmo did e;.'.1st and that it served as the
trans~ ti ona 1 government

from the Maxi ma to to Carden i smo.

Tr1e first cr1apter est ab 1i shes AtJe 1ardo Rodriguez as a
very capab 1e governor who 1itera11 y carved an econom i ca 11 y
v 1at'1 e and po 1it i cal ly stab 1e Me;-: i can state out of nothing. .At
the same ti me he cemented the confidence of both Ca 11 es and
the US and created his vast persona 1 \A/ea 1th and po 1itica1
poiNer

in

Northern Mexico. Cr1apter two describes the po 1itica1

povver ·3truggle at the national level which revolved around the
upco1-n i f"HJ 1934 president i a1 e1ect ion and how Rodriguez was
p 1ac eel t1y Ca 11 es as third president of the Maxi mato. .A.ft er trw
stage is set, cr1apter tr1ree separates Rodriguez from tr1e

2~~AUS Diplomatic Record Group 59, Records of the Departmer1t of State
Re1atmg to Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1930-1939. Microfilm Ed M1370
Hereafter cited Nf'.US
?Lor-enzo Meyer, Historia De La Pevoluci6n Mexicana 1928-1934
Vol 12 Los I nicios De La I nstituc ional izac1on La Politi ca Del Max1mato. and Vol
13 El Ccmflicto Social y los Gobiernos del Maximato (Mexico City El Colegio De
11exi co. 1978)

"1Jol-ir1 F.W Dulles, Yesterday in f'1ex1co .A. Chronicle of n1e Revolution
1919-1936 (.Austrn University of Texas Press, 1961)
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1''1a::x.imato and highlights his administrative qualities and the
·::;.trcng US influence he brought to the Mexican presidency.
Cr1apter four answers trie centra 1 question of who ran the
Rodriguez government Both Rodriguez and Ca 11 es strugg 1ed to
dominate the government but Rodriguez prevailed wr1en r1e
rep 1aced several of Call es' co 11 aborators with men of his own
rn his cabinet Important l·y, from the outset he contained the
nat i ona 1 rn i 1itary power Chapter five moves beyond who

cor,tro 11 ed the Rodriguez acJm in i strati on to sr1ow triat
Ro1jri10uez was actively involved in the transition to
Caroenismo

It describes tr1e power struggle between Car,jenas

and Ca 11 es and Rodriguez's role in tr1 is strugg 1e during tr1e
1jev·e1opment of the Mexican Six Year Plan in 1933.
Cr1apter six, seven, and eight focus on Rodriguez's
concrete accomp 1i shments in the areas of finance, and agrarian
ana labor reform whicr1 set the groundwork for the Cardenas
administration's social reforms. Here the question of who ran
tr1e government is answered cone l us i ve 1y as Rodr\ guez and r11 s
f rn an c e m 1n 1st er s set f i s ca 1 po 1i cy f or t he country, Rod r· i guez
u 1t i mate 1y usurped a11 power from the states and congress and
01ctated agrarian reform as head of the .Agrarian Commission
and regulated labor through personal control of the national
Arbitration Board . .A.t the same time he promoted consumption
throu10r1 minimum wage legislation which he also strong-armed
througr1 Congress over States' interests.

6
Chapter nine returns to the power strugg1e between
Cardenas and Ca1 ies, no'vv set m 1934 When Ca11es reignited
Hie r·e1igious issue to create a po11tica1 crisis for Cardenas,
Podri guez s tab111 zed the situation for Cardenas. Fina 11 y, the
cone 1us ions reconsider trie Rodr1 guez administration based on
tr·,1~

nevv information.

7

Chapter I: Education of a Northern Politician

A.tlelardo Lu1s Rodriguez was born in Guaymas on May
12, 1E\89. He vvorke1j in Sonora for the Cananea Copper Co. after

a minimal primary education before Joining the Constitutional 1st Army in 1913 at age twenty two. Between 1913 and
1915, tw rose from lieutenant to divisional general, the

Me>-'ican .Army's ri1gr1est rank, as a participant in almost every
major revolutionary battle. From 1916 to 1920 Rodriguez
served e/clusi·v·ely

in

a Sonoran unit \/\/here he fought the Yaqui

Indians for the Carranza administration. It was during this

t i me tr; at r·1 e ,j eve 1oped a fr 1ends r1 i p w i t h Pl utar co El i as ca 11 es
vv·ho vvas Chief of Yaqui Operations. Rather than use violence,
C:clonel Rodriguez proposed to settle tr1e Yaqui problem through
ei~uitable

land 1jistribut1on. By the end of 1916, he had

organized tr1e first Indian camp under his custody and pacified
an important point of unrest.1
In r··1ay 1920 Rodriguez became Brigadier General under
President Obregon and devoted himself to army administration,
serv mg as a zone commander, adjutant genera 1 of 1'1exi co City,
cr11ef of cavalry and chief of staff. In .July, Obregon directed
Rodriguez to organize an expedition to reestab 1i sh federal
control over BaJa California since the northern area remained
1,Ja·vier F. Gaxiola, El Pres1dente Rodriguez ( 1932-341 (Me;,;1co
Ei:i1tc1r1a1 Cu1tura. 1938), p 62

e
outside of federal authority. It was an independent state under

u-·,e persona 1 contra l of Co 1one l Esteban Cantu In 1923, after
def eating Cantu, Rodriguez becarne chief of Operations and
Gover·nor of U-·1e Norther·n District of BaJ a Ca 1lf orn i a.

2

Northern District Governor: 1923-1930

Tr1e primary task of Rodriguez's administration was to
def end 1v1e::-'.ico's sovereignty against the encroachment of the
United States by estab1ishin1;i permanent military and
comrnun i cation bases and pro vi ding rnteroceani c
communication which linked BaJa California more closely with
tr1e Mexican Republic. 3 He al so concentrated on the
development of public serv 1ces and education in his carnpai gn
to keep the Nortr1ern District under Mexican control. What he
achieved was far greater. He l itera11y created a Mexican state
\Nhere none had e:-,; i sted .
.As a state administrator, Governor Rodriguez bui 1t up the
1oca1 treasury to deve 1op pub 1i c works. In the 1920s, the
Northern District was subsidized 900,000 pesos annua1 ly by
tr1e Federa 1 Department of Pub 1i c Education and '-Justice. By
1924 Rodriguez had reduced ha 1f of the subsidy and in 1925 he
~.urren,jered

the other r1alf. Soon the treasury of the Northern

2Jbld,p65
3 Ibid., p 65-66
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District furnished the Central Government the amount of
900,000 pesos to help defray' the large expenses created by the
'delar1uertista' rebellion.4

By the end of his governorship in

1930, Baja California had established an impressive balance of

4 8 OO, OOO pesos f i nan c in g a 11 of i ts own pub l i c s e rv i c es,
especially the educational branch. It provided additional funds
to the Federal government to fight the Escobar Rebe 11 ion in

1929.'.::·
In the early 1920s, Baja California public employees
often 1ived on the U.S. side of the border because services \Nere
available there that did not exist in Mexico. Governor
Podr1 guez order·ed them to 1ive w 1th in the nation ta l territory.
He (jevelope(j Tijuana an(j Mexicali as principal population and
touri :rn centers by pro vi d mg neccessary mun i ci pal services
such as sewa(;ie, lighting, electricity and paved roa(js. He built
schoo 1s, residences and other public buildings like stores and
theaters. He provided irrigation and drinkable water througr1

tr1e

construction of the Rodriguez Dam. It harnessed the

Ti Juana River vvaters and challenged the idea that the United
Stat es was tr1e on 1y one to profit from it. Rodrf guez bui 1t
roa(js between Mexicali and Tijuana, Tijuana to Ensenada,
rvie/1cali to .Algodones and Tijuana to La Paz. He developed new
4

~~.A,U'.:· e 12.00/29793, ~~o. 1e45, Excelsior, September 5, 1932, Reel

r;.

s Javier F. Gaxiola, El Presidente Rodrlauez ( 1932-34) (Mexico
Ed1tor1a1 Cultura, 193e), p 69-70. Rodriguez also provided arms against the
Escobar Rebellion by organizing the 21st infantry Batallion and two voluntary
corp~. to invade Sonora
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in1ju·3tri es in the Northern District including soap, seeders,
flour, distilleries., \.\;ine, ice and beer. Eventually r1igher
salaries and the elevateij standard of living of the workers
attracted new residents ..As a result, the population of Baja
California increase1j from 23,537 inhabitants in 1921 to
48,327 in 1930.f.
Gover·nor Rodriguez's education policies in the Northern
District paralleled those of Presidents Obregon and Calles on
tr1e nat i ona 1 1eve l. During r1 is pres 1dency, Obregon named .Jose
\/as.concelos secretary of education to implement .Article 3 of
tr·,e 1917 Constitution. Backed by increased federal funds,
vas.concelos became the patron of the rural school. Over a
trwusan1j rural schools \fv'ere built in Mexico between 1920 and
I 924, more than during the previous fifty years. By 1928
Calles r1ad arjrjed two triousand rur·al schools.7

Witr1in this

conte'<t, Gover·nor Rodr·iguez put an emphasis on rural education
in his District. He estimated that the Revolution had:
"acqu i rea a national and human compromise that cannot
be re ct lf i ed without the fundamental change and
immediate construction of pub 1i c education, and for
sincere revolutionaries to boast of the Revolution solidly
contradicts this compromise which must consist of
educ at in'J the people. "C.

t ltil•j, p70

. lli0-1at-l C 1-ieyer and W1lliarn L. Sherman, Hie Course of 1-iexican
His tc·rv U·Je w York: Oxford ur-ii vers i tv Press, 1991 ), p S72-584

: Ja111er F Gaxiola, El Pres1dente Rodrigue7 ( 1932-34) (Me:<ico
Edltoria1 Cultura, 1938l, p 71
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Governor Rodriguez devote(j 46% of his State's total
put1l1c \NOrks budget to education to sustain 55 schools
incl u1ji ng r11 gh schoo 1s, e1ementary schoo 1s and night schoo 1s
which consisted of one industrial and another normal and
p1~eparatory

schoo 1. He constructed more than 35 bu i 1dings

1N1th mo(jern facilities and educational materials. His special
focus \A/as on teacher's pay who received 1Oto 15 pesos a da·/.9
In regard to agrarian reform, on the national level
i=1resi den ts

Obregon and Ca 1l es divided agri cu 1tura1 1ands into

communal e 1i1jos rather than individual parcels. However,
1:Jo.,/ernor

Rodri1~uez

exper·imented with both individual

parce 1at ion and communa 1 efforts. He redeemed nat i ona 1 1ands
\Nhicr1 had been in the hands of foreign companies and
distributed them to small in1j1vidual Mexican agriculturalists.
He tiougr1t closed colonies \Nr1ose lands were a part of the

Co 1ora1jo P iv er De 1ta an1j o·wned by U.S. companies according to
the Commission on International 'Waters. 'With these he formed
Mexican colonies but gave indn1i1jual financing to the colonists.
Governcr Rodriguez a1so est ab 1i shed a cooperative system of
colonization, tr1e Colonia Progreso y .A.nexas, which involved
:230 families and over 5,300 hectares of land under the total

contro 1 of the District government as an experi men ta 1
proJect.10

91t,1d,p71.
p 72-73.

101t)J•j,
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Nationally, President Calles initiated a series of
i rri

gat ion pro Jects and agricultural schools and began to

exten1j credit to small farmers to help curb the decline

in

aqr1cultural productivity as a result of confiscation of land
from the hacienda system. Likewise, Rodr\guez sought
agricultural productivity for the Northern District over mere
social reform and knew this could only be realized with credit,
:rr1 gat ion, supplies and education. .Agricultural development
required fun1jing and the Governor founded the .Agricola
Peninsu1ar Banco with his O\Nn money and half a million pesos
in capital to lend money for provisions, seed, and irrigation
water. 11
Lat.or was neither organized in the Northern District nor
incorporated vv· i th the 1ab or movement in the rest of the
ccuntr/

There were on1·; four unions wltr1 a total of 173

members prior to 1924. During Rodr\guez's governorship, it
gre\·V to 35 syndications with 3, 350 members. Most of the
gro1.Ntr1 vvas due to day laborers transported to the Northern
District from Sinoloa and Sonora, repatriated nationals, and
U'1e accord that obligated Mexican businesses to hire 50%
rviexican workers. Eventually the District required businesses
to hire 90% nationals which was before the establishment of
the Federal Lavv which required the same ..A personal
preoccupation of Governor Rodr\ guez was the establishment of
a minimum wage, a policy he carried with him to the
11 1b1d, p 74

13

Pres i (jency. He es tab 1i shed the Board of Conci 1i at ion and
.A.rt,itration in r,1ay 1925. The eigr1t hour work day, double pay
for overtime an1j the minimum wage of four pesos a day
fonowe j sr1ortly.1::
1

Governor Rodriguez s rngl er1andedly carved a pol it i ca 11 y
stable, economically viable Northern State in Mexico where
none had

e;.:i~.ted

in

1e~;s

than a five year period. A Mexico City

paper put r11 s achievements into perspective:
"(3enera 1 !=~odri guez devoted hi mse 1f who 1ehearte j1 y to
the economic reorganization of the district.
f"iagn if 1cent1 y equipped schoo 1s, agri cu 1tura l colonies,
r·1 i gr1v11ay~, modern mun i c i pa 1 services, and what is the
most noteworthy of mention, perfect order throughout
the region, 1Nere the results of an administrative labor
over a period of 1ess than five years. The capita 1 of the
District, Mexicali, came to be the on1y city a1ong the
r·~ortr·1ern tior,jer more important than its neighbor of the
.Arneri can side. Trave 1ers crossing the border received
the impression of being in a progressive, rich and
ind us t r·i ous town." 13
1

Prosperous Businessman

V/rii le Rodriguez's goa1 as governor of Baja Cal lfornia
was to bring the northern periphery into closer po 1itica1

,..,

l:21t11d' p 74
1
3t~t..US 812 00/29793, i'Jc 1245, E\Celsior, Septe1-nt1er 5, 1932, Reel
1

14

control by the Mexican Republic, his success was achieved by
forging close ties \A/lth the A.merican economy which not only
enriched tr1e l~orthern District but also enriched Rodriguez
personal 1y. This in turn increased hi'.::. need to remain in
control of this region so that his holdings would not be
Jeopardized.
By 1930, Rodriguez was already a prosperous business
rnan with a variety of interests. These included almost
compiete ovvnersr1ip of the Compania Productos Marinos, S.A
\Nhich ha1j fish packing plants at El Sauzal, near Ensenada, at
Cedros Island, and at Cape San Lucas, Lower California, as well
a'.::. a fl oat i ng cannery - the C.ALMEX; interest in the Bancari a
iJe1 Pac1f1co, S.A, the only bank operating rn the Ensenada
consular district; a vvinery at Santo Tomas, Lower Cal if ornia;
otr1er rancr" and agricultural lands in the municipality of
Ensenada; and a twenty-five percent interest in the A.gua
Caliente Hotel Company which he shared primarily with
A.meri can investors. 14 The Compani a Me xi can a de l Agua
Ca 11 ente, 5. A was organized under Mexican 1aws on September
13, 192'8 for the purpose of operating a hotel and resort. A
maJor1ty of the company's officers and directors were
American citizens forfeiting rights under Mexican law. is "To

14

~MUS 8 12 00 Lower Calif ornia/91, Smale, ~~ovember 1O, 1931, Reel

13
1:=t~.AUS ("12.5034/ 1 14, May 12, 1931, Reel 51
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these interests General Rodrlguez later added large holdings
an j rndustr·1 al enterprises on tr1e mainland of Me xi co." 1e
1

Governor Ro1jri guez established a reputation of be mg
friendl\' tovvard the United States. He was popular with the
officials and U1e people of Southern California.17 During his
adm1nistrat1on, the Northern District government was known
for prompt payment of its obligations, so that business
1

nterest5 in nearby cities and towns of Southern Cal if ornia

became very eager to do business with him. Rodrlguez often
coc,perated \Nlth the commercial interests on the U.S. side to
tr1e extent that Mexicali residents could purchase merchandise
on in5.tallment plans and bring merchandise, especially cars,
into r1ex. 1co. If a resident of Mex i ca 1i def au 1ted, pressure

1Nou 1d be e:<erc i sed through tr,e District Government Po 1ice
.A.uU1or1 ti es. i:::

Political 1r·,tr1gue in the Northern District

Gene1-al Rodriguez acted as Caudi 1lo of the Northern
D1str1ct The only maJCir political challenge to his position
came vvhen Pre'3 i dent Ortiz Rubio attempted to usurp local
power and economic prof its from Rodriguez's interests in BaJa

Gt~A.US·212 00/29744, Smale, .August 5, 1932, Reel 2.
812 002/3'.':·3. t·Jo i 727, R Clark, August 1, 1932, Reel 25.
13NAUS 812.00 Lower California, Frank Bohr, April 13, 1931, Reel 13
1
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California. While the World Depression affected the growing
tour·1st trade, the frontier to\Nns continued to receive an
enormous quantity of visitors. Prohibition in the U.S. and the
existence of numerous casinos brought enough tourists for big
econom 1c returns. 19 This led to a struggle for contra l of the
pol it 1c1 an 's bonanza \Nh1 ch the development of the American
tour1 st traffic had made of the region. The Rodriguez forces,
'vVhich followed a friendly policy with the Americans, were on
one side fighting to hold their own while Rubio and his allies
sougr1t to oust them with claims they would return the
t\Jortt1ern District to greater Mexican control. 20
First to come under attack by the Rubio fore es was
r3overnor .Jose Mari a Tapia

After being in power for six years

rn tr1e Nortr1ern District, Rodriguez had resigned from the army
an1j the 1Jovernorsh1p at the end of 1929 and spent eight months
w1 Europe studyrng the r1otel rndustry. Rodriguez handed off the
governorship to General Tapia, his long time protege. Tapia
r·1a1j served in various government positions in Lower
California, first as a military officer under General Rodriguez,
Hien Chief of Staff to Rodriguez until 1926 when he was
elected Congressman to Lower California. As President, Emilio
Portes Gi 1 appointed Tapia as his Chief of Staff, then

19Lorenzo Meyer, Historia De La Revoluci6n Mexicana 1928-1934 Vol
12 Los lnic10s De La lnstitucionalizac10n La Politica Del Ma:><imato (Mexico City
El Cole,~io De Me><ico, 1978), p 271.
20t\JAU5 812.00 Lower Ca1ifornia/59, Harper/5ma1e/Ensenada,
December 1930, Ree 1 13
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Provisional Governor of the Northern District and finally Civil
and Mil ltary Governor of tr1e

t~orthern

District about two

rnontr1s before tr1e latter retired from office. 21
Soon after Ortiz Pubio took office as President on
February 5, 1930, he pursued replacing Tapia with a governor
1oya1 to himse1f and one who \Nould share the large profits
f rorn tr1e d lf f erent Rodriguez garnb ling and racing concessions
1ocateij in Tijuana and

A(~ua

Ca 1i ente. Senor Manuel Hernandez

Cr1azaro, Private Secretary to President Rubio, vis lted Agua
Caliente and made a passionate report to Mexico City that the
border

\.~as

completely .Americanized, so much so that Mexican

money vvas not being allo\Ned to circulate and blamed the
conditions on Tapia. Tapia resigned and led demonstrations
tr1roughout the district General Calles, vvho had always
supported Tapia, tried to prevent him from being removed from
off ice t)ut Cr1azaro's influence at the time was too great. Next
Calles met with several Cabinet members including Portes Gil
\:,:r·10 trweatened resignation lf Cr1azaro did not step down. As a
result Chazaro was removed from off ice but given the more
1mportant position as Governor of the Federal District. Calles
protested and after Chazaro held the position of Governor for
on 1y 48 hours r·endered his resignation and left for· Europe "on
account of riis health." 22

? 1 lt11d

22

lt1Jrj
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General .Arturo Bernal, who was in the Rubio camp,
replaced Tapia for three short months from September 3 to
December 24, 1930 until Rodriquez, who had scarcely landed
from Europe, rushed off to the Capital to rectify tr1e situation.
Rodr\guez's considerable influence with Calles led to the quick
removal of General Bernal. Bernal had earned Rodr1 guez's
displeasure by temporarily closing Rodriguez's Foreign Club
Gambling Casino at Tijuana, adding to his difficulties with the
AB.\ll Casino at Mexicali, and stopping construction on the
Podr\ guez Dam. Bernal al so incurred tr1e displeasure of the
commercial and industrial interests by initiating high road
constuct ion ta:xes and exact rng contributions during a ti me of
l ovv cotton prices and considerably reduced income from the
American tourist trade.23
Carlos Tre Jo 'y' Lerdo de Tejada replaced Bernal from
December 27, 1930 until November 1, 1931. Tejada's political
sympathies were with the Rodriguez faction, and his selection
was attributed to Rodriguez's influence in Mexico City.
General Tapia came back as military commander of the
peninsula, a 11 of which indicated that Rodriguez was st i 11
powerful in this section of Mexico. This pro'."""Rodriguez
political change also gave rise to a general feeling of
optimism among American business concerns.24
23 ~~.AUS 812.00 Lower California./60, Frank Bohr, December 20,
1930, Peel 13
24~MUS 812 00 Lo 1Ner California/59, Harper/Smale./Ensenada,
Decemtier 1930, Reel 13.

19
Even tr1ough Rodriguez succeeded in placing his own men
1n trie governorsr11p, Rubio tried other measures to gain control
of the gambling profits. In July 1931, Rubio took control of
tr'1e gamb1 ing concessions in Mexico from the Department of
Gobernaci6n. The contention was that many games and
gambling devices were being operated which were not
perm1ssable in accordance with Mexican Federal Law. Tr1e
outcome \Nas that nevv' legislation on gambling permits would
nee,j to be enacted in the near future. Meanwhile, the only
char.ge was that the s 1ot machines at Mex1ca11, wh1 ch had been
suppressed for some five or six weeks, were now again being
operated by means of permits that were issued directly by tr1e
1oca1 Di strict Government instead of by the Department of
Gobernaci 1:)n in Mexico City.:::::= Tr11s was an obvious victory for
Rodriguez.
The \t/orl d Depression negative 1y affected Rodriguez's
holdings along \Nith tr1e local and national economy. Profits
from grain commerce and cotton and subs i diaries shrank w 1th
the c 1os ing of the e::<port markets, and income from the North
.American tourist trade at hotels, casinos and horse racing
decrease,j.::?t The econom>1 was exceedingly depressed in view
of tr1e continued scare i ty of work and the 1ow exchange va 1ue
cf the Me>-'1can currency. This resulted in the closing either

25~~.A.u:;, 812.00 Lower Ca1 iforn1a, Frank Bohr/.American Consul, ,.July 9,
1931, Ree 1 13.
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temporari 1y or indefinite1y, of a 1arge number of the 1oca1
sci loons and cabarets.

21

The Ow1 or· AB.W. Gambling Casino,

the on1y licensed gambling casino in Mexicali, was closed on
.A. ugust

3 1 for an ind ef in i t e per i od I ts con c es s i on was

surrendered to the Mexican Government because the owners,
\Nh1ch rnclu,jed Rodriguez, were said to have been losing about

$10,000 during each of the three previous months due to the
,jepress 1on, the C:as ino 's considerable overhead, and $30,000
."ie:><'.1can Federal Government taxes and contributions.2e In
otr·1er wor,js, Rodriguez r1anded off his gamb 1ing concessions to
the government when they were losing money and took them
back \Nhen they were profitab1e.
A. 1tr1ough throughout the Rubio adm in i strati on attempts
to acquire gamb1ing profits from Rodriguez's concerns
continued, during his cabinet crisis in October 1931, Rubio was
suo,jenly more lenient. The AB.W. Gambling Casino at Mexica1i
v,,1 as again opened for business on October 1. More f avorab 1e

concession terms were extended by the Government. On the
same date, tr1e competing four small er gamb 1i ng concessions
that had been extended during the past month to 1oca l sa 1oons
\Nere revoked and the gambling in these was suppressed. Each
concession was required to pay $250

per~

day in taxes. All of

triis gave monopoly control to the AB.vl. Casino. In addition,

'.27~~.AUS 812.00 Lower Califomia/83, Report for August, September
1931, Ree1 13

:=:::r-~.AUS 81200 Lower California, Octot,er 14, 1931, Peel 13
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Cr1apter II: Rodr\guez and National Politics

From 1930-32 e><-governor Rodriguez moved into tr1e
inner circles of government in Mexico City in conjunction with
his politica1 partnership with Genera1 Cal1es. As ear1y as
January 30, 1932 Genera1 Rodr\guez was being groomed for tr1e
Pre~idency

of Mexico. During this period, 1eading politicians

and Cabinet ministers in Mexico City were in a power strugg1e
revolving around the domrnant po1itical figure Calles and the
upcoming Presidentia1 election in 1934.

Rodriguez

co i 1at.orat e1j with Ca 11 es against the po 1itica1 intrigue of
President Ortiz Rubio and his al1ies as each side strove to
form ai 1iances in an effort to shift the ba1ance of power at the
nat1onai level.

Cabinet Crisis

President Rubio counted on four active generals in his
Cati met, .Juan Andreu A 1mazan, Joaquin .Amaro, Lazaro Cardenas
and Saturnino Cedil1o, to back him against any dissent from
otr1er leg is 1at i ve and Party 1eaders. However, Rubio was
concerned that War Minister Amaro was trying to usurp his
presidential powers. Like his secretary Chazaro, Rubio
be1ieved Amaro cou1d take sides with Calles against rnm lf

' ) r""")

LL

necessary.1 Calles also thought General Amaro was becoming
c1ictatorial but rn oppostion to Calles.2 In addition
Comm urn cations Mini st er Almazan, felt Ca 11 es had robbed him
of much of his glory and that Calles allies Perez Trevino and
Carlos Riva Palacio were conspiring for the presidency. 3 .AJ l
of this political intrigue led to a radical cabinet change in
October 1931 w1tr1 ex-governor Rodriguez siding with Calles
against .Amaro.
During events leading to the Cabinet crisis, General
Cai les. 1-1ad sent for General Rodriguez in September, wr10 was
tr1en in i ow er California attend mg to his private bus messes.
Lt. Miguel R Navarett, who was m charge of the Mi 1itary radio
station in Ensenada, stated that when Rodriquez arrived in
Mexico City General Calles, " had his bags packed, ready to
,jepart," i no 1cat i ng that a very serious pol it i ca 1 condition
prevailed in

~1e><1co

City at the time of his arrival and it was a

cl ear rnf erence that General Rodriguez was instrumental in
clarifying tr1e situation."4 Sr. Miguel Gandara, one of General
Roar1guez's closest friends and a partner in a number of the
Genera 1's Lower Ca 1if orn i a enterprises, said Rodriguez had
communicated to him from Mexico City that Rubio was being

1'"'1ohn F.'v'I Dulles, Yesterday

in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 CAustin: University of Texas Press . 1961 ), p 522-527.
2
~~AUS 812.00 Lower Cal ifornia/91, Smale, November 10, 1931. Reel
13.
:'.'.John F.W Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), p 522-527.
4NA.US 812.00/29744, Smale, August 5, 1932, Reel 2
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dominated by General Amaro especially in recent months. At
the ~.ame time the press reported that General Ca1 les was
about to depart for the United States for health reasons.'.:·
Calles was leery about leaving the country with Rubio in
charge and Amaro on the move. Calles wanted Rodriguez in a
Cabinet position to represent his interests wh i 1e he was
absent from Mexico City.
General Amaro challenged Rodriguez's authority in the
Northern District as part of his offensive against the
Calles/Rodriguez partnersh1p

Coronel Cortez, Commanding

Officer of the Military forces at Ensenada reported that
or1;ianized agrarians in the district were a threat and that
.A.maro military men r1ad been lending very active support to
tr1e organized agrar·1 an movement.t. Thus, one of the ob Ject i ves
of Rodriguez's trip to Mexico City was to settle the agrarian
troub 1es created by Amaro in the Northern District.
In addition, Gandara told Rodriguez that Coronel Aleman
Vazquez, Commanding Officer of the Military forces at Tijuana
r·1ad reported General Rodriguez's every movement to Amaro.
Tr1at General Rodriguez and General Amaro were not friendly
·vvas common knowledge. One reason was Amaro's opposition to
Rodriguez as a cabinet appointee following the 1929 Escobar
insurrection. Another reason was Rodriguez's friendship with

SNA.U~· e12.00 Lower California.191, Smale, November 10, 1931, Reel
13
61bid.
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Ca 11 es. Whether the dislike for each other antedated General
.A.rnarc.'s opposition to his appointment to the cabinet was not
known 7
In connection with the agrarian issue, the question was
raised as to why Baja California Governor Tejada, a Rodriguez
appointee, had taken no action to suppress the agrar1 ans in the
Northern District. Military and civil authorities had been
opposed to each other rn the District and Tejada as a c iv1 l i an
vvas povverless to correct the agrarian situation which was
being fostered by General Arnaro. Rodriguez had tried to
rernam inconspicuous during the Tejada rule, neither siding
\A/~tr1

the Military or the Governor but Amaro had forced hirn to

step in. c
Frorn Mexico City Rodriguez hinted that the agrarian
troubles, were not confined to Lower Cal if ornia. The Mexico
City press of October 5, 1931 reported that four Mexican
state·~

r1ad proposed the creation of a vast reserve arrny arnong

the carnpe~. mos, which if extended to the entire Republic would
furnish a reserve arrny of sorne 500,000 persons. Therefore,
Rodriguez wanted to rernove a very serious local threat against

tr1e Calles national faction.

9

The Rodriguez/Calles faction asserted its power and
tr1urnphed over A.rnaro and Rubio at the national level. The

71 tnd
31 t>id
?Ibid.
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outcome of the Cabinet crisis was the resignation of the four
'Jenerais, w1tr1 Ca11es becoming Minister of War and Rodr\guez
taking over as Undersecretary on October 14, 1931. On January
20.1932 further cabinet changes e1iminated Montes de Oca
(Finance), Genero Estrada <Foreign Re1ations), and Aaron Saenz
(I naustry, Commerce, and Labor), three part i cu1 ar1y 1oya1 to
Rub 1o. Rodriguez became the new Mini st er of Industry,
Cornmerce and Labor which p1aced Ca 11 es and Rodriguez in key
Cat; in et positions. 1o

.A. De 1i berate Path To The Presidency

Rodriguez's objective was the presidency, not a key
CatJrnet post. In May 1932, Genera1 Rodriguez stated that he
vvould not be the Secretary of Commerce for 1ong, that he
w 1sr·1ed to 1ay the foundation for cert a in changes in the 1ab or
1aws, inc1uding a four peso minimum wage, and wou1d be
prepared to 1eave the work mg out of detai 1s to a successor. He
vvanted to return North to his commerci a1 enterprises because
he ·wa5. disgusted with po11tics. But when asked what he wou1d
do if it was decided that the country needed him in the
Pres 1dency, he rep 1i ed: "you a1ready know (the answer)

"11

l')John F.W. Dulles, Yesterday m Mexico A Chronicle of tr1e Revolution
1919-1936(Austin University of Texas Press, 1961) . p. 527.
11 t·MUS 812.00/29744, Smale, August 5, 1932, Reel 2.
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Gener·al Rodriguez could have returned to the governorship of

n-·,e

Northern Territory but his attitude was that if he could not

occupy a high position in Mexico City he would simply remain
an officer in the Mexican Army and concentrate his efforts to
further his private interests in Lower Califor·nia.

12

The next rung on the ladder for Rodriguez was Minister of
War Ca 11 es had been absent for a month during the spring of

1932 \Nhen, as his second wlf e's health was fai 1ing fast, he
took twr to Boston. Upon his return to Mexico, since neither his
01Nn

health nor r11s vvlf e's would permit him to run the War

r~1 in i stry,

he dee i ded to resign and suggested Abe 1ardo

Roar1quez, Pedro Almada or Andres Figuera as a replacement.
Pedro . J Almada described the trip made to inform President
Rub10. He was in the car with Rodriguez, to whom he remarked:
"You'11 be Minister of War. But what crazy chance made
F110ueroa and me opponents'? They cou 1dn 't have chosen worse
opponents. I think tr1is was something that was planned so as
to r1ave you grouped with some of us who would not outshine
you." .A 1mada goes on to say that "Abe 1ardo 1aughed, but my
prophecy came true." Calles told Ambassador Puig Casauranc
not only to advise the President of his decision to resign from
tr·1e "liar Min1str'y, but also, not to leave his study, "even lf it

l2~MUS 812.00 Lower California/91, Smale, November 10, 1931, Reel
13
13John F.W. Dulles, Vesterdav m Mexico. A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1 936 (Aust m Un1vers i ty of Texas Press, 1961 ), p. 233.
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took hours to convince him," unti1 Rubio agreed to make
Rodriguez the next War Minister. In five minutes Ortiz Rubio
agreed to his appointment.13 Within somewhat more than a
year General Rodriguez's military rank had been raised from
Sub-Secretary of War to Secretary of Commerce, Industry and
Labor, and f rna 11 y Secretary of War.
Already at that time, rumors circulated that Rodriguez
wa~.

berng groomed for the Presidency. In June 1932, three

rnonths before Pub i o resigned, Sr. A.1 berto V. Aldrete, Genera 1
Manager of the C1s. Mexicana de1 Agua Ca1 iente, S.A attended a
gatr1errng in r1onor of General Juan Andreu Almazan with ten
high-ranking generals in the Mexican Army. He told U.S
Consular Smale that General A1mazan had given a toast which
enoed t)y saying, " I would 1i ke you gentlemen to drink with

me

a toast to the next President of the Repub 1i c, ,Abe 1ardo."14
\'v'lth the completion of the first three years of the sixyear presidential term to which murdered General Obregon had
tJeen elected, a change in the presidency of the Pepub 11 c did not
require triat a Substitute Pres1 dent be f o 11 owed in office by
an o tr1 er Const it u t i on a 1 Pres l dent pop u 1ar l y chosen in a spec i a 1
election. Late in 1930 1egis1ators had fixed this matter by
amending Const itut i ona 1 Art i c 1e 84. It was now poss i t le under
1

14N.A.US 812 00/29744, Srnale, August 5, 1932, Reel 2.
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the Constitution, for Congress simply to name an Interim
President to complete the term. 1:
Calles forced Rubia's resignation on August 22, 1932
after a hospita1 administrator scandal. In an obvious
cone i 11 atory move, President Rubio sought to name as head of
the Federa 1 District, Genera 1 Jose Mari a Tapia. Instead,
General Tapia and Llc F.J. Gaxio1a were sent to notify Rubio of
Ca11es'

dec1~.1on

not to support him further. Calles did seek

o:upport from Genera1 A.mar·o on his decision and .Amaro
agr-·ee(J 1c Now the door was open for Rodriguez to move from

tr·1e catirnet to the presidency.
Likewise, Rodriguez remained in control in the Northern
Di strict. He inf 1uenced the rep 1acement of Te Jada w lth
Genera 1 o1acr·1ea as governor on November 7, 1931. With

c! 1acr1ea

as head of the m 11 itary and c iv11 government and

t)acked by Rodriguez, the agrarian problem promised to be
reso1ved soon. 01achea governed unti1 August 16, 1932 when
Governor Arturo M. E1i as came on board. The appointment of a
pers.on c 1ose to ex-President Ca 11 es as Governor was seen as a
po 1ltica1 move to 1i ne-up the Territory we 11 in advance of the
approaching 11ex i can president i a 1 e1ect ions. The hope \A/as that
Governor E1ias, who was fami1iar with border conditions,
\A/Ould

be as S'/mpathetic \Nith the efforts to improve this vast

15,Jor1r1 F.'d Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico. A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 533.
lCltiid, p 538
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and undeveloped region as r1as been his predecessor in office.

17

However, Genera 1 O1achea was reappointed Governor of tr1e
~~orthern

Distrct as soon as Rodriguez replaced Rubio in the

Presidency a few weeks later. 15
Rodriguez had run Baja California as governor for over
six years

From January 1930 unt i 1 September 1932, six

cr1anges took p 1ace in the governorship. Rodr\ guez inf 1uenced
each change. He remained the Strong Man of the Northern
D1str1ct protecting his business interests as he moved on to
U1e Pre·31 dency.

17

NAUS 2, 12 00 Lower Cal iforn1a/91, Smale, November 1O, 1931, Reel
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Ill: Northern Politician in Mexico City: Rodr1guizmo
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From the outset of his presidency, Rodriguizmo existed
an•j wouid distinguish itself from the Maximato as Rodr1guez's
term

in

off ice progressed. The new interim President of

Mexico brougr1t strong adm ini st rat ive ski 11 s to Me xi co City as
witnessed by r1is impressive accomplishments as governor in
BaJa California and as a cabinet minister. Both the Mexican
Pre:s and U.S. D1p1 omats ack now 1edged these sk 111 s which
added immediate prestige to his office. In addition, his
favorable dea1rngs with the US. as a northern politician
carTiea over to his presidency. Most importantly, his border
experience greatly influenced his national policies as he
orche:, trated tr1e soc1a1 and economic reconstruction or Me xi co.
Tr1e culmination, Rodriguizmo, was not supplanted by either
tr"1e belier:. or the Maximato or Cardenismo.

Accolades as an Administrator

U.S. Diplomats and the Mexican Press recognized
Rodriguez's administrative skills from the beginning. The PNR
da11y newspaper, El Nacional, as we11 as the Excels10r, El

Universal and La Prensa unanimously praised the character and
ab 11 i ty or tr1e new President: "Rodr1 guez is an ab 1e 1eader, a

31
cap ab le businessman and honest." i Excelsior, Sept 5, 1932
1~eported:

"Ever s rnce General Rodriguez d1 st i ngu1 shed hi mse 1f
notably in the Government of the Northern District of
Lower Cal lf orn i a, we r1ave thought tr1at we had a citizen
who was of good administrative timber; a man of action,
of clear and calm Judgment, a champion of law and order;
a man who says little, but who gives real significance to
what he does sa)i, as if they were al ready accomp 11 shed
facts, an enemy of vain promises and of delusions ... He
is, above a 11 e 1se, a man of action and of great enterpr1 se
1ook mg to rndustri a 1 and econorn i c i mprovernent. .. is
seen in his first statements to the press after tak mg
office as President of the Reput111 c: I dee l are that I sha 11
make every effort possible and necessary to comply
with my duties, constituting a serious national
Government, in vvh i ch there will be unity of action and
which will bring confidence and tranquility to the
Republic, in order that all sections of the country may
devote themselves to their labors, thereby attaining the
economic reconstruction and development of the Nation."
Tr1e Press gave prominence to his statements that he intended
to 1jevote himself to work and thus set an example for the
:·,1e:x:1can people:?
In contrast to tr1is positive press, Rodriguez attracted
little public attention during his first months in office. In
September 1932, Rodriguez remained in Mexico City and
devoted himself to his administrative duties, maintaining a
lovv profile with both the public and the d1plornatic corps. He
spent long hours at the National Palace working quietly and

1 ~JAUS, f, 12 00/29793, ~~o 1845,

R. Clark, Septemt1er '.::', 1932, Ree 1 ~.
'.:'r'-J.A.US 812 00/29792, t'Jo 1851, R. Clark, September~ 9, 1932 . Reel 2
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serious. ly, and very seldom made speeches or gave statements
to U-·1e press

3

Instead, Pres i ,jent Rodriguez focused on runn mg

hi·:; a1jministrat1on, implementing his social and economic
po 11 c i es., and genera 1ly setting Rodr1 guezmo into motion.

Us. diplomats also felt confident of Rodriguez's
leadership. As early as January 1933, the U.S. Military Attache
in

11ex1co observed: "General Rodriguez is doing a good JOb as

President and is assuming more and more the responsib1lit1es
and decisions., wr11ch were formerly left to General Calles
,jur·rng the Ortiz Rubio a jm in 1st ration
1

4

.A.nd U.S. Ambassador

Reuben Cl ark reported that the peso had strengthened with
Rodriguez, ind1 cat ing tr1e confidence in him in f i nanc i a1

c ire less and that the po 11 cy of tr1e United Stat es was one of
cor j1al friendsr1ip6 Wi 11 iam A Smale, American Consul in
1

BaJ a. consistent 1y praised Rodriguez, stating that "The
President has impressed me as being a person intensely
courageous in his convictions. "7 Such praise by U.S. diplomats
inclicate U-1at U.S.-Mexican relations were favorable. They
knevv tr1ey could work successfully with Rodriguez JUSt as
.A.rnerican t1usrnessmen had done wr11le he was governor of Baja

3~J.A.US 812.00/29792, No. 1851, R Clark, September 9, 1932, Reel 2.
Also NAU'.:, 812 00129799, No. 1959, R Clark, General Political Report.
C:>c tober 20, 1932, Reel 2
4 N.AUS 8 12.00/29828, Robert E. Cummings, Acting Mi 1i tary Attache. G2 Report. '-January 1933, Reel 2
=·t'1.AUS 812.00/29792, No 1851, R. Clark, September 9, 1932, Reel 2.
6N,A.US 812.00/29793, No. 1845·, R Clark, September 5, 1932, Reel 2
7NA.US 812 00/29937, Smale, October 1933, Reel 2.
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California. He had an established reputation as a capable
adm in i ::,trator and for positive dea 1i ngs with the United States.
Sma 1e a1so reported tr1at Rodriguez spoke with
directness and candor, espec i a11 y in a statement he made in
Ensenada in the fal 1 of 1931:
"I thought that during my tr·ip abroad (to various
European countr1 es) I wou 1d find some country in a
worse condition than ours. I was disappointed; we are
1ower than any one of triem, and we \Ni11 continue to t)e
the 1owest country on earth unt i 1 there is e1ected as the
Pre:: 1aent of our Re pub 1i c a person chosen by the peop 1e,
\Nr10 vvi11 govern honestly and fear1ess1y and not with a
vievv to enriching himse1f and about 200 of his closest
friends." E
Of course, Rodriguez was not chosen by the people, nor did he
break vv itr1 the Mexican patronage system of enriching hi mse 1f
and r1 i s co 11 ab orators w h i 1e he

\V as in

power. st i 11 , r1 e was

couraqeous in his convictions to run his administration
1ndependent1y of the Maximato.

U.S. Inf 1uence on Rodriguez

In ad,jition to r1is administrative ski11s, Rodriguez
brought both his procapita1ist economics and his New Deal
po 1lt i cs to Mexico city from r11 s U.S. border experience. As a
po1itician r1e envisioned soc1a1 reform and an economic system
3r·~i\US 812.00 Lower California. Smale, .August 1932, Reel 13
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like the United States. William A Smale, American Consul in
BaJ a, assessed Rodr\ guez: "From conversations which I r1ave
1-1ad with General Rodriguez, upheld by others who know r1im
we 11, I have cone l uded that he a1most passionate 1y desires for
Mexico a system of Government in practice as we 11 as theory
as nearly possible 1ike tr1at of the Federal Government of the
United States. "9
Rodriguez's minimum wage plan to boost consumption by
the masses and generate more interna 1 i ndustri a1i zat ion and
agr1cu1tura1 proauct1on was s1m11ar to President Roosevelt's
New Deal policies with it's 'trickle up' philosophy. Likewise,
Rodriguez so 1i cited vo 1untary cooperation from his
industrialists Just as Rooseve 1t received from his U.S.

:n Justr·1al an J agricultural enterpr1ses.10 In return for their
1

1

cooperation, President Rodriguez sought to assist capita 1 by
c ontro 11 i ng 1ati or through government arbitration. His mixed
economic phi 1osophy app 11 ed his procap ital ism to a country

vv 1tr1out pr1 vate capita 1 by st i mu 1at mg industry trwough both
pr1 vate and pub 1i c funding. This phi 1osophy a1so p 1aced
Rodriguez squarely

in

the m1da1e between Ca11es and Cardenas.

Ca11es was strictly procapita1 supporting the "trickle down"
trieory whi 1e Cardenas was a radical social reformer who
strongly supported labor over capital.

·?~J.AUS 812 00/29937, Smale, October 1933, Reel 2.
1Or~A.US 812.5041 /57, W1ll1arn Cochran, .American Vice Consul, ,August
29. 1933. l~c, 541. Reel 58

35
Rodriguez also had r11s own brand of agricultural reform
1Nr11ch comt)ined small private ownership within communal land
distribution. This was unlike both Calles' model which
promoted large commercial land ownership, and Cardenas who
favored non-privatized communa 1 1and di stri but ion.
President Rodriguez was influenced by r1is U.S. neighbor·
beyond economic po 1i c1 es. He believed in separation of Churcr1
ancJ State. He f e1t that public education contributed strongly
tc\ the cr1osen sys tern of po 1it i cs and he supported a form of 1ay
educ at 1on wh1 ch corresponded to a country ruled by a l i bera 1
and democratic pol lt 1ca1 constitution like tr1e United States.
In d1 rec t contrast, Ca 1i es and Cardenas both favored "soc i aii st
education," Ca 11 es as a means to contro 1 the Catho 1i c Church
ancJ Cardenas as a strong e1ement of his soci a 1 reform po 1icy.
Finally, Rodriguizmo was interested in tr1e development
cf .A.meri can f ootba 11 and he provided f inanci a 1 support bringing
tvvo .A.merican co11ege f ootbal 1 teams to play the National
University of l"'lex i co

In addition, Rodriguez di sp 1ayed a strong

interest in tr1e development of Mexican athletics in qeneral. He
issued an Executive Order in October 1932 creating a Nati ona 1
Federation of .Athletics and had a council made up of
represent at iv es of the /"'Ii n i stri es of Education and War, the
Federa 1 District and tr1e PNR 11

11

~·J.A.US 812 00/29799, No 19:;,9, R Clark, General Pc,11t1cal Report,

Octot,er 20. 1932, Reel 2
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Cr1apte1- I\/: Rodriguez vs. Ca 11 es: Wr10 Ran the Governrnent?

At;e l ardo Rodr 1guez rn it i ally agreed to be Genera 1 Ca 11 es·
interim
Pt·~P

P1~esident

with the fundamental mission to keep the

unified, provide political stability and peacefully hand off

the next presidency to tr1e cr1osen PNP candidate. In exchange
for loyalty to Calles until the next presidential election rn
1934, Pcdr i guez was granted adm rn i st rat ive control to proceed

v1..1itr1 the social and economic reconstruction of the country rn
tr1 e t wo ye ars a 11 ot ed to r1 i m. Because Pod r i guez d i d not r1 ave
r1is O\Nn po1itical base, this necessitated his relationship or
"partnersr11p" \11/ith Ca1les. Their common accord was to leave
the po 1it i cs to Ca 11 es an1j the adm in i strati on of the government
to Podr i 1~uez

i

In rea 1lty, tr·1ey were each involved in both

realms .
.At tr1e beginning of the Rodriguez presidency, Cal Jes was
preoccup i e1j w lth family and health concerns. His wife d1 ed rn
r~ ov

ern be r 19 3 2 and ca 11 es, h i s o\/\/ n he a l th not good, cont i nu ed

to r-esicJe almost continuously rn Cuernavaca2 Calles felt r1e
1Nas leaving the Go\;ernment in safe, capable hands with
Rodriguez.:'.

As a result, Rodriguez had the opportunity to

take tr1e control of his administration into his own hands as
1,.John V/F Du1les, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 (Austm University of Texas Press, 1961), p 573.
2~~AUS 81 2 00/29326, No. 2293, General Poli ti cal Report, February
16, 1933, Reel 2

3~~AUS 81200/29805, Robert E. Cummings, Captain, Infantry, .Acting
r~1111tary

Attacr1e, Sept 17, 1932. Reel 2.
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\Nell as become more involved with political issues as his
term in off ice proceeded

His first objective vvas to isolate

both Calles and the military, the power brokers of the 1920s,
from day to day contro 1 of his government. Gradually he
disarmed Ca 11 es with successful countertact i cs and p 1aced
r1imself fully in tr1e leadership role.
President Rodr\guez's first problem was the reporting
i s·::ue. Podr i guez r1ad d 1f f i culty be mg f u 11 y respected because
General Calles was generally referred to as tr1e "Jefe f'·1a:x.imo

ae

lc. Revoluci6n" beginning w1tr1 tr1e Rubio administration.

Tl11s title, wr1ich was not very r1elpful to the prestige of the
presi1jency, was attributed to Luis L. Leon, tr1e El lv3c1onal
manager. .A.ct iv it i es seemed to confirm the tit 1e. The press
reported important commissions first ca 11 rng on the " ..)ef e
1·1a:x:irno" and peri-1aps tr1en calling on the President. The
Cat)inet in May 1931, adopted a resolution prohibiting members
of the Administration from consulting with Cal.les unless so
ordered by the President Hovvever, there \A/as a lack of
comp 1i ance with any such agreement during the Rubio
adrnmistr·ation . . . )
A.s soon as Rodr\guez took off ice he sent around a

c i rcu 1a1~

to his cabinet members in an attempt to cha 11 enge the

report mg issue. He wanted to deve 1op a new i rnage of the
Presidency. In dire ct contrast to the system of 'acuerdos
4

'"Johr1 \/l.F. Dulles, 'r'esterdav in Mexico. A Cr1ronicle of the Revolution
Ur1 i v er s i t y of Te x as Pr es s, 19 6 1 ) , p 5 2 1- 2 2

1 9 19- 19 3 6 ( Aust rn
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colectivos' which had been established by Ortiz Rubio,
Pre·; 1dent Rodriquez made it c 1ear that he d1 d not consider his
Cabinet to be a group of persons collectively responsible for
tr1e Adrn in i strati on. Tr·1e Chief Executive, said Rodriguez, was
the bearer of the executive power. In a circular of November
1932, he pointed out to his ministers, attorneys general and
department heads that "the po 1itica1 Constitution of February
5, 191 7, frankly es tab 11 sr1es the president i a 1 reg1 me of the
i]overnment" and he vvent on to show that the President is
con st itut 10na 1ly author1 zed "to name and free 1y remove r1 is
ministers," and is "irnplicitly responsible for each and all of
the act·:; which the different dependenc1es of the executive
power deve1op." General Rodriguez told r1is subordinates that
a 11 important matters shou 1d first be submitted to his
consideration, so that "it sha 11 be the President who di rec ts
and or1 ent s tr1e po 11 cy of the government in the different
realms of pub1ic administration which constitutiona1ly are
'ncumbent on him." He conc1uded his circu1ar with these
·vvcirds: "P1ease acknowled 1~e receipt"'=· This was his first
c r1 a 11 en g e to the 1eg it i mac y of the J e f e Max i rn o and the
1

1ax1mato.

:;. I t' 1d , p 5 4 7
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Problems With Pani

In spite of such directives, problems remained. There
\Nere ongoing problems of insubordination with Alberto Pani,
the

1~1inister

of Finance due to both professional differences of

opmion and Pani's consu1tmg with Calles inspite of
PocJr1guez's orders. lnltia11y, Podriguez supported Pani. First
r1e stepped into a dispute between the Comptro 11 er Genera 1ship
Rafael A.guirre 1·1anJarrez an1j Pani. In claiming duplication of
vvork and abo 1i sh i n1j the Comptro 11 er Generalship, the functions
cf U-·1e Comptr'C:;, 11 ersr1 i p were absorbe,j by tr1e Pub 1i c Hae i enda. e.
A. b 111 \Nas presented to Congress by President Rodrf guez and
Pan 1

in

October 1932 an,j became effective January 1 1933.

7

Ne;.:t, a conflict between Education Minister Narciso Basso ls
::rnci Pani over tr1e control of the construction of the Palacio de
Be 11 as Art es became into 1erab le in A.ugust 1933. Rodriguez
a·~a rn

ru 1e·j in favor of Pan i. E
However, st-iort 1y thereafter, Rod1-1 guez and Pan i c 1ashed

over funciamental differences in opinion over economic pol icy.
Wr1ile Podriguez was getting tr1e Labor Law amended to include

t I t) id , p 5 48
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?Jol-ir-1 w.F Dulles, Yester-dav rn 1·1exico A G1ror11c le of trie Revolution
919-1936 (Austrn Ur11vers1ty of Texas Press, 1961 ), p. 552 He ordered
tr1at tr1e Pa lac 10 would be turned over to the Education r1inistry only after the
'.::rx1Strur:t1on vvo1-k was completed. Basso ls tr1reatened to r-esign t ut instead ag1-eed
tc. go on an official trip to trie United States to purcr1ase in,justrial scriool
macr11nery, returning for tr1e opening of Congress on September 1, 1933
1

1
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minimum wages on Septmember 12, 1933, Pani in an informa1
vis.it to Ca11es discussed his be1ief that Rodr1guez's pet
project and persona1 campaign for minimum wages was not the
so1ut1on for the masses. He fe1t that increasing the workers'
purchasing power, as distinct from nomina1 sa1aries, ·was the
answer.9 Wr1en President Rodr1guez returned to Mexico City on
September 27 from a meeting with Ca1 les, he instructed his
private secretary Li c. Ga xi o1a, without consu1t i ng Ca 11 es, to
obtain the resignation of the Finance Minister at once. Calles
haij te1ephoned from Tehuacan stopping pub1 ication of news in
the pr·ess w ltr1 a view to reconc i 1i at ion. President Ro jr1 guez
1

was reputeij to have said that he wou1d to1erate no
interference in this matter and that he was "no Ortiz Rubio." 1o
Ca 11 es c 1aimed he had not knovvn about the resignation
request when Rodr1guez 1eft their meeting, and that the step
haij been a surprise to him. Ca 11 es agreed to accept the Finance
Mini st er position until the Pres l dent named a permanent
1·1in1ster on .January 1, 1934. Rodr1guez, rea1izing the enormous
break r1e had made \<\!1th Ca 11 es, inv lted Ca 11 es to rep 1ace Pan i
rn a cone i 11 atory rnove.

i~onethe 1ess,

Rodr1 guez had prevai 1ed

over Calles. The message was that if Calles wanted to run the
Puti1ic Hacienda, he wou1d need to do so as Minister. Not
'Ni

11 i ng to serve as Rodriguez's cabinet mini st er, Ca 11 es agreed

91t id' p 554
1 oi·j,AUS 812.00/29926, ,J Daniels, September 29, 1933, Reel 2
1
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to be only a temporary replacement. Rodriguez was able to
place a man of r1is ovvn choosing in the position.
President Rodriguez had also been displeased witr1
cr1 tic ism by Pan i's son wr10 had stated that the President was
not governing the country but triat Calles was the real ruler.11
Rodriguez exp 1a med the resignation resu 1ted because it was
not right for Pani to continue occupying a post of confidence
clo'.:.e to the President \Nhen his son was criticizing the
Pres i ijent 's soc i a 1 manners and affirming that the Finance
rv1in1ster did not recognize the authority of the President nor
r·esolve with him the business of his office.12
Nonetheless, Foreign .Affairs Minister Puig told U.S
.Ambassador Josephus Danie 1s tr1at the rea 1 reason why Pan i
vvas asked to resign was tr1at his views on economic and fiscal
policies were 1j1ametrica11y opposite to those of President
Rodr1 quez. 13 Frnance Ministry profess i ona 1s 11 ke Pan1 were
eijucated in Europe. They were guided by the laws of economy,
finance and e\'.Change rates. The po 1i c1 es of the Mexican
Presidents in the 1930s, whether conservative or radical,
1Nere ba=.ed rncreas i ng ly on non-po 1itica1 patterns of capita 1i st
financing and budgeting.14

1 l~~AUS 812 00/29927,

'-J. Daniels, September 29, 1933, Reel 2.
12Jol-ir1 'v'v' F Dulles, Yesterday in Me:".ico A G1ronicle of tr1e Revolution
1919-1 936 CA.us t rn University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 554
l 3NAUS 812.00/29927, J. Daniels, September 29, 1933, Reel 2
1"1F1-e·j1-icr1 Scr1uler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt Me.x_1can
Foreign Pol icy in the Age of Lazaro Cardenas ( l 934-40)(University of New
f'1ex1co Press, 1998)
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Other Prob l er(ls of Authority

AJ triougr1 tr1e agr·eement between Ca 11 es and Rodriguez
vva2. to leave politics to Calles and the administration of the
government to Rodriguez, a clear cut division of power was
difficult if not impossible to adhere to as long as the
strongrnan's collaborators continued to consult witr1 him. A.
·y'ear after r1is initial circular, Rodriguez again asked his
Cabinet to abstain from consulting Calles. On September 27,
a!ong vvitr1 the Pani resignation, General Rodriguez sent a
strong directive to his colleagues which had already been
sr1own to Cali es. Rodriguez observed that ministers of state
and department heads frequent 1y consulted Ca 11 es about
matter~.

related to the adrn in i strati on of the goverment 's

e><ecut i ve tiranch. The members of his government should
abstain from calling on Calles.

Rod1~1guez

said r1e would not

retain an appointee who felt the President was rncapable of
directing tr-'1e put,il1c administration. If any colleague wanted to
knovv the opinion of Calles about administrative questions, he
cou 1d 1earr, of it trwough tr·1e President 1s
It was a continuous struggle. Following this directive,
President Rodriguez had problems of dis l oya 1ty fr·om r1 is
Secretary of Education, Li c. Narciso Ba2.so ls. In pursuing the
PNR socialist educational reform, Bassols was attacked in the

15'-John \/IF. Dulle::., Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolutior1
1919-1936 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 555
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press for being a radical. These attacks became so strong U-1at
rn Decernber 1933 the Presi(jent issued a statement which
1jef ended the Secretary and expressed his support for
Bassols.1 c On 11ay 9, 1934 urnverslty agitation rnade it
necessary to shift Basso ls to another but higher ranking post,
U-1at of 1'1i n1 s ter of Gobernac i 6n. However, sl1ort l y thereafter,
Ba~. sols

consu 1ted w i tr1 Ca 11 es and Cardenas without

perrn i ss ion from Rodriguez and tr1en at a Cabinet meeting w i tr1
Pcdrl~1uez

urge(j r1irn to take rnore drastic measures against the

Cr1urct-1. Rodriguez ref used and Basso ls resigned, forced out by
Podr·1,~uez

for r11s disloyalty.11 Bassols had also acted

a 1~ainst

tr1e inte1-ests of President Rodriguez wr1en he proposed tr1e
clo·srng cf tr1e recently inaugurated, Casino de la Selva en
Cuffnavaca and tr1e For·e i gn Club

in

the cap lta 1. 1E·

In a letter of E:)l:-Pres i dent Ro1jri guez wr1 tten late rn
r·/1arc1-1 1936, Rodriguez tried to Justify Calles' role in
a1Jrn1n1strat1\/e affairs:
"Ca 11 es po rnte1J out to rne that he intervened on 1y in
those matters vvt1ere he was consulted, 'vVhich ·was
perfectly true. Never when I was at the head of the
government did he make any hint that I could interpret
as the slightest indication that such and such a thing
t'e done. It was the politicians and one or another of
16~J.A.US 812 00/29826, ~40 2293, General Political Report, February
16, 1934. Reel 2
17~Jor1n '0/F Dulles, Yesterdav in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1 936 (Au::.t in University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p. 560-61
L'>Lorenzo Meyer, H1storia De La Revoluci6n Me.xicana 1928-1934 Vol
12. Los lnicios Dt- La lnstitucionalizacion La Pol1tica Del Maximato (Mexico City
El Coleg10 De Mexico, 1978), p 178
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rny collaborators who grovellingly requested his
orders and are respons i b 1e for the present situation of
the General . . To Leon, General Calles owes the title
of " Max i rn o " . . . I n rn y op rn i on it i s Le 6n w r1 o t-1 as
ind i sputab 1y hurt the pub 1i c character of Ca 11 es the
rnost."19
Podri guez b 1arned Ca 11 es' co 11 aborators for tr1e i r
d i s 1oya lt y t c r·1 irn r atr1 er t ha n ca 11 es h i rn s e lf. Pod rig uez
admittedly consulted Ca 11 es frequently, and although Ca bi net
members. 'vvere not suppose to cal 1 on Calles, he could ca11 on
tr1er-i-1. In 0U-1er words, no matter what demands Rodriguez
placed on his Cabinet rnembers, Calles remained a powerful
autr1ority ber1ind tr1e presidency. However, Rodriguez's
irnportant countertact i c was to increasingly rep 1ace Ca 11 es'
collaborators in his a1jministration as they challenged his
po 11 c i es

Pan 1 and Basso ls became prominent victims of this

effort.
Tr1e issue vvas e><acerbated because f ore1gn countries
cont 1n1_Je1J to see Ca 11 es as the a 11 powerful unofficial 1eader of
f"1e::< 1co. U. S. A.mbassador Josephus Danie 1s came to Mexico

·vv i tl1 the vv 1desprea1j idea that Ca 11 es was the "Iron Man" of
Me:x:1co. For e:x:ample, in Marcr1 1934 Rodriguez was informed of
a 1unch to be given in honor of Josephus Danie 1s at the home of
Calles in Cuernavaca. Foreign Minister Puig had already invited
sorne foreign ambassadors and ministers and Ambassador
Dan1e1s vvas to present Calles with a letter from President
q'-John VIF. Dulles, Yesterdav in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 (Aust in. University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 673
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Roosevelt congratul at mg him on the "peace and growing
pro·sperity of Me:xico." .After consulting \Nith the President,
Gaxiola to1ij

Fo1~eign

autr1orize him to

l'1inister Puig t1-1at Rodr\guez refused to

i~.sue

the invitation because Calles "was

simply a private citizen." Gener·al Rodriguez then ordered Dr.
Puig to \Nithdraw the invitations and in the presence of Martes
Gcimez and Gaxiola, tr1e President pr1oned Calles to let riim
knovv tr1at if the party took place and if Roosevelt's letter was
put:i1ciy an1j offically delivered to Calles, he vvould fire Puig
an cJ any of h i s assoc i ates vv ho attended the fun ct i on. He a1so
\Noula publiciy condemn the attitude of Calle~. and Puig, for he

cou 1d not permit his authority to be broken. Ca 11 es agreed to
ca nee i tr1e 1unch claim mg i 11 ness and received Roosevelt's
1etter pr 1vate1 y. Ca 11 es responded that he was not

in

any

concrete government post, but r11s contribution had been
1jeve I ope1j only a 1ong I mes of genera 1 cooperation, "i nsp i re1j by
my past re=.ponsibilities, m/ convictions and political
commitments, my respect and affection for President
Rc;dr 1gue z, and my s rncere esteem for tr1e e:x:emp I ary
1~overr1ment

work wr1icr1 r1e is developing ... " :=:o

In otr1er words,

Ca 11 e·:; ga\1e rn comp 1ete I y to Rodriguez's demands.
Some montr1s later Ambassador Daniels, after an
interview· with General Calles, was quoted in El National as
calling r11m "tr1e Strong Man of 1"1exico." .Again, President
Ro1jr \guez wrote to tr1e Ambassador, exp 1ai ni ng tr1at
:2C11 r.,_.L
· j , p. cc:g
~>~'.
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a1jmin1strative matters were not in the hands of Calles and
tr1at

"\Ne

are living uncler a well-organized political regime in

vvh i c1-1 a 11 (jemocrat i c 1nst itut ions function norm a 1ly." .After
(JescritJing these two incidents Mr. Daniels added that Dr. Puig
and General Ca 11 es "knevv that the man in Chapul tepee Cast 1e
was the President of Mexico. "21

Controlling the Military

.A.notr1er powerful faction that required Rodriguez's
a\jrr1in1strative control was the military. One of former
Pres11Jent

Rubio·~,

greatest problems had been his fa1 lure to

contro1 tr1e military generals vvithin his cabinet which led to
tr1 e cab i net er 1s i s and r1 i s event u a l down fa 11. Rod r l gu e z
addres·3ed tr11s

th1~eat

from tr1e outset, almost completely

1jivorc 1n1~ the Cabinet from the military department Only two
cf tr1e ten members of the new Cabinet were from the military.
One of triem \A.las Secretary of War Pablo Quiroga and the otr1er,
Gener·al Miguel r·1 ..Acosta, was in charge of communications. 22
Rodriguez also reorganized his personnel and military
·::.taff. Gaxiola announced that the Executive Off ices would
issue no letters of recornrnendat ion for persons desiring
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emp 1oyment 1n the various departments of government,
permitting each cabinet minister and cr1ief to choos.e his own
collaborators. Likewise, Rodriguez's office would handle only
1ts

own business. .A.l l other matters wou 1d be ref erred to the

appropriate brancr1es of the government. This was interpreted
to mean that the President desired that r1 is military staff
would r·efr·ain from intervening in politics.23

His Chief of

Staff, General .Juan Azcarate, told a mernber of the U.S
Emtia:ssy Staff that it was the President's desire that his
mi 1ltary staff conf me itself to mi 1i tary matters and the
General ha1j (jismissed all civilian staff in the military and
replaced triem w1tr1 officers and soldiers.:24

By .January 19 3 3, tr1 e u. s. r··1 i l i ta ry Atta c r1

e to Mexico

21ssessed tr1e m1l1tary situation under· President Rodriguez as
po5.itive

Former~

threats to the country's political stability

\.Vere under control. General .Amaro had very little political
influence, yet still had quite a following in the .Army because
of h 1s exce 11 ent v11ork as Secretary of War and now Di rector of
r~ i 1itary

Education. He rernai ned ambitious but under contro 1.

13enera1 Cedillo, seemed to have lost a great deal of his
follovving, had very little influence, and in army circles it was
ccw1si.jere·j tr1at r1e r1ad ver>1 little ability as we1i.2:.
:2:Z~JAUS 812 00/29792, r~o 1851, R Clark, September 9, 1932, Reel
~,

2 4 ~jAUSf,1200/29799, ~Jc, 1959. R Clark, General Political Report,
October 20, 1932, Reel 2.
:?S~jAU'.:· 812 00/29828, Robert E Curnrnir1gs, Acting Mil itar~y .:,ttacr1e,
C·-2 Report, ,Jan 1933, Reel 2
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Governors of more "radical States" like

Vet~acruz

realized that Rodriguez was determined that certain state
mi i itary should not control things as they had in some
ms tances under Pres l dent Rubio.

Rodrf guez used forceful

n1easures to disarm the agrarians in the State of Veracruz and
divide the patrimonial ej idos witr1 the assistance of army
officers, in tr1e face of opposition by the agrarians. Tr1is way

ttw regional caudi 11 o .Alberto Tejeda cou 1d not use the armed
agrar1 ans 1jurrng the com rng presidential campaign. 26
Rodr 1guez continued to control the nat i ona 1 military
H1rou(~hout

r1 is tenure. On

t~ovember

16, 1933, he sent a bi 11 to

trie Chamber of Deputies with the purpose of enf ore i ng morale
rn the rank and file of the Mexican Army. Tr1ose who
participated in a rebellion and who had been discharged could
ne\ier enter that service again. Officers e 1ected to public
off 1ce cou 1d aut om at i cal ly return to tr1e i r posts in the army at
any t1me after tr1e termination of their tenure in office. This
nevv m 11 itary 1eg isl at ion was considered of great importance
in further di'.:,ciplrnrng and professionalizing the Mexican
army.:;

26 Ibid.

2 7 ~JAU5 812 00/::'9951, ~Jo. 807, J. Daniels, November 17, 1933, Reel
"'7
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Cl1apter V: Politi cs Behind The SD< Year Pl an: From Maxi ma to
to Cardenismo

President Rod r lg uez was very much in v o1v ed i n U-1 e r is e
of Carden1smo to power even though he had promised Ca11es
that he wou1d 1eave traditiona1 po1itica1 concerns to him.
From tr1at vantage point, tr1e Rodriguez administration
ernbo1jied not the third puppet of the Maximato, but
Podr1gu1zmo and its role rn the peacefu1 transition of power
from tl1e l'1aximato to Cardenismo. The povver struggle p1ayed
1t·=·e1f out tier·1 ind tr1e scenes during the f ormu 1at ion of tr1e
1·/1 e;< 1c an

s i x Ye ar

P1ar: i n 19 3 3.

A.s the Presidential election came to the forefront,
Po,jr'.1~ue2

off1c1a1ly announced in Apri1 1933 that r1is

governrnent vvould keep outside of po1itics and remain neutral,
triat he hacJ reso1ved to administer the nation's business and
leave tr1e "political nuisance" in Calles' hands. However, in
or1jer to survive politically he had to remain deeply involved in
all G·Ol1t1cal maneuvering.
Portes Gi i believed Calles would support Perez Trevir10
or Carlos Riva Palacio for the presidency in 1934. Gil
supported Cardenas and s i nee 1931 r1ad been gathering support
from various reg i ona 1 1eaders--overa11 agrarians-- to bu i 1d a
Cardenas rnovernent so strong tr1at it wou1d be irnpossitJ1e for

50

Calles to get Trevir10 01· Palacio elected.1 Rodriguez supported
1~11

's plan. Cardenas alone was r1olding a post in tr1e Rodriguez

Cabinet of the four generals who had resigned from Rubia's
Cab met. Rodriguez's f avorab 1e op rn ion of Cardenas added
important momentum to tr1e push for a Cardenas candidacy.
President Rodri(Juez asked Calles wr1etr1er it would be
acJ v i s ab 1e f or card en as to res i gn r1 i s War l'1 i n i st ry post and
de(j1cate 1-11mself to the campaign and Calles agr·eed.

2

Tr1e

o i s so 1ut i on of tri e l'1 ax i m at o ri ad begun and Rod r· i guez was on
board.

The Mexican Six Year Plan

The policies established in the Six Year Plan of Mexico
reflect this transitional period of power from Calles to
Cardenas. Tr1e Plan was credited to Calles, who wanted to
contro 1 tr·1e Cardenas presidency w i tr1 it. 3 However, Ca 11 es on 1y
i nU odu c ed t 1·1 e i de a. I t was ac tu a 11 y form u l ate d by Rod r· i guez,
Cardenas an(j a number of less conservative e 1ements w itriin
trie Party . .A.s a result, it represented a compromise between

1Lorenzo Meyer, Historia De La Pevolucion Mexicana 1928-1934 Vol.
12 Los lnicios De La lnstitucional1zac1on La Politica Del Maximato (Mexico City
El Colegio De Mexico, 1978), p 274
2John Vl.FDulles, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 573.

3Tzvi fvledrn, El r1rn1mato Presidenc1al Historia Pol1tica Del f'1ax1mato,
1928-1935 (f'1e:x1co City Ed1ciones Era, 1972), p 137.
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opposing ideologies that worked within the Party, since the
Pt,~R,

vv i th its control of the public treasury and the army, was

the only instrument that could carry it out.
From outside Mexico City Calles was interviewed in June
and introduced tr1e need for this plan publicly. "I am of the
opinion that the ti me has come for the formation of a detailed
p1an of action to cover the six years of the next presidential
term, a program which should be based on statistics,
estimates, and e.xperience." He felt that the Revolution's
economic and social reconstructive proposals had faile(j due to
a complete 1ack of coordination and to the failure of high
p 1ace1j persons to wor·k for tr1e undertaking. 4
Fo11Cl'Wing Calles announcement to the public about the
formation of a plan, Rodriguez provided a written statement to
the press on July 18 in which r1e named members of the
Technical Commission who would collaborate with the Party's
Commission on the Program: Alberto Pani, Secretary of
Treasury; Primo Vi 11 a Mi che 1, Secretary of National Econom·y;
f'1i1Jue l Acosta, Secretary of Commerce; Narciso Basso ls,
Se er et ary of Educ at i on; and Juan de Di o s Bo j 6 r q u e z, Ch i e f of
the Department of Labor.
"Tr1e ~~ational Revolutionary Party has officially
communicated to me on June 12 the formation of the
Commission on the Program of Government for the

4John \tlF Du1les, Yesterday in Mexico

A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1961), p 551
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Presidential term of 1934-40. The Secretaries of State
and trie Criiefs of Departrnent are considered to belong as
technical advisors, in order that triey may contribute
their share of experience to the formulation of tr1e
p1~ograrn." ::.
In tr1e same press release Rodriguez identified trie four
essent i a 1 prob 1ems of the country:
1. Provide public education to the masses to reduce illiteracy.
2. The agrarian problem required not only redistribution of
1an(j, but in order to assure the organization of agriculturists,
the adequate deve 1oprnent of the soi 1, and the deve 1opment of
agr1 cu ltura 1 tee hn i que, government must create corresponding
institutions of credit, and construction of irrigation works.
3. Labor ref or·m needed to put into practice .A.rt i c 1e 123 of the
Constitution, but a 1so raise the standard of 1iv i ng and
harmonize interests of lat)or and capital to the benefit of the
nat 1onal economy .

.4 Internal communications \A/ere needed for transportation of
goods to consumption centers and to be assured of a market,
but also a network of commun1cat1ons was needed to increase
so 1i darity and conso 11 date the Mexican nation.
As governor of BaJ a California, Rodriguez's primary
focus had been on so 1ut ions to these four prob 1ems. He had
greatly expanded access to public education in the Northern
District. Rodriguez riad initiated irrigation works and provicJed
funding opportunities in developing agriculture. Minimum \A/age
=·~.)Al
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had been a major reform issue and the development of a
netvvork of com mun i cation and transportation had been centra 1
to economic growth and 1inks betvveen the rest of Mexico and
Ca11fornia.
Rodriguez t)ecame very visib1e in tr1e press at tr1is point,
stating his opinions about what the Six Year P1an sr1ou1d
contain. His v1e\NS were more moderate than the radica1
agrarian e1ement within tr1e PNR Rodriguez referred to the
rad1ca1 elements and agrar1stas within the Part); and his
resistance to their utopian idea1s:
"Since, in my opinion, the 1abors of that Commission
sr1ou 1d not depart from tr1e rea 1it i es of Me xi can 1if e nor
express Utopian purposes which wou1d convert the
program into a e:xpression of good intentions, I deem it
e:x:ped i ent to make knovvn my persona 1 viewpoint with
respect to the fundamenta1 point that the program shou1d
inc 1ude the economic and f inane i a 1 capacity of the
Federa1 Government, in determining what revenues the
Con st i tut i ona 1 Government w i 11 have avai 1ab1 e during the
coming term, taking into account the nature of taxes and
the paying capacity of the constituents. Thus the
Minister of Finance must be a direct consu1tant."

In other words, reform cou1d not take p1ace outside of fisca1
respons i bi 1i ty. .As a US inf 1uenced capita 1i st, Rodriguez's
social reform was based in economic reality not post-

revo i ut 1onary idea 1s.
Rodriguez's ideas for the Six Year Plan a1so dlff ered
from Ca11es' in a number of ways. First,

Rodr~iguez

promoted
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his pet project, minimum wage, which Calles seemed
1ntere5ted in postponing. Calles had suggested an increase of
the n1inimum wage but only after the profits were made thus
not "to strangle at its birth an undertaking by demanding
tlef ore an assured prosperity, unsustainable minimum
salaries." c Ro,jriguez saw minimum wage not only as a way of
obtaining labor support, but also as a means of stimulating
1rHJu·strial grovvth desired by Mexican capital. Second, Cal1es
supported private capitalist agriculture in the form of large
cooperatives and land sufficient to "stimulate men of
ambition." He felt that small properties seldom lent
ttwmse 1ves to modern agri cultural techniques and large profit.
Rod r i gue z a l so supported pr i vat e l and owners r1 i p but i n t t-1 e
form of sma 11 property' ownersh 1p

\A/ itr1 in

the protection of tr1e

communal e1ido setting. At the same time, r1is agricultural
model repre5.ented a compromise with the more radical
391-aristas like Cardenas wr10 emphasized communal tenure as
the key mst1tut1onal means to regenerate the agrarian
economy. Tr1ird, Calles strongly sided with "socialistic"
e1Jucat1on as tr1e vehicle to educate tr1e masses, vvhile
Ro1Jri guez just as strongly promoted scientific lay education
like that found in the U.S.
Fourth, and most volatile to his relationship with Calles,
\N as

a central issue Rodriguez presented to the 1·1e:x: i can press

vv r1 i c r1 had not been men t i one d earl i er by ca 11 es:
t·~LA.IJS 812.00/29878, Excels.1or, ,.June 15, 1933, Reel '.?.
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".A.ttention rnust t)e given, in rny opinion, to the fomenting
of industries relating to ravv materials and to the
utilization of the natural resources of the country.
Especially mining is one of our sources of wealth which
has not attained the development or the technical
advance it should r1ave, working also, toward the
coordrnation of all the factors contributing to the
production of Me:xico, in order duly to organize the
national economy. "7
E·J er1

tr1ou 1~ r1

Pr es i dent Rod r i gu ez s e 1do m spoke to tr1 e

press, Just a fevv days later, another article in the Excelsior
quote1J him regarding this topic of the extractive industries:
"I dvvelt especially upon the necessity of seeking the
1Jevelopment of the extractive industries and the
util1zat1on of the natural resources of the country
The State must f ornent by every means to develop the
mining industry and the improvement of its technical
methods. \t./e rnust stu1jy the possibility of creating
nat i ona 1 mi nera 1 reserves to prevent tr1e unrestricted
exploitation by private individuals, to the immediate
pre Judice of the econorn i c sys tern of the country ... I
cons11jer of vital importance the solution of the problems
vvhich I have set forth vvith respect to the mining
industry of Mexico. "E

In August, Rodriguez again stated to the press tr1at tr1e
exploitation of extractive industries rnust be carried on by
nat i ona 1 enterpr 1se and capita 1. The President then ref erred to
tr1e nat i ona 1i zat ion of e 1ectri cal energy, stating that a pl an for

7~~.A.US 8 12.00/29389, ~.Jo 385, Excelsior, July 19, 1933, Peel 2
EN.AUS C.12.00/'.?9C.9S·, l·Jo 397, E\C2ls1c1r, .July 25, 1933, Peel 2
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the nat i ona 1i zat ion of a 11 free resources of e1ectri ca 1 energy
·vvas novv t ef ore tr1e Mex1can Senate for approval.9
1

President Rodrl guez sided on this issue with Cardenas
and the more nat1ona11st1c and radica1 elements within the
revo 1ut i onary f am i 1y who demanded the nat i ona 1i zat ion of the
subsoil and the amplification of the national petroleum
reserves to break the foreign company monopo 1y. In the wake
of the \'lorl\j Depression, they wanted the Mexican State to be
tr1e agent to promote antj control al 1 the vital processes of the
country, es.pee 1a1 ly the economy and not to simply be the
custoij i ans of the order and rntegri ty of the territory. 1o
Fo 11 ow rng Rodriguez's statements to the press, Ca 11 es
returned to Mexico City on the morning of July 30, 1933 after a
four montri atJsence. Apparent1y Rodriguez's focus on the
e><tract ive industries had st i rre,j the waters. Upon his return,
ca11es made a speech which \A/as interpreted by the Mexico City
press as making it plain that Mexico would cooperate with the
un1ted States in economic matters and spoke briefly of the
economic p1an of President Rodriguez. 11

'?~~AUS 812.00/29906, Excelsior, August 9, 1933, Reel 2
1Cto1-enzo Meyer, His tor ia De La Revo luc i6n Mexican a 1928- 1934Vo1
1 2 Los lnic10s De La lnstitucior1alizacion La Politica Del Ma.x:1mato (Mexico City
E1 Co legio De f"1ex i co, 1978:" p 234
11 ~~A.US 812 00/29897, No 426, A.ugust 1, 1933, Reel 2
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Conflict and Compromise

In Octot)er, .A.merican Consul Smale reported the
possibility of a political disturbance brewing at the summer
home of General Calles

The basis of the disturbance was

attributed to Cardenas an(j like minded officials of the Pt~R
1ivantinq to free themselves from what they termed a virtual
dictatorship t)y Ca 11 es.. This sub Ject brought about a heated
altercation between Generals Calles an(j Cardenas during tr1e
vi·31t of the latter to Calles summer home. In the cas;e of any
serious de·3ertions from the ranks of high Calles adherents,
Smale felt that Rodriguez might Jorn in. Althougr1 Rodriguez
11ad been a staunch friend and supporter of General Ca 11 es, he
mlgr:t not oppo·3e efforts to bring about Calles retirement if
opposition to such a movement should threaten his private
bus mess i nteres.ts. He had continuously expressed a desire to
retire from public life and devote himself to his industrial
enterprises. 12 Wr1en he returneCJ to Baja California r1e would
nee1J Cardenas's support to maintain his local hegemony and
protect his national economic interests.
Shortly tr1ereaf ter, on October 7, the Excels/or published
an article in1Jicating a visit had been made by President
Rodriguez and his Cabinet to Ca 11 es at Tehuacan to confer with
Ca 11 es regard rng the Six Year Pl an. A.n agreement was reached
to create an "I ntersecretari al Committee" and that General
1:2t\JAUS 812 00/29937, Smale,

October 1933, Reel 2.
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Miguel M..Acosta, Minister of Communications, was appointed
p1~esidng officer of this new committee. Its functions \Nere to

gather a 11 data that has been compiled by the various
ministries and have it incorporated in a general report whicr1
was to be submitted to the President for· r1is approval.

13

.A.pparent 1y, Ca 11 es thought with the implementation of this
Committee, r1e r1ad reined in Rodrf guez and Cardenas and
involved him=,e1f more directly in the formulation of the Six
Year Plan.
The presentation of tr1e six Year Pl an created a heated
aet)ate from December 3 to December 16 during which the
"agrarians" introduced substantial modifications and
projected a political program more in accord with the desires
of Car•jenas and 1ess accept ab 1e in tr1e eyes of the originator
Ca11es. 14 It was approved by trie Pf\JR at the Convention of
Oueretaro in December 1933, the same Convention wr1ich
officially nominated Cardenas as its Presidential candidate.
Pres.ident Rodrlguez used the Si.x Year Plan as the
program of the last year of his administration, and he issued a
cir-cu 1ar· te 11 rng his co 11 aborators to be gu i de,j by it. 1::. Because
it vvas a plan created by compromise of varying ideologies,
·::.ome as.pects \Nere not procapital istic enough for his tastes.
1:.'N,L-,IJ5 812 00/29938, J. Daniels, October 12, 1933, Reel 2
1 4Lorenzo 11eyer, Historia De La Revo Jue ion Mexicana 1928-1934 Vol

12 Los lnic10s De La lnstitucionalizacion La Politica Del Maxirnato (Mexico City
El Colegio De Me>'.iCO, 1978), p 234
1SJohn V/.FOulles, Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1961), p 598

59
He supported agrarian reform but vvith private land 0\11.mership
and \vitr1in f1-=;ca1 rneans, and he backed labor reform but
tempered w i tr1 capita 1 interests. Rod1-1 guez was strongly
-=,upportive of developing national interests in the extractive
in1justri es. He promoted access to pub 1i c education but
11\/1

thout the socialist connotation.
Frorn the beginning of his presidency, President

Rorjriguez was atJle to move forward with social and economic
reconstruction in Me;x;:ico which had stalled during Rubia's
adm in 1st ration. Un 1i ke his predecessor, caught up in po 1itica1
upheaval and a Worl1j Depression, he had a stronger national
economy and greater control over his cabinet members.
HO\/v'ever, tr1e momentum of his reform efforts increased
rapi1jly 1.A1ith the implementation of the Six Year Plan in
.January 1934. RocJriguez la1a tr1e groundwork for Cardenas'
reforms, inter Ject i ng his own interpretation as he proceeded
an entire year before Cardenas took office. This increased
level of federal involvement in economic and social
reconstruction was due 1arge1 y to Rodriguez's expanding
personal power, distinct from both the Maximato and
Carden i smo.
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Chapter VI: Public Hae i enda and tl1e U.S. Foreign Debt

Tri e succ es s of Pres i dent Rod r i guez ' s ad m rn i st rat i on
depended largely on the success of the Ministry of Hacienda.
Rodriguez and r1is finance ministers, first Alberto Pani and
later Marte Gomez, establisr1ed national finance, prosperity
and confidence rn Mexico after the Rubio political crisis and
the continuing ·world economic depression. Since Mexico did
not partake to any great extent in World War I and post-war
eras of prosperity, it did not reach the same heights of
inflation and therefore, did not have to pass through the depths
of depression tr1at tr1e U.S. experienced.

1

However, tr1e Wor·ld

Depr-ession r1ad fo1-ced tr1e Rodriguez administration to create
mterna l markets and credit to f i 11 the void created by tr1e 1oss
of e:>< t er- na 1 1-r1 a1-k et s. In add i t i on, tr-1 e stab i 1i ty the

Rod,~ i gue

z

A.drnrn1strat1on brought to the country restored confidence in
tr1e government which translated into an improving economic
:.ituation. Change in political leadership from Rubio to
Ro(jri guez pro(juced a recovered nat i ona 1 opt i rn i srn. A new
president in power l lf ted the psycho log i ca 1 effects of the
Depression

2

1~Jl.,US 8 12 00/29904, Ramsde 11 S Lasher, March 28, 1933, Reel 3
::?"'1avie1- F. Ga:x:iola, El Presiderite Rodriguez ( 1932-34) (Mexico
fjJt·x1al Cultura, 1938), p 345.
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Pani Legacy

Finance Minister Alberto Pani must be credited with
laying tr1e financial groundwork for Podrfguez before r1e
assumed office. Vlr1i1e President Pubio was sti11 in office,
Pani implemented pol icy in 1932 which, along with improving
w·or 1d economic c oncJit ions, he 1ped reverse the negative
financial state of Mexico. The financial policies of the
government pr1 or- to .January 1932 and the 'Wor 1d economic
crisis ha1J been adverse to Me>< i co. These po 1i c i es inc 1uded the
1-ene\Nal of tr1e service of the external debt when Finance
f"1in1ster Luis de Oca \Nitr1 29.5 million pesos in the Treasury,
·s1(Jr·.e1J the Montes de Oca-Lamont .Agreement on July 31, 1930.
A ne'vv monetary law ca11 ed The Plan Ca 11es, issued on June 25,
1931,

Vv'3'=·

also tr1e work of fv1ontes de Oca. It demonetarized

iJ01cJ and limited silver coinage in an attempt to maintain the
peso at its legal parity and reestabl isr1 itself in the
international exchange after July 23, 1931 wr1en Mexico went
off tlw qold standard. Policies also included the imposition of
ne'vv and ex tr aorlj i nary taxes, and re duet ion in Federa 1
salaries. ::
Pani oppose(j these policies. From a diplomatic post in
Par1s, r1e wrote to President Rubio advising against the foreign
lJebt agreement and later wrote to Ca11es against the
3~u. us 81~.5111943, ~~o 609, J. Daniels, September 19, 1933, Reel

70
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1Jef lat i onary measures. Ca 11 es asked Rubio to replace Montes
de Oca w1H"1 Pan1 and r1e agreed.4

Pan1 arrived in Mexico

in

February 1932 and wrote the f o 11 o·w i ng i rnpress ion of the
economy as a result of tr1ese financial policies:
"The i 11 ness of the public treasury at the start of 1932,
I repeat, vvas incomparably more serious and difficult to
cure tr1an that of 1923 ... acute monetary deflation;
i nternat i ona l instability of our exchange and total
1j 1sappearance of credit; progressive paralysis of
indu:=.try and commerce; lowering of salaries and
increase in the number of unemployed; and as a
consequence of all this, a precipituous decline in the
federal income and an incr·easing deficit in Hacienda":.
Pan i went to work to reverse a 11 of r1 is predecessor's
deflationary policies. He initiated the Monetary Lavv of Marc1-1
9, 1932 which replaced The Plan Calles. Control of coinage
vv as taken from the Bank of

~1ex i co

and pl aced in the hands of

trw Finance l'1inistry. The Lavv· of April 12 amended the Law
Constituting the Bank of Me xi co, restricting its functions to
tr1at of a Central Institution. This amending act reduced the
Bank's capital from 100 million to 50 million pesos and at the
sarne time confirmed provisions established in the previous
year to the effect that tr1e Bank vvas no longer to carry on
dire ct bus mess w i tr1 the pub 1i c6

4 John WF Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico

A. Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 ( ,A,ustin University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 506.
::lbid,p515.
CltJld, p 515.
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In a(j1ji ti on, Pan i es tab 1i shed the Lavv of May 19th, whi cr1
·:;pec1f 1e1j private institutions as the sole organ for tr·1e
creat 1on of money and for the contra 1 of money and credit. It
constituted tr1e commercial banking system that required
branches of foreign banks or banking institutions to be
incorporated rnt o th 1s system, and defined the regulations
governing such branches. The Genera 1 Law of Institutions of
Creijit of .June 28 related the commercial banking system to
tr1e system for genera 1 contra 1 of credit in the Repub 1i c.
Frnaliy, tr1e Lavv Regulating Securities and Credit Operations
was decr-eed

Au,~ust

26, 1932.7

.As a result of these lavvs, the Bank of Mexico, novv a

Centra 1 Bank, operated as the so 1e bank of issue s i mi 1ar to the
U.S. Fe1jeral Reserve Systern. Restrictions were placed upon
tr,e operations of a11 foreign tiank tiranches requiring their
capital to t)e represented by Mexican money, credits payable

111

r·1e><1co, Me><ican real estate, ana Mexican secur1tes and all
triese plus their reserves and investments ·were to be held at
311

t1rnes in the Pepubl1c of

r-e·:;tr1cte1j

111

11e~·:ico.

Insurance companies VI/ere

the same manner to maintain certain investments

1n Me:x i can properties or

secur~it 1es.::.

Pef 1ect rng tJack on Pan i's accomp 1i shments, Li c. Eduardo
:Suarez e:x:plained in a speec1-1 on July 15, 1935: "Me:x:ico, in
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Ramsdell:::, Lasr1er, 1"1arc1-1 28 . 1933, Reel 3
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seeking to solve its crisis, turned first, in July, 1931, to
deflationary steps, but later, in March, 1932, it corrected this,
reversing the policy, and this, put into action with decision, is
tr·1e pr·rnc1pa1 cause of the good condition of the nation.9
However, once Rodriguez took office, he orcriestrated the
country's economic po 1i c i es and coordinated them with the
~1in1ster

of the Hacienda. A year after control of coinage had

been taken from tr1e Bank of Mexico and p 1aced in the hands of
Finance Minister Pani, the Monetary Reserve Decree of March
22, 1933, returned the control to the Bank once it r1ad been
restructured. Under provisions of these decrees, a monetary
re~.erve

of approximate 1y forty mi 11 ion pesos was es tab 11 shed,

the spec i a 1 authority for the coinage of silver pesos by the
flin1ster of Finance was repealed, and the Bank of Mexico again
t)ecarne the coordinator of red i scount operations and protector
of tr,e va 1ue of tr·1e nat i ona 1 currency i o The monetary stock
\Nas increased by the issue of bank notes by the Bank of Mexico
as a resu 1t of discount operations.ii

In addition to the

conso 1i cJat ion of the Bank of Mexico, the constitution of a
monetary reserve, the establ isr1rnent of a standard of
excr1ange, and the poss i bi 1i ty to mint corns, indirect measures

9 Javier F.Gaxiola, El Presidente Rodriguez ( 1932-34) (Mexico

E,j1tor1al Cultura, 193cn, p 517.
1
CNAUS 812.51/1923, No. 29, J. Daniels, May 4, 1933, Reel 70.
11
~~AUS 812.51/19~3, No.609, J. Daniels, September 19, 1933, Reel
70.

65
\Nere established to prohibit tr1e exportation of capital and to
r·eestat) 11 sr1 confidence.

1~

Ro1jriguez also initiated rnore sopr1isticated metr1ods on
\Nhich to base national financial policies. Although the
statutes of 1925 a1ready required an office of economic
research, the Bank of Mexico did not create one unti 1 after
Rodriguez took office in October 1932. It was similar to triose
rnarntained by rnost large banks in foreign centers. The off ice
studied econorn ic factors and activities to aid the bank in
ccordrnat ion and deve 1opment of commerce and industry, study
of balance of payments, and cost of living index.

13

Funding Me>< i co: Credit Institutions

One of trie central goals of trie Rodriguez government was
to replace trie externa1 credit exhausted by the Wor1d
Depression vv i tr1 the expansion of i nterna 1 credit in the nation.
Once the 1avvs were in p1ace to fac11itate the use of credit, a
new 1oan provided the capita 1. On November 1 1, 1932, short 1y
after Rodriguez took office, an agreement was signed tletween
tr1e Huasteca Company ($3 million), tr1e Agui1a Company ($3
million) and Hw Pierce Oil Company ($1 million) to advance to
1'.'.'Javier F Gaxiola, El Presidente Po,jr\guez ( 1932-34) (Mexico
Editorial Cultura. 1938), p 367
1
3~~.A_US 812.51I1893, Tr1ornas J. f'1aleady, America1·1 Vice Consul,
Se~·terr:t'er 30, 1932, Reel 69

66
the Mexican Government the sum of seven mi 11 ion do 11 ars, as a
tax advance loan, to tie repaid within forty months, from
December 1932 unt i 1 March 1936. The rate of interest vvas
4.787fo annually.14 Seven million dollars was tr1e disputed
amount of Mexican funds held by the International Bankers
Committee for purposes of paying the external debt. The o i 1
companies, in an attempt to mitigate the tension between the
Bankers and tr1e Mexican gover·nrnent, 1s were trying to bolster
their ovvn position during this period against renewed interest
1n nationalization of the petroleum industry in Me xi co.

The purpose of the 7 mi 11 ion do 11 ars was not to cover
bucjc:;ietary neecJs. First, it was to cover the deficit of 4.8
mi 111 on pesos from the 1931 budget carried over to 1932 and
r1alf a million pesos for cyclone victims. Second, rather than
recjuce salaries of public officials and employees and increase
taxes on commerce, industry and agriculture, it ·would meet
current expenses of the Public Administration and pay all civil
and military personnel which provided needed political
·::.tat!illty. The rest \Nould be used to expand availability of
credit. 1e.

14~1A.U~· 812.51I1897, ~,Jo. 4259, Robert E. Cummings, .Acting Military
Attache . ~Jovember 15, 1932, Ree 1 69.
1 SLorenzo Meyer, Historia De La Revoluci6n Me.xicana 1928-1934 Vol
12. Los ln1cios De La lnstituc10nalizac10n La Politica Del Maximato (Mexico City
El Colegio De ~1e;, ico, 1978), p 234
1 lNAUS 812 51/1 898, r~o. 2085, El Umversal, December 1932, Ree 1
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A.mong the proposed investments, first pl ace ·was given
to tr1e renevvel of activity among institutions of agricultural
c red i t. Pan i f l aw l es s 1y v o i c e d Rod r i gu e z econ om i c p ri 11 o sop r1 y
vvhen lw declared:
"In fact, in view of the fundamental importance wr1ich
this popu 1at ion has in Mexico as a productive force and
as a market for consumption, it is not possible to hope
that tr1ere may be a norrna 1 deve 1opment in industry, in
commerce, and in trw other economic acitivities for the
country, if the position of tr1e farmers is not bettered
ancJ tlieir- ·::;tandard of living considerably raised .... A.ny
Economic plan runs tr1e risk of being a disaster 1f it
forgets or ignores the essent i a 1 point of seeing that
agr~i cu ltura 1 production is encouraged, and of providing
trierefore the indispensable technical and financial
means. S rnce the resources of the State w i 11 a 1ways be
smal 1 in comparison vvitr1 the magnitude of the problem,
the sums can be usefully employed only if they are used
ma rational manner, as the initial support for the
norm a 1 1Jeve 1opment of the credit which agri cul tu re
nee,js." 11

Secor11j after agriculture, vvas the organization of the
Nat 1ona1 Urban

r·1ortga(~e

Bank (Banco Nae i ona 1 Hi potecari o

Urbano) to el1rnmate tr1e scarcity of long term credit with its
resultant usury, and put back into circulation the enormous
vvealtr1 tied up in mortgage investments. This permitted the
f 1nanc1 ng of the reestab 1i shment or organization of numerous

171b1d
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rndustri es, as we 11 as the rea 1i zat ion of urban programs such
2s

tr:e assurance of minimum sanitary con jit1ons 12
1

.Another f rnanci a1 institution estab 1i shed by the
government was the Nat 1ona1 Fi nanc i era, S.A, which though not
properly appreciated at the time, turned out to be the greatest
1ever for the i ndustri a1 deve 1opment of the country. I ts
function was the purcr1ase an j sa 1e of securit 1es.19 The
1

~~ational

Financiera, S.A operated in a buy-sel1 of stocks and

ton jS, exp 1orrn 1~ virgin territory rn l"lex i co.
1

20

Th1r1J, tr1e completion of the national credit system \Nas
t r1 e est ab l i sh men t of a Pop u1ar Bank ( Pe op 1e ·s Bank ) as t r1 e
gu:ae and techt11ca1 agent for the organization and financing of
cooperatives and small rn justr1es.21
1

Tr·1e Minister· of Finance

created a f una of t vvo mi 11 ion pesos for the organization and
(jeve 1opment of a Popular Credit. This a11 owed transactions of
bus 1ness. \/\/ i th members up to 2000 pesos vv i thout property as
security, up to 8000 pesos with property as security, up to
SOOC pesos with urban mortgages, and up to 3000 pesos under
av10 contracts. Membership was to include workmen, smal 1
rn justr·1 es or mercJ1ants, prof ess1 on al men an,j emp 1oyees.22
1

1 ·31 bid.

1".:lJorin W.F. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico. A 0-1ronicle of the Revolution
19 i 9-1936 (Austin. Un1vers1ty of Texas Press, 1961 ), p. 592.
20Javier F.Gax1ola, El Pr'esidente Rodr\guez ( 1932-34) (Mexico
Ed1tor1al Cultura, 1938), p 397.
2 l ~JAUS 812.S1/1 898, No. 2085, Ei Uni\/ers211, December 1932, Pee 1
69.
22i\JAU5812.51/1938, ~~o 564, J. Daniels, 5eptemt)er 8, 1933, Reel
7(!
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Among others, it was use1j in the case of the Electrical
Cooperatives.
The expansion of cre1j tt institutions was as f o 11 ows:23

lns.t1tut1ons; of Credits
.A.u>: 111 ary Ins.ti tut ions.
Tota1s

1931
65

1932
53
10

1933
68
21

1934
77
29

65

63

89

106

Fund ir: g 1·1 e~' 1c o: I ntern a1 Lo ans

Under Rodriguez, tr1e service of tr1e internal debt took
prececJence over the external det)t as another means of
stren1Jtl1en i ng i nterna 1 cre1jit
I~.,~1·c,::::
' _, ,J ~ '

'r· crr1Pr
I _, ,. )
I

I

In order to p1ace their f i nanc i a 1

t"'~
a·e·,~·ted
I I t: Rnr1ria1
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'
'
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I
' ' vu

o\1er
' 1nn
,, ~·

m1111on pesos to amortizing 1jomestic obligations. On
Decemt)er 31, 1932 a decree authorized the issuance of bonds
in tl-,e amount of 60 mi 11 ion pesos to be paid over 40 years for
tr1e re,jernption of the Internal Debt.24

f<nown as "Bon,js of the

Internal Put1l1c Debt of the United Mexican States," they \Nere
non-interest bearing but redeemable at the rate of 21 /2% per
annum over a period of forty years. The bonds vvere dated
..January 1, 1933. Tr1e first coupon was due December 31, 1933,

23"..lavier F.Ga:-:101a, El Pres1dente Roc:lr1guez ( 1932-34) (Mexico
Ed:tcria1 Cu1tura, 1938), p 399
·;'4~1'
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and holders of Mexican Internal bonds or bonds of the external
oebt in the 1922 and 1925 .A.greements vvere to be given the
option to exchange their securities into this nevv loan. Special
features included making thes.e bonds acceptable at par value
in

payment of Government properties offered for sa 1e at

auction. Tr1ey offered a way of con sol i dating most of the
\.iar1 ous credits r1e l d against the government in a \Nay to permit
amortization over a period of years without unduly ta>:ing tr1e
r·.Jat 1ona1 Treasury

2s

Prov1s1ons were also made for the two years overdue
interest announced on December 30, 1932 on the Public
.A.r;irar1 an Debt. This action 1eft pending only the coupons due
Decernber 31, 1932 which were being bid for in Mexico City at
9016 of their face value. The expectation of ear1)1 cash payment
V•iOU l c1

tiring thes.e i nterna 1 bonds up to date as to botr1 interest

pa'/mer:ts and sinking fund since about 44% of these 20-year
bein,js r·1a1j been retired dur rng the past five years
Tr1e

e:1 traor~dinary

26

Income Tax La\v of .July 31, 1931,

vvh1ch VI/as only in effect that one year, placed a ta:x of one to
t'vvo percent on tr1e gross receipts of commerce, industry and
agriculture. The taxes had been resented and a large portion
\Vere never pa 1d. In order to gain some monetary returns, a
circular 'v\1as issued by the Mexican Ministry of the Treasury on
A.pril 17, 1934 authorizin1;i tax offices to accept

in

pa'y'ment

2'::1 r·~.AUS e 12.00/29904, Ramsdel 1 S. Lasher, March 22>, 1933, Reel 3.
26Jbld
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bonds of the Agrarian Pu ti l i c Debt and bonds of the Internal
Pu ti 11 c Debt up to 70% of tr1e taxes due. 27
One of the most impressive examples of success ·with
internal funding Vv'ithout relying on IJS. capital was the
construction of the Mexico City-Nuevo Laredo highway, a must
for deve 1oping i nterna 1 markets and increasing the econom 1c
boom from the expanding tourist trade. A previous contract to
complete the highvvay had been cancelled because an .A.merican
contractor vvas di ssat i sf i ed with the method of payment. It
1,.va5 r1oped, througr1 the a1Nard of contract-=; to engineers,
foremen an1j masons who were formerly employed by this U.S.
cor:tractor, to accompi i5h 1.N1th the same amount of money
\A/hat 1Nou l d have been accomplished had the contract not been
cancel led The goal wa5; to finish this road first, then the road
from Veracruz-Mexico Ci ty-Guada l aJ ara to Puerta Va 11 art a,
an j trien tr1e Matamoros-Mazatlan
1

r1i 1~r1ways.2e

The government arrange1j to borrow 20 mi 11 ion pesos to
te u5e 1j

in

1934 and 1935 to complete the \A/Ork on the Laredo-

Me:x:ican City r11gl11Nay. This roa(j building loan was guaranteed
by tr1e Banco Nati ona 1 Hi potecar1 o Urbano y de Pub 1i cas,

establishe1j in1933, largely by government capital, to promote

27~~AUS 812 51I1 998, t'-lo 1376, R Henry Norweb, Charge d'affaires ad
rnterim, May 2, 1934, Reel 70
23~·JAUS 812.51I1893, Tr1omas .J Maleady, American Vice Con~ul.
Seotember 30, 1932, Reel 69
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the bui1ding of pavements, market p1aces, sewages, and \Nater
1rnes 1n smal 1 towns.29
The ne\N contract cal1ed for 1'.2 mi11ion pesos in 1934and 4
mil1ion in 1935. The remaining 4 mi11ion wou1d be spent in
1935 on other trunk highways. The 1oan 1.Nas p1aced with eight
1oca1 bank mg organizations and American Vi ce-Consu1 Wi 11 i am
P. Cochran, Jr. noted "that none of the 1oca1 branches of
.Arner1can banking rnstitut1ons appears on the 1ist." The bonds
1Nere amortizab1e in five years, and were guaranteed by the
rncome of tr1e Federa 1 Government from gaso 1rne tax. 30
.A.nother 25mi11 ion peso bond was issued by the Federa1
oistr1ct for 1.A/ater d1str1but1on, drainage works and rep1acrng
of streets rn August 1933.

31

The Mexican government proved

to itself tr1at it cou1c successful1y provide interna1 funding for
national pro Jects

u S.

\ii/

i thout depending on U.S. capita 1. When the

denied funding, it no longer meant that Mexico cou1d not go

forvvard with its economic development. Likewise, U.S.
businessmen were 1jismayed that Mexico cou1d proceed with
1nterna1 deve 1opment independently of tr1em.

2·;iJorm Vff Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution
191 9-1936 ( Aust m University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 592

30~4AUS 81251/1979, wiil1am P Cochran, American Vice Consul,
Jariu::-:ir-v 29, 1934, Ree 1 70.
31~MUS 81251/1935, v/11l1am P Cochran, American Vice Consul,
Lu:just 31, 1933, Reel 70
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Favorab 1e Traije, Favor ab 1e Budget

Me::.:ico continued to report a favorab1e trade ba1ance as
rn j1cated by the fo11owing figures: (rn m111ion pesos)32
1

E\ports
I m12ort~

1932
304
180

1931
400
217

1930
459
350

Balance

124

183

109

T1-1e ne\t tv·/O years \A/ere even better with the Jump in va1ue of
f'!e>-:ican e><ports in 1934 to 645 mi11ion pesos over a figure of

36S

in

1~f33 ::;:::

From the stanrjpoint of trade 1.Nith the U.S., figures on
e~~port~.

and imports indicated that Mexico stood second in

importance among Latin .American nations. In 1932, on1y
E.raz11, Columbia and Cuba shipped more goods than Mexico to
the U.S. an(j Mexico was the best U.S. customer among the
nations tc the Scutr·i.34
Tr1e budget for 1934, in accordance with the suggestions
of President Rodriguez as stipu1ated in the Six Year P1an,
stated that a11otments to Education, Commun1cat1ons and
.A.gr1cu1ture \A/OU1d be increased if receipts permitted, and the

e

32~.JAUS 12.00.129904, Ramsdell S Lasher, March 28, 1933, Reel 3
33Jc;r1n \A/F. Dulles, Yesterday ir1 f'1exico A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919- 1936 (Aust in University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 591
3 4 NAUS 812.00/29904, Ramsdell 5. Lasr1er, 1"1arch 28, 1933, Reel 3
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Ministries of Gobernac1on, War and Marine, Foreign Affairs,
~~at i ona 1 Economy

and the Treasury \Nou1 d not be increased. It

al so increase1j a 11 otments to carry out ob 1i gat ions to the
pub11c debt:.''=·
The summary of the Budget for 1933 and 1934 a11ocat ion
to departments in a statement by Undersecretary of Finance,
Ing. !'1arte R Gomez was as fo11o\NS:

25.468.709.61

1934
4,957,684.66
1, 999,615.32
3,000,000.00
2,818, 148.69
4,523' 999.42
27,6S7,894.19
SS, 1 18, 189.0S
14,694,512.04
30,420,9S4.32
5,773,9S4.88
31,235,183.28
7,523, 945.81
6,000,000.00
1,220,863.20
1' 170, 998.24
4,276, 160.64
40.669. 1B9.72

Total E:x:penditures

233, 771, 970.70

243,061 ,293.46

Tota 1 Revenues

239,473,921.00

242, 750,000.00

Leg1slat1ve Po"Ner
E:x:ecut ive
.Ju1j1 c i al
Interior·
Relations
Finance
\•/ar
.A.gricu1ture
Commun1 cations
Economy
Education
Pubiic Health
f't1nuf acturrng Pl ants
Labor
.A.ttorney General's Off ice
.A.grari an Department
Put:i1c Detit

1933
5,303,021.47
1,644, 905.20
2,88 1,303.56
2,442,576.60
4, 344,294.23
37,461,919.96
5 s' 3 44' 9 0 2. 2 2
15,474,596.27
31, 167,699.30
5, 778, 750. 16
31,628,789.34
6,540,834.48
6, 15S,230.34
963,440.72
1, 170,998.24

Frorn statements that appeared in the local press and
base1j on information obtained from the Minister of the
35t·MU5 2'1251/1964, ~~o 814, '-J Daniels, November 1933, Peel 70
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Hae i enda, it in1j i cated that a 11 outstanding government
Gt:1igations for tr·1e period 1926-1932, 1.Nith one or t1.No
e;.,:cept ions, an1j which had remained un liquidated in the Federal
Treasury, were paid or prescr1 bed during the ca 1endar year
1933 . .A.1so, practically all of the 1933 obligations had been

met on time or wouM be liquidated early in 1933.36

Foreign Debt

E.ecause the service of the internal debt took precedence
c·v'er tr1e service of tr1e external detit, President Rodriguez
rna,je no prov1 s ions to meet payments due from ob 1i gat i on·s of

tr·1e e><ter·na1 ,jebt.37 He state j
1

in

his messa Je to Ct'.)n Jress on
1

1

September 1, 1934 tr,at put:11c oprn1on rn Mexico \·Vas opposed to
the 1,jea of pay in1;i ob 11 gat ions in e;.,:cess of Me xi co 's capacity to

pay, add rng that:
"V·/r1ate-./er movement of funds rn 1arge amount from
[vl e :.: l C0, Vv't-1 i Ch \N 0 U 11j 0 f neCe SS i t y take p 1aCe, \;\/ 0 U 1d
great iy affect tr1e carrying out of Mexico's economic
program for road bui 1ding, agri cul tura 1 and i ndustri a 1
development and other projects undertaken by the
Executive, but also because it would upset the
equi 1ibrium of r"'1e><1co's trade balances, since they

3t.r·~/\IJS. 212.51'1971, i~o 966, J Dar1iels, ,January 3, 1934, Reel 70
37r·J,A,IJS 81251/1943, No. 609,..J Daniels, September 19, 1933, Reel
/(1

w ou 1d be arn ount s def rn it e 1y taken fr orn trl e domes t i c
mar·ket. "3E
Throu1~hout

the ens.tence of

Me1~ico

76

as a nation, defau1ts

on the foreign debt ha(j occurred from October 1827 to 1931,
on ry to be f o11 O\A/ed rn each case by negotiations for the
resumption of debt service. 0\Ning to the intervals until
interest payTnents \"lere resumed, the maJor part of Mexico's
debt consisted of accumulated interest It was estimated that
as mucr1 a·= 20% of rviex1co's revenues \A/ere needed to cover
both internal and international obligations. Therefore, certain
.Americans believed the bonded debt of Mexico could be
·:;erv1ce1j vv·ithout placing an un1jue burden on the finances of
trie countr'/ at peace. 39 Tr1e r"ie>< i cans

,j id

not agree.

On May 21, 1934, trie Mexican goverment officially broke
off relations w itr1 the Internat 10na 1 Bankers Comm it tee. Not
only dicJ f"1e:x-ico reject the idea of seeking to pay beyond her
capac1t·y- by means. of one refunding operation after another rn a
·:;eries of "capitalizations" vvt1ich were believed to hide reality
temporar1 ly, but

r~1ex i co

ma i ntarned that the I nternat i ona l

Banker's Committee acted i 11ega11 y an1j was unfriendly to
!v1e~1 i CO.

Me~<1 co

ref erred to the Committee's "i 11 ega l and

unjust" retention of about 7 million dollars which Mexico had
paid under the Pan1-Lamont .Amendment of 1925 but \A/hich the
Comm 1ttee had not d1 stri buted to the bondho 1de rs. Thomas

33t•LA.US 812 =:.1 /2020, No. 1807, J. Daniels, September 25, 1934, Reel

70
391 bid

II
I

Lamont tried to negotiate a compromise with the Mexicans, but
Pres 1.jent Rodr1 guez rnade it c 1ear triat nothing shou 1d be aone
that might be interpreted s a renewal of relations with the
Banker's Committee and that nothing less than the entire 7
rn 111 ion do 11 ars sr. 1ou 1·j be accepted.

40

Rodr1 guez made the break with tr1e Banker's Committee
at a moment when tr1e internal i ona 1 bankers were practically'
e>-:cornmunicated by the U.S. Government which clearly
e/pressed th.e opinion that the force of the .A.meri can
C3overnment was not at the disposal of the Bankers for the
co i 1ect1 on of tr1e i r .jebts. 41 Tr1eref ore, Podri ·;iuez knevv he was
not Jeopardi zing his re 1at ion ship with the U.S. government. At
the sarne time, tr11s was a drastically independent step, unlike
any policy Calles. had followed with the U.S. This was another
reflect1cn of Poari·;iuez's cr·1ange in loyalty from Calles to
Cardena·3.
Tr:e showdo\Nn began in September 1932, when the
Eanker's Committee brougrit suit before the Suprerne Court of
the State of New York to determine the method of distribution
tr'1ey believe·j srHJU1·j be autr:orize.j by the Court.4:?

Tr:e

fie xi can Government maintained the funds be 1onged to the

rv1exican Go·v'ernment and decl med to appear in the case

1

4C John W.F. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 ( Aust in University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p. 593.

41 ~JAUS 812.51/2014, Exselsior, September 8, 1934, Reel 70.
~~~.AUS 8 12.51/1889, To Henry St 1mson from Banker's Cor-nn11 ttee,
::eotember 14, 1932, Reel 69
4r1

I
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c 1ai rn mg its rights to i mm unity. Henry St i rnson requested that
a U.S. attorney be appointed to represent the Mexican
Government without argument or comment before the Supreme
Court of

~,Jew

York on January 9, 1933

43

Tr1e decisicm of tr1e

Nevv York Supreme Court on January 30, 1933 dec1 ined the
action f i 1ed by Thomas W. Larnont regarding the disposition and
accounting of funds received frorn the Mexican Government. A.n
El Universal editoria1 reported 1ega1 victory for Mexico and the

Committee of eankers \·Vas e;<coriated for cornmittmg acts
" v erv s 1rn i 1ar to s i rn pl e an ,j p 1ain spo 1i at i on. "44
President Rodriguez wisr1ed in no way to become rnvo1ved
; n an/ cornprorn i ses that rn i ght hamper the new adrn in i st rat 1on
vv·r1ich \Nas about to take off ice. Foreign Minister Puig
informed .Josept"iUS Danie1s that Rodriguez had to1d hirn that he
vvouid not take this rnatter up 1juring his term of office; that
the Mini st er of Finance had recornrnended a bi 11 be introduced
to Congress with reference to the foreign debt; but that it \A/as
Po Jriguez's intention to 1eave this matter to the incornmg
1

a jrn in i strati on. 4:.:;
1

Ttw U.S. government took the initative in October 1933 to

ca 11 togetr1er in Washington a group of pub 1i c-sp i rited citizens
to

con~.1der

the formation of the Foreign Bondho1ders

43r·~.A.US 812.51I1900, To Attorney General from Henry Stimson,
'"'January 3, 1933, Reel 70.
44~~AUS· 812.:,111907, ~~o 2282 . R Clark, February 11, 1933, Reel
7(>
4

'=·~J1\US 812.51/2022, No 1829, J. Daniels, October 6, 1934, Reel 71.
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Protective Council w lth offices in New York to assist
ind ivi dua 1 bondholders. The organ1 zing committee of the
Council r1ad met as ear·ly as December 18, 1932.46 Tr1e r1olders
cf

r~1exico's

foreign bonds came to be represented by this new

organization.
V/ith s,uch a favorable climate, at the same ti me, the
Fourth Congress of the Rai hvay V/orkers of Mexico sent a
communication to the President, General Cal Jes, and tr1e
Executive of the Nati ona: Ra1 l ways requesting a moratorium or
tr1e debt ovved by the National Rail ways to the New York
bankers in order that the funds could be used for the
,jeve 1opment of tr1e ra 1l v,;ay rnc1ustry. 47

Claims Commission
Pres1oent Rooriguez made significant

pro,~ress

in tr1e

vvork of the United States-Mexican Claims Commissions, set up
as a result of the Bucarel1 Conferences of 1923, during his
term

in

office. Progress had been very slow and costly and

botr, President Rodriguez and Foreign Minister Puig were
concerne(j about the matter. Both President Rodr1guez and
A.mbassador Daniels liked the idea of a lump-sum settlement
to take care of the United States claims. Two agreements of
46~~AUS 812 5112027, \//ill iam Pr1i 11 ips, Acting Secretary, November
6, 1934, Ree 1 71
47~~.AUS e 12 '.5 1I 190'.:'> See 8 12.504/ 1371 ) No 2207, R c 1ark'
.Jzrnu2ir'.v· 25, 1933, Reel 54
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.Apri 1 24, 1934 were signed. One of these revised the
rrocedure of the United 5tates-Mexican Genera1 C1aims
Comm l ss l on in order to s imp 1ify and speed up the \Nork. Each
'Jovernment was to choose one commissioner, and each
comm1ss1oner was to appraise claims rndividua11y. Then the
commiss.1oners \Nere to get together and try to sett1e the
d1ff erences. There was then to be a Jo int report to the two
CJ•)\:'

erT1rnents. 42
The other agreement of .Apr11 24, 1934, took care of trie

Un1te1j States spec1a1 c1a1ms for damages resu1ting from the
Pev'O 1ut ~on. The amount was to bear the same proportion to

total c1a1ms as the European a'Nards. But in making this
computation, de1juctions from the total US c1aims were madedeouct ions in the amounts corresponding to dup 11 cations vvh i ch
inf1atecJ the claims figures and c1aims that had already been

cec 1oed. It

V·/aS

agreed that Mex1 co would pay ha 1f a mi 11 ion

do 11 ars yearly start mg on .January 1, 1935. The tot a 1 to be
paid 1Nas. ca1cu1ated to be seven mil11on do11ars, or 2.65
percent of the spec i a1 c 1aims 1ess the above mentioned
ceauct1ons. In th1·:: \Nay, more than ten years after the
ratification of treat l es worked out at the Burcare 1i
Conferences, new agreements f ina 11y sett 1ed the comp 11 cated
matter of U.S. c 1al ms arising out of damages caused by the

~

4.:\Johrr \'/F Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Pevolutiorr
g 19-1936 ( Austirr Urr1vers1ty of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 597
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!'1ex i can Pevo l ut ion.

49

Ca 11 es was completely absent from

tr1ese important negotiations .A.s \i\/lth the Banker's Committee
dea 1in gs, Ro(jri guez acted independently of Ca 11 es in re solving
another critical issue vvlth the United States.

Economic Evaluation of Rodriguez's Presidency

n~,e p~,JP

had cr1argeo President Roarf guez w itr1 creating

po1it1ca1 and financial stab1l1ty in or1jer to establish the
Pevo 1ut1 onary party on a permanent f oundat l on, ana his
aijm in i strati on \Nas cred lted

VI/ i th

successfully handling the

nation's affairs.. Conservative government spending res.u l ted in
ba 1anc ing the budget for 1933 with even a sma 11 surplus, an(j
aft er earmarking 25. 5 m 1111 on pesos for interest payment or
trie pub 11 c debt The Rodriguez a(jrn 1n i strati on financed cre(j it
ano amortized more than 100 rn 111 ion pesos of the I nterna 1
Put; 11 c Det:)t It created a monetar;,r reserve of $ 1 16. 177 ,000 00

pesos Tr1e consolidation of the Bank of r1exico assured the
fl ej:1b11 lty of the monetclr'y' system with in the credit
organization, trie e\istence of a banking system in a l 1quid
state perrn1tte!j the ability to pa')" its obligations, and

Me~<1co

es.tab 1i sr1e1j an e:;..;change rate \Ni thin the i nternat i ona 1 market

rvios t importantly, Rodriguez left Me xi co with a r1ea lthy
economy, by e 11 mi nat rng the prob 1ems of def 1at ion
4 9 : bi cJ

, r, 5 9 7

\N lthout
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falling into vicious inflation. He left the Treasury vvith

$ 1.413,.861 .00 pesos and the pub 11 c treasury w i tr1 a
confidential fund of $8.625,853.34 pesos that was reserved to
be delivered to the Treasury and vvhich the public domain did
not knovv about, as an act of solidarity with the next
a·jm 1ni st rat 1on. ::.o
Rodriguez supported Pani and r1is policies until
September 1933, \Nhen his shift in al 1egi ance from Ca 11 es to

cardenas,

enaed the rel at 1onshi p. Ca 11 es had been rnv1 s i bl e in

financial policy decisions, leaving policy making in the
profess i ona 1 hands of Pan1. By

e 11 m mating

Pan1 from the

process, Rodriguez shut out Ca 11 es from the f i nanc i a 1 sector.
It came at a time \·Vhen Calles \Vas less influential on
Rodriguez and could not save Pani's job for him. President
Poor 1guez and h 1s new Finance Min 1ster, Marte Gomez, who had
serve1j under Gil and was more pro-Cardenas, did not change
their f inane i a 1 goa 1s for the country. They continued to focus
on i nterna 1 economic gro\Nth st i mu 1ated by expande1j
a"/a1lab1lity of credit over concern about the external debt. In
other words, Rodriguez's policies remained in force from one
Finance Minister to the next.
.As President, Rodriguez indirectly continued to improve
the internal economy and credit position of Mexico as a nation
with peaceful elections, educational programs to further

SCiJavier F.Gaxiola, El Pre21dente Rodriguez ( 1932-34) (Mexico
Editorial Cultura. 1938), p 400-401.

ou5
reduce illiteracy (which was at about 47% down from 853). He

created greater demands b'y' the masses, continued agri cultura1
an1j i ndustri a 1 1jeve l opment, an1j gradual exploitation of the
natura 1 resources. In addition, V/orl d povvers had taken
favorable act 10n regar1jing silver, a rec i pro cal tariff
agreement with the U.S. had been negotiated and a sufficient
comp 1et1 on of the international highway permitted tourist
trade from the U.S. an1j Canada to boost the economy. I ncrease1j
1nfrastructure trwougr, road bui 1ding had a 1ready aided f"1ex1 can

nat1onal1srn.='·1 In addition, by finally settling trie U.S claims
1ssues wltr1 !'1ex1co, Pooriguez contributed to stronger
re1at10ns 1Nitr1 the us.

51 tV,l_J:=:, 81 2 001299'.)4, Pamsde 11 S Lasher, March 22,, 1933, Ree 1 3
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Chapter VI I: A.grarian Reform

Sriortly after assuming office, President Rodriguez
·stated in a press intervie\Ai on September 30 that he
cons 1dered the problem of the peasant to be the f undamenta 1
one of Me;<ico and he discussed his plan for the division of
communal e11dos into rndividual parcels for families.1 From
tr::s pcrnt on he acted quickly to open up the floodgates of
a 1Jr ari an reform. Ro1jrf guez believed large property ownersri i p
create,] povert}1 and ignorance among the rural masses 1Nhi le
inc11·v·11jua1 private land 01Nnership \AJithin the security of the
ei1ao. 1f exploited by rational, modern methods 1Nould benefit
the ent 1re economy. Therefore, he saw agrarian reform as one
of tr<e ke\1 elements of his plan for economic stabillt)1.
One of the most important aspects of Rodriguez's
agr.;r1an reform 1.vas his belief in creating individual 1ana
ovvners.h 1p in the

e 1i do,

rather than communal possession. His

reform revo; ved around respect for the i ndi vi dual property
ov1mer's rights and the rights of the creditors. By providing
:oca1 credit and modern technology to individual ownership,
Ro1jrfguez believed it would assure that productivity would
benefit o·wners ,j1rectly and the country as a whole.2 Trns form
of redistribution \A/as a mixture between Calles' plan which
1
t~.AUS 2>12.00/29799, No 1959, R Clark, General Political Report,
O::tober '.20, 1932. Reel 2.
'.::Javier F Ga><iola, El Pres1dente Ro,jr1guez ( 1932-34l (Mexico
Ed 1 t 1:.r- 1a l Cul t ur a, 19 3 8 ) , p 46 2- 46 4
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ernp1-1as i zed private capitalist agriculture and Cardenas'
commitment to the communa1 e1ido system as a means of
economic recovery for Mexico.

Beginning Legis1ation

Pres i rjent Podr1 guez's first task was to expropriate 1and·3
from large property owners. He began by imp1ementing
legislation \Nh1ch increased parce1ation of large properties. By
193'.2, 1oca1 .A.grarian Commissions in seven states had ceased

to receive ne\N petitions for e ii dos and they interpreted this
as havrng sett1ed tr·1e agrarian prob1em. Ho\Never, the
re9ulatory iavv of the Division of EJida1 Lands and the
Const 1tut10n of tlw Paree 1ary EJ i da 1 Patrimony of December
19,19:25 had been amende1j in .August 25, 1927. The 1927

amenament a11 owed the Nati ona 1 .A.grari an Commission w 1th
the President to fix the minimum area of the parcel, vvhich
cou 1d not be reduced even if the number of parce 1s did not
correspond to the total number of agriculturists entitled to

r·ece i ve 1ands.

Th 1s ne'vv 1avv of e j i da l patrimony meant that

trie National A.grarian Commission cou1d decide that the size of
thee j ido was be1ovv the minimum requirement and cou1d
expropriate add it i ona 1 1ands from adj oi ni ng private 1y owned
property. This new reform of tr1e 1aw could 1ega11y reopen the
\A/hole agrarian question and grant new or additiona1 ejidos in

86
these seven states. 3

Rodriguez employed this law in his

rnit1al steps toward reform.
In addition to the lavv of patrimony, the most important
changes of another law, the Law of Dotat ions and Restitutions
of Lands and Vlaters of March 21, 1929, stated that preference
of grant rng of dot at ions wou1 d be given to lands under
cultivation by means of investments of capital or labor. Where
such ;and 'vvas not available, other lands would be given, but
never a lari]e amount of poor quality land as compensation for
lack of arat,le lands. :=,econa, tr1e provision stated that if there
vvas a shortage of parcels in the e j i do. the campes i no could add
parce15. vvhen available. This provision amended Article 130
an1j 131 \Nh 1ch had stated that a petition to amplify could not
be made unt 11 ten years after the grant rng of the orig rnal
dotat10n and then only to persons not receiving an original
ijotat 1 on

.::i

Po 11t1 cal Maneuvers and .A.grari an Reform

Pres 1dent Rodriguez first invoked the Law of EJ i cal
Patrimony for political reasons, not agrar1 an reform, when he
·sent a number of army engineers to the State of Veracruz in
or1jer to carry out the parcelation of ejidos which had already

~t.J.AU'.:·

4 1t'1d

8125211785,
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2171, R Clark, January 17, 1933, Reel 82
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been granted. He was not trying to increase ej i do 1ands but
seize control of existing ejidos from his political enemy
Alberto Tejeda, ex-governor of the State. Tejeda, who had
expropriated private companies and 1and, was a mi 1i tary,
po1itica1, electoral and ideological threat to the PNR
A.ccording to the press, the President wanted to bring about
increased production in the
not cu 1t1vate the

e j i dos s i nee if the campesino d1 d

e 1i do parcel given to him, then the parcel

'11vou1d be taken away from hlm. However, the League of
A.gr1cu1tura1 Communities in Veracruz, incited by Tejeda,
provoked the campesinos to ref use to a 11 ow the army engineers
to parce 1 out triese e 1i dos.=· Therefore, Rodriguez's effort to
divide tr1e parce1s to individual families as a means of
economic pro1juction was largely a political move in opposition
to TeJeda'·3 collective vision of using the communal e1idos as
t\oth a social and m 1l i tary base. 6
Tr1e Federal Government wanted to disarm the agrarian
forces in the State numbering up to 30,000 in order to prevent
Te Jeda from mak mg use of them as a mi 1ltary force during tr1e
corning pres1dent1al campa1gn.7 In response to TeJeda's
oppos lt ion, Rodriguez ordered Genera 1 Acosta and 6,000
f eijera 1 so 1di ers to accompany the engineers and disarm the

=N.AUS 812 5211 771, ~~o 2052, R Cl ark, December 1, 1932 . Reel 82
0Tzvi Medin, El l1m1rnato Presidenc1al. Histor1a Pollt1ca Del 11a.>\irnatci
1928-1935 (Mexico C1t1i Ed1ciones Era, 1972), p 129.
7
~~.A.U'.::> 812 00129828, RGbert E Cummings, .Actrng 1"'11l 1tary .A.ttache,
G-2 Report, January 1933, Reel 2.
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a·~rarians::

On January 1O, 1933 about 10,000 of tr1e organized

'Juer111 as 'vvere peacef u1ly disarmed \A/hen they were ca il ed for
rev i evv in the various pl aces vvhere they were organized, their
arms stacked in the presence of federal troops, and the arms
taken into possession. However, a large number of unorganized
a·~rarians

remaine j arme j
0

0

9

Po 11 ti cs v,.1ere a1ways a mot i vat rng factor

in

promot mg

agrarian reform and were not 1i mi ted to contro 11 i ng the 1oca1
cauc;11 !c

1ri

Veracruz. Senator Elp1d10 Rodriguez, f ormeriy

Off~ca1

rv1ayor of the National .A.grarian Commission, told

Stanley Havvks of the U.S. Embassy that Congress passed the
1avvs

of patrimony reforms for pol it i ca 1 reasons. The goa 1 \Alas

not to actually f o11 ow through on expanding tr1e
appea~e

e ii dos

but to

political adversaries in the 1934 presidential

election. Tr1e mini mum area of a parce 1 vvas yet to be dee i ded

t·1• tr,e

~~at1onal

.A.grar1an Commission. Because it had to be

approveo by the President, it possibly could result in no
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However, PresicJent Rodriguez's motives were more tr1an
po 1lt1ca1 He

a1~gress ive 1y

sought 1and reform as a means to

economic recovery and in doing so made a clear break vvith the
~,la;.: i mato.

~1any

of the off i c i a1s in his government changed as

agrarian reform accelerated. He chose new· off i c i a1s more

a:b1d

91b1d
101b1d
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a11 gned w itr1 tr1e Gi 1-Cardenas' agrari st as who supported
increased 1and confiscations, as he moved away from the
conservative element vvhich inc1uded the novv reactionary
Ca11es. L icend1ado .Alfonso Pomania Ferreira, Of icial Mayor of
the Ministry of Agricu1ture resigned his position effective
.January 15, 1933. His resignation had been forced by certain
members of Congress due to his opposition to the reforms
vv't"'11ch r1e declared had been put through Congress by radical
elements. These radical elements included two Federal
Deput 1es, I ngen i ero Luis L. Lecrn, Edi tor of El Nacional and
f orrner 1'·1rnister of Agriculture, and lngeniero Marte R Gomez,
former Minister of .Agriculture during the presidency of Portes
Gi1 \Nhen the Nationa1 Agrarian Commission had been more
active than at any other t 1me
cornrn unities.

in

granting of ej i dos to rura 1

11

Pef orm Leg 1s1 at ion Stepped IJp

President Rodriguez and his new co 11 aborators
accelerated 1egislation of 1and reform. On January 9, 1933, El
Nacfonal reported that the Supreme Court had handed down a

decision that amended .Article 1O of the .Agrarian Lavv of
.January 6, 1915. The ref arms of this lavv made binding that
propr1 et ors. affected by re so 1ut ions of do tat ions or
11~,JAUS 81252/1785, ~~o.2171, R Clark, ~January 17, 1933, Reel 82
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restitutions of

eJi dos

or vvaters would ho 1d no r1 ght for either

ordinary iegal recourse or for the extraordinary legal recourse
of amparo against such re solutions. Therefore, owners had no
1ega1 recourse beyond making ob Ject ions to the Nati ona 1
.Agrarian Commission. Since such a decree could not be put
as 1de by a dee is.ion of tr1e Court, neither the owners nor the
campesinos couM 1-1ave any doubt as to its val idity.12
On !'1arcr1 31, 1933 President Podr1 guez signed an
ex.ecut ive order revoking the President i a1 Order of August
31, 1932 granting the

~~at1onal

.Agrarian Commission authority

in matters connected to the establishment of agri cultural
settlernents.13 Then on July 26, 1933, a PresMential decree
'Nas pub 11 shed in the Diario O.ficial in 1Nh i ch he revoked a11
decrees previously issue1j by President Ortiz Rubio which ha1j
granted to the population of various states certain periods of
time in vvhich to present petitions for· the restitution or
do tat ion of

e 11 dos and at the end of such periods, the .Agrar1 an

Commissions could be dissolved. The states were to revert
back to the law of .January 6, 1915. The Federal Government
r:a1j been receiving requests from communities in the states
that the .Agrarian Commissions resume their function mg and
accept nevv petitions for restitutions and dotations of lands
an1j waters. Again, to minimize concern by the landowners,
Undersecretary of .A.gr1culture, Parras said this did not mean
12r,LA.IJS· 812. 52/ 1784, r·~o. 21 94, R Cl ark, January 20, 1933, Reel 82
13NAUS 81252/1797, No.6, J. Daniels, April 20, 1933, Reel 8'.2.
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the Federa 1 Government had embarked on a po 1icy of increased
activity \Nlth regard to dotations but simply that it did not

fee 1 it had the 1ega1 right to deny agrarians communities the
ri 1~r1t

to petition.

14

.An editorial in the El Universal of .July 28, 1933, pointed
out that from 1915 to 1932, 13,019 applications for ejidos
had been presented to the

~~ational

Agrarian Commission, but

that only 5,334 vvere definitely sett1ed up to 1932, leaving
7,6.:35 cases unsettled. The editor1al further added that in 18
years, the agrarian question had cost the Federa 1 Government
40,079,605pesos.1 s After laying tr'1is groundwork, El 1Vac10nal
putl1ished an article on July 29, 1933, reporting an interview·
vv 1n, r·1in is t er of

.A 1~r 1cul

tu re, Francisco S. E1i as. He stated that

tr1e entire National Agrarian Commission had been completely
reorganize1J to expedite business by the Commission so that it
vv·oul1J be possitile to decide upon more than a thousan1J cases
per year eartolome Vargas Lugo, vvas appointed Official 1"1ay'Or
of the Comm1s·31on. As Governor of Hidalgo, Lugo ha1J the
reputation of being proactive in granting a great many
dotat1ons of eJ1dos.1e.
President Pedri guez cont rnuecJ to step up his program of
aggressive parcelation of land. On October 11, 1933, r1e issued
instructions to the National .A.grar1an Commission to direct the

14NA.U~· t1252/1809, ~Jo 419. J. Daniels, July 29, 1933, Reel 82
15~tAUS 812.52/1313, r~o 439,,.J Daniels, August 4, 1933, Reel 82.
1CNAUS 812.52/1810, ~~o 424,J. Daniels, August 1, 1933, Reel 82.
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local agrar1an commisssions to expedite al 1 cases pending
tlefore tr1ern. Undersecretary of Finance, 1'1arte R Gomez issuecJ
orijers placing at the disposal of tr1e Ministry of .Agriculture,
propert1es nO\N r·,eld by the Federal Government be used to
sat 1sfy the agrarian needs of the vi 11 ages adJ oi ni ng these
propert1es.11 In accor,jance w1tr1 orders issued by the Minister
of .Agr1culture, from October 20 to November 10, 1933, 54,091
r,ectares of land \Nere distributed to 4,218 ejidatar1os. This
1]1str1but1on of land was effecteij under 45 presidential
r·eso1utions an J 17,000 per·sons benefite,j. lt
1

The Grand .Agrarian Commission

:v1eanvvr1i1 e, the Cham tier of Deputies named members to a
Gran1J .A.1]rarian Commission in .A.ugust 1933 to study the
ref orrn of the agrarian laws as they should apply to the
ere at 10n cf a new .A.grari an Department and incorporate th i ·3
proposal into the Six Year Plan. Members of the Commission
rncluoec Deputy Gilberto Fab1la, Deput·; .Angel Posada, Marte
G6mez, and Ga:x i o 1a, w ltr1 tr1e 1atter two members representing
tr:e Rcdr·1guez viewpoint. Two distinct ideologies were
r~epresented

Deputy Fabila \A/anted collectives and socialized

cre 1Jlt and transport. President Rodr1guez based r1is capitalist
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reform on the country's economy and budget limitations. The
i:::;,utcome was a compromise t;,etween the two ideo1ogies19 and
tr1is compromise was represented

in

the Six Year Plan. The

rad1ca1s \,\/on the creation of an autonomous Agricultura1
Department vvith

mi~<ed

commissions consisting of local and

federal members, and the creation of a minimum fund of 50
mi 1i10n pesos to facilitate the deve 1opment of the e 1i ,jos

20

Ro1jr1guez secured the dlv1sion of individual parcels witr1rn tr1e

eJi dos ratr1er than co 11 ect iv es and reform w lth in f i sea 1 means.
The only limitation \/I/JS that agricultural product1on \/I/as
requffe,j to satisfy rural population centers. 21 More
importantly, Rodriguez put h1mse1f in charge of the new
autonomous agri cu 1tura1 department.
President Rodr 1guez and trie agrari st as took 1and ref orrn
comp1ete1y out of the hands of the states and the Congress.
The SD< Year· Plan ca11e1j for the renevval of land division under
a more s1mp11fied system of greater federal admrnistrat1on
ratrier tr1an state so that this division could proceed more
rapid1y. Under the o1d system of loca1 Agrarian Commissions
an1j a Nati ona 1 Agrarian Commission not much 1and had been

i·?-:-zvi Medin, El Mm1rnato Presidenc1a1. H1storia Politi ca Del Max1mato
1928-1935 U1exico City Ediciones Era, 1972), p 141.
='Ctorenzo Meyer, H1:.tor1a De La Pevoluc16n Mex1cana 19-::·s-1934 Vol
12 Lo: lnicios De La lnst1tuc1onalizac1on La Polit1ca Del Max1mato (Mexico City
El Coleg10 De Mexico, 1978l, p 96
21Tzv1 Medin, El Mmimato Pres1dencial. H1stor1a Po11t1ca Del f1ax:imato
1923-1935 (Mexico City. Ediciones Era, 1972), p 141.
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d1 str1 buted recently. Off i c i a1 statistics showed merely
196,000 hectares for 1933, the lowest point since 1922 and a
·srna11 fraction of tr1e averaide year fol1ovving 1922. A.n
1rnportant reason for this s.lowdown had been tr1e refusal of the
central t;iovernment to conf 1rrn the "prov is 1ona l"
reo~ str~ but ions

\Nh 1cr·1 state governments had been continuing

to rnake.== Pr-·iOr to U--1e ueation of tr1e Six Year Plan,
Poer 1guez r·,ad act rve 1y 1eg1s1 ated for agrar1 an ref orrn. t'Ww r1 is
goal vvas to solve the agrarian problem, in so far as possible,
our~n1J

trie last year of his aamrn1strat1on by usurping al 1

povver f rorn the states and the Congress.

The Pres.1 dent's A.grar1 an Commission

On December 13 1933, Pres11jent Podr1quez gave a
r-:res'der·,t1a1 me·ssage to tr;e Congress regarding the creation of
an A.grar1an Department of the Government to take over
t-,ar-,,j 1 mg of the agrarian la1Ns from the Department of
A1Jr1culture. Article 27 of the Constitution, wt11ch was
arnen,jea by Congres.s before it adjourned on December 26,
1933 created this nevv independent department of the
guv·E:rnrnent functioning under the direct orders of tr1e
Pre·s i 1jent. The department \Nas assisted by an A.(jv i sory Body
of five rnenbers appo rnted by the President and Deputy A.nge l
22'-Jnr1r1 F 'd Dulle::., Yesterday In Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution
19: 9-1936 ( Austir1 Uriivers1ty of Te>;as Press, 1961 ), p 599
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Posaija was appointed c1-·11 ef of tl1 is department.23 The decr·ee
publ is.r·1e1j 1n the O.ficfal D7ano of .January 12, 1934, granted the
E;..ecut1ve special po'vvers until .August 31, 1934, to issue this
~·~ev·/

Lav,/ of Organization for the Ministries of State and to

arnen j tr1e existing agrarian legislation.24 The former· National
1

A 1Jrar i an

Comm 1ss ion, function mg under the decree of .January

6, 1915 and presided over by the Secretary of .A.griculture,
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·=ubm1ttea to Congress a oraft of an organic la\11.1 governing the
functrnns of tr1e .Agrarian Department. This lavv was in
acccir,jance wltr1 the recommendations contained in the Six
Year Plan. The work \Nr11cr1 in the past has been handled by
1oca1 .A.grarian Commissions and private executive committees

v. .:as. taken over by rn1xed commissions, by private executive
Cornrn 1t tees, and by commissariats representing the ovvners of

e 11,jos State governors no longer had Jur1sd1 ct ion in agrarian
rnatter·s .:=:c
Pr· es i dent Pocw1 guez saw to it that a11 the "provisional

possessions" vvhich ha1j been held up

in

recent years, v-;ere

automat i ca 11 \I confirmed wherever the 1oca l re so 1ut ions had

23~·1.A.u::. 812.52/ 12.53. Ho 1004, ..J Daniels, .January 17, 1934, Reel
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not been tr1e sub Ject of spec lf i c actions taken in oppos it i on.27
He issued a decree of .January 8, 1934 sett mg a term of th i rt·;
1jays. f rorn .January 1, 1934 during which owners of property
affected by provisional decrees of dotat ion of e j i dos cou 1d
subm lt a 11 egat ions against such decrees. After thirty days
these cases vvere considered closed and there was
automat 1ca1 ly issued a president i a 1 re so 1ut ion confirming the
1jec is ion 1·en1jere j by the local autrwri ti es.2c.
1

A meet rng on February 16 discussed the regu 1at ions to be
used in which future dotations and restitutions of lands and
\A/aters 1.A/ould be carrie1j out within the general outline of the
Si:x Year Plan.29 The Commission determined that facilities
\A/Ould be given to owners of haciendas. If land dotations were
not cultivated, the lands would be given to others for
cuit1vat1on. In addition, other facilities vvould be given to land
O\Nners in order that they might cultivate the 1ands and not
211ovv tr·:ern to remain i jle as often had been the case.3o
1

27John F.\fv' Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico .A Chronicle of trie Revolution
1919-1936 (,A.ustrn University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 599.
2'3i'~.A.U5 81252/184'3, N·'.) 992, J. Daniels, January 12, 1934, Reel
82
29NAUS 812.52/ 1857, ~Jo 1111, J Daniels, February 1934, Reel 82
30N.A.US 812.52/ 1862, l\lo. 1i82 . J. Daniels, March 2, 1934, Reel 82
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The promulgation of the first Agrarian Code of March 22,
1934 fcwrnu1ated primarily by Fabila31 r·ecognized all the
le1~1slation

dispersed until then: The Law of Dotation and

Pest ltut ion of Lands and V/aters, the Repart lt ion of EJ i da 1
Lands and of the Patrimony Paree 1ari o EJ i da 1, New Centers of
,A,gra1~i an

Popu 1at ions and the Nati ona 1 Agrarian Registry. 32 Tr1e

.Agrar1 an Code introduced the concept of ind iv i dua 1 parce 1s
vvithin established population centers as a means of
ma1ntaining the socia1 and econom1c strength of the
communities already established around the ejidos including
·::crwo1s and local financial institutions and to protect the
campesinos from exploitation. However, the Code also allowed
est at; 11 shment of nevv popu 1at ion centers if it meant better
ut 111 zat ion of tr1e natura 1 resources. 33 With this Code,
Pres 1dent Podri guez proceeded with r1 is goal of cap Ha 11 st
production

\A/ ith rn

the e ii dos.

The Department of .Agri cu 1tu re arranged for the
1j!str1bution of approximately forty million hectares of
nat 1ona1 1ands to he 1p e><ped1 te the so 1ut ion. It estab 11 shed the
organization of techn i ca 1 br1 gades vvh i ch were charged with

31Jav1e1- F Ga.\1ola, El Presidente Rodriguez ( 1932-34) (11exico:
E·dltor1al Cultura, 1938), p. 449.
32Lorenzo Meyer, Histor1a De La Revo 1uc16n Mexicana 19/8-1934. Vol.
1:::· Lo'= lr:1cios De La lnstituc1onal17acion La Polit Ka Del Max1mato (Mexico City
El Coleg10 De Mexico, 1978), p 163. NAUS 812.52/ 1867, ~~o 1257, March
23, 1934 . Reel 82.
33,Javier F. Gaxiola, El Pres1dente Rodriouez ( 1932-34) (Mexico.
E,d1tor1al Cultura, 1938), p 456
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defining boundaries and dividing the lands. Once this was done,
the Department entrusted the colonization division to take the
necessary steps to distribute the population equally on the
1an js so di vi ,jed and estab 1i sr1 a just economic equi 11 i br1 um.34
1

The Department increased personne 1 and mi 1i tary engineers to
speed up distribution. In addition, the law stipulated that
tr1ere was a maximum of 180 days for land division grants to
conform to the nevv Code.
Pres i aent Rodriguez sougr1t to provide the Banco Nae i ona 1
de Credito .A.grari o \Al ith enough money to enab 1e the many who
\A/ere receiving parcels of land to get them into production. In
spite of the Worl1j Depression's effect on official resources, he
maintained irrigation works, construction of roads and
provided local credit organizations, although regional
difference=

e~<isted.

The Banco created agencies in Campeche,

Durani]O, Morelia, NavaJoa and Pachuca; multiplied operations
in .A.guasca1 ientes, Ciudad .A.nahuac, Celaya, Cordoba, Chihuahua,
.Ja 1apa, .Ja 11 sco, Mexico, More 1os, Oaxaca, Pueb 1a, Oueretaro,
Tarn au 11 pas ana Va 11 e de Mexico. At the end of Rodrl guez's
term in office, there were 1491 credit es tab 1i shments with
103,444 members of which 85, 155 were eJidatarios and

18 ,286 vvere srna 11 agri cultura 1i sts. The agri cultura 1 credit
1Nas an operat10n that was essentially local . .A.s compl irnent to

34~JAU5 812.52/ 1865, t~o. 1240, Stanley Hawks, Embassy Secretary,
f'1arch 20, 1934, Ree 1 82
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the vvork of cre1jit, the Banco initiated the establisr1ment of
some soc1a1 services sucr1 as rural medicrne.3:::.
Tr1e Cuerpo Consultivo A.grario of the new Agrarian
Department met at least twice vveekly to act quickly on all
accumulated appl icat1ons, vvitr1 the result that land
distribution vvent ahead at a rate which even exceeded that of

n·,e heyday of Portes Gil. The President's report of September
1, 1934 a1jvise1j that between February 20, 1934 and A.ugust
31, 1934, 1,281,000 r1ectares had gone to 97,000 heads of

f am i l 1es.36 Tr1e A.grari an Department reported it had
distributed more than a m1111on hectares of land in the period
from February 20 to .July 31, 1934. There had not been a single
Pres11jent1a1 Decree published

in

the Diario Oficial denying a

petition for the dotat ion or restitution of e 1i dos. The total
numt;er of presidential re solutions was 904, \A/hi ch covered an
area of 1,045,707.22 hectatres of land and benefitted 81 ,928
families..
rv1 c:.r1 t h

February
rv1arch
.April

Pr es 1dent i a l Pe s

103
65
357

Hectares

135,707.32
77,528.61
445,722.59

Heads of
Family
8,818
5,563
34, 170

-:75Javier F Gaxiola, El Presidente Rodriguez ( 1932-341 (Mexico
Ed;tcJrial Cultura, 1938), p 473-477
36Jor1n F.W. Dulles, Yesterdav In Mexico .A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 (Austrn University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 599. Javier F.
:Ja".10la, El Presidente Rodriguez ( 1932-34) (Mexico Editorial Cultura.
19: 8 ) ' [i 46 7.
1

Ma'/
June
.Ju1y

Tota1=·

96
109
174
904

79,722.75
120,550.74
185890.?1
1.045, 122.22

7,263
10,660
15 454
81 ,928
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These tota1 figures, presented in relation to the states
favored, are made up as f o 11 ovvs:

Presidential Res.

State
Campeche
co11ma
Ch1apas
Ch1huar1ua
Durango
GuanaJuato
C3uerrero
Hi (ja 1go
._)311 =·CC

'7
~

I

3
74
46
15
39
49
40
26
45
60
11

r·1e:x i co
;v11 cr·1oac an
Na\/ar1
t
- I
'7
~·~uevo Leon
-!
·:Ja:x.aca
10
Pueb 1a
34
:Jueretaro
15
San Lu1s Potosi 48
Srna1oa
24
Sonora
9
Tamau1 ipas
20
Veracruz
270
Yucatan
11
Zacateca=·
49
--;; --;

Hectares
8,568.00
1,992.62
82,470.42
95,036.75
26,659.36
24,043.24
81} 128.36
32,369.80
23,322.97
24,004.21
53,725.54
23,544.77
10,776.09
6, 109.70
33,507.37
19, 125.98
66,201.27
23,050.85
28,871.63
14,201.82
213,390.70
46,636.91
106,383.86

Families
226
150
8,629
3,589
939
2,745
5, 127
3,800
2,745
6, 111
6,930
1,405
284
732
2,760
979
3, 194
2,054
1,018
-,893
-,830
-, 132
4,656

3 t·J.AUS 81252/1885, ~Jo 1715, ...J Dariiel::., .August 25. 1934, Reel 8'.::'
7
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Despite the pos.it1ve numbers, political motives alvvays played
a role. Veracruz had the largest number of hectares
1j1·3tr1buted vvh1le reform in Lovver California, where President
Roori guez o\vne j mucr1 agr1 cu aural 1and hi mse 1f, was
1

none~ l stent.

St i 11 Rodriguez can be credited with mak mg the

break \/\/ 1tr, the i"1a;: 1ma to, taking contro 1 away from the states.
and Congress an1j personally laying the groundwork for
Cardenas rn tr1e realm of agrar1an reform.

1n·-)

0··1apter VI 11: Labor Reform, Me><ican Capita1 and Nationa1 ~L
Economic Deve 1opment
President Rodriguez's goal was to meet the demands of
both lab or interests and Mexican capita 1 in order to f aci 1i tate
national economic growth. His 1abor reform was guided by the
Feoera1 Labor Law of 1931 and the principles of the Six Year
Plan which he developed with the PNP between July and
December 1933. One goal of the Six Year Plan was to put
.Art i c 1e1 23 into practice and contra l 1ab or by it but a1so raise
tr:ew standard of living with minimum wage leg1slat1on. On
tr1e side of f'lex1can capital, President Rodriguez wanted to

oeve 1op nat i ona 1 com pan 1es and create a semi off 1cia1
regulatory and protective agency to defend the Mexican middle
class from foreign interests. Thus, he wanted to intervene and
re13u 1ate the re 1at ions bet ween a 11 the different sectors but
re·~pect

the actions of the same as he supported cautious

rntervent ion in 1ab or re 1at ions. 1 Rodriguez provided Mexican
c2pitai vvith a stable, procap1tal1st government and a uniform
nat 10na 1 1ab or code which offered the poss i bi 1i ty of a
I ega 1is tic re so 1ut ion to 1abor-cap lta 1 re 1at ions and 1essened
the authority of state off i c i a1s to intervene with Podr1 guez 's
re 1~1Jlat1on

of labor.=-

1

Medin, El Min1rnato Pres1denc1al. Historia Pol1tica Del Maxirnato
Ed1cior1es E1-a, 1972), p 14:2
.:::Ale;x r·i Saragoza, Tr1e r1onterrey Elite & trie 11exican State. 1880; 940. 1Au::.tm Univers1t'/ of Texas Press, 1988), p 135.
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On August 28, 1931, one year prior to Rodr1 guez taking
office, the Federal Labor Law gave legislative form to the
provisions of .Article 123 of the 1917 Constitution. This
article included a call for a minimum wage, an eight hour day,
a six day week and double pay for overtime. It also stipulated
that emp I oyers wou 1d be 1i able for ace i dents and occupat i ona 1
diseases and would at their own expense provide comfortable
ano sanitary dvve 11 ings and compu 1sory school mg. It
proc 1aimed the legality of strikes, and addressed how disputes
betvveen 1at) or and capital would be arbitrated.
The Labor Coae offered concessions to labor in return
for closer Federal regulation of industrial relations.
Labor disputes \Nould be submitted to a board of conciliation
an\J art)itration. This board would consist of equal numbers of
representat1ves of both lat;or and capital and one
representative of the government. Tr1is was signlf icant in that
it a 11 ovved the government to have the contra 11 mg vote

in

a

iabor cJispute and was used as a key mechanism for contro1 ling
labor. Article 576 of this law gave very broad powers to the
tJoaras. of cone i l i at ion and arbltrat ion so that they cou 1d,

in

the

case of each dispute, order the institution of a 11 sorts of
conaitions of work, among them wage scales, hours of work,
and tr1e increase or aecrease of personne 1. Among the Federa 1
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Labor Law's approximately 700 articles were important
provisions leading to compulsory trade unionism.=
As one of former President Rubia's Ministers of Industry,
Commerce, and Labor in 1932, General Rodriguez had been
interested in plans to reorganize that Ministry. The
equi 1ibrium between the organic development and the
integration of nat i ona 1 industry and commerce on one hand, and
the solution of the problems of the workers on the other, was
very aifficult to realize. This was amplified because both
basic aspects of the economic and soc i a 1 life were under the
charge of one ministry. .As President he qui ck ly acted to sp 1it
the fv1 in i stry into the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of
t~at iona 1 Economy.4

The new autonomous Labor Department,

which now reported directly to the President, could devote
itse1f to the accumulating and increasing number of cases
vvh1ch, with the new labor legislation, were coming before the
Boards of Cone i l i at ion and Arbitration. With this department
unaer riis control, Rodriguez commanded the decisions of the
arb 1trat ion board.

3John F.\tl.Dulles, Yesterdav In Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 (Austin Univers 1ty of Texas Pr-ess, 1961 ), p 514
-'iJav1er F.Gax1ola, El Pres1dente Rodriquez ( 1932-3L.J) u~ie:x1co
E01tor1al Cultura, 1938), p 496
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Labor Re 1at ions and Nati ona 1 Capita 1

During Rodriguez's tenure, he tried to obtain unity with
the Camara Nati ona 1 de 1 TrabaJ o but its 1eadersh i p was out for
its own se1f-interest, not that of the workers, and riva1ry
between leaders prevented this unification. In the power void
1ef t aft er the CROM monopoly during the Ca 11 es presidency, ana
1.11nth tr1e passage of the labor code, the new strength given to
i ab or organizations caused cons i derab 1e bickering among their

lea1jers. None of the worker syndications - the surviving
CRO l'1, C.C3.T and others- represented hegemony of the
problems of the worker, much less represented the interests
of a national movement.= Gaxio-ia wrote that the directors of
the 1aborrng masses 1ost their character as 1eaders and became
irresponsit ie agitators. c·
1

Tr1e President himse1f intervened to 1ay' down the basis
of settlement in a number of important labor disputes. His
a\Nard of December 10, 1933sett1 ing a bus strike, was the
first award to place in a 1abor contract the clause making it
obi igatory for the company to use exclusively workers
belonging to the union. Rodriguez announced his arbitra1
decision

in

a dispute between the National Railways of Mexico

'=1t1id) p 487
5Jc !-11-1 F.'vV.Dul1es, YestE-1-,jay lr1 l-1f\iC0 . .A_ G1ron1cle of ti-1e Revolut1or1
19 1;- 1'.? 3 6 ( Aust i n Un i v f 1- s 1t y of Tex: as P1- es s, 19 6 1) , p 6 OO.
1
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and the Union of Ra1 lroad Workers on June 14, 1934 7 When he
intervened he not only helpea this union obtain the recognition
of the Pai lways, but ordered that the contracts include the
union's exclusive rights in the case of hiring and f iring.e
President Rodriguez took steps in these disputes to see
to it triat contracts between labor and companies included
clauses which made the unions exc 1us i ve bargaining agents
vvith r1grits to say whom the companies should employ and
s~-:ou!d

fire. This was a privi iege of the unions which tr1e

Presi1jent wanted to be use(j in a manner which would not
a11ow tr1e labor leaders to make reprisals harmful to the
workers themselves, and he sought means of limiting it to
cases \Nhere there were legal reasons why a worker should be
removed. The goal of the exclusionary clause was to maintain
tr1e

'v' i gor

of trie synd1 cation and at the same ti me, protect the

ind1v1dua1 1.Norkers from the opression and abuses of their
leaders. He included tr11s as an essential point of tr1e Six Year
Plan.9
Strike movements became prevalent in June 1934 as
reporteij in the Mexico City press and inc 1uded such di verse
interests as the National Railways of Mexico, El Aguila Oil
Company, and fourteen other potential strikes in the San
7

~iAUS 312.5045/ 171, Johr1 S. Littell, Americar1 Vice Cori::,ul, Jul'/ 3,
1934 . Ree 1 58.
:o·.Jc;rm F V/Dul1es . Yesterday ln Mexico. A crwonicle of trie Revolutior1
19 19 - : 9 3 6 \ Au =· t i n UrFv er- s i t y of Te :,.; a s Press, 19 6 1), p 6 O 1

?Javier- F.Gaxioia, El Presidente Rodriguez ( 1932-34) ll"lexico
Editorial Cultura, 1938), p 499-503.
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CristotJal sugar mi11, El Oro Mining, Atlas factory, Mexican silk

factory, E1 A.gui1a Textile factory, Parke Davis drug company,
bus 1ine str1 kes, E1 Progresso factory, YMCA, Sinc 1air gaso 1i ne
st at ion, /\Zarco l'1in ing Company, Centra 1 Nati ona 1 hat factory,
Coahu1la and Zacatecas Railway, Sabinas Coal Companies and
tr'1e Mexican Zinc Company.1c,
The strike of the Union of Oi 1 Workers of Soutr1ern
Veracruz against Me><ico·s largest oi 1 company, El Aguila
['1ex i can Petro 1eum Company, and its subsidiary, Ingeni eros. y
Constuctores Martin, SA. started on May 9, 1934 On '-June 6 it
\Nas learned that, at the suggestion of Labor Minister
Bo J(Jrquez, President Podri guez had been named arb lter. The E1
.i:\gu i 1a str1 ke enaea soon afterward, although lt was not until
earl·y in July that tr1e details of Rodriguez's awar(j became
knc'vvr:. Tr1e presidential decision established regional
commissions to consider grievances and make awar1js. Each
commission consisted of three members- a f edera 1 inspector,
a representative of the interested labor organizations and a
representative of the company concerned. The Presi1Jent's
dee is ion a 1so est ab 1i shed the uni on·s exc 1us i ve rights in the
aeterrninat1on of company employees; it reduced the work
vveek to 46 1/2 hours, cal led for obligatory payments on the
weekly rest day, established numerous worker tieneflts,
increase1J the number of holidays w lth pay, revised vacation
1

193~.

'~l4AUS 81:::'5045/171, '-John S Littell, Arner1car1 Vice Cori::.ul, ,_July 3,
Reel 52.
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and retirement po 11 cy, and increased workers' vvages.
Furthermore, it est ab 1i shed the methods to be used in grant mg
promotions, based on year·s of service and competence.11
.A.s a resu 1t of the settlement with E1 Agui 1a, the workers
uni on of the Hu as tee a Petroleum Company asked for contract
changes in accord vv ith the principles estab 11 sr1ed for the El
.A.gu i 1a workers. .A. strike notice was issued to take pl ace on
October 6 but the conflict mg parties agreed to submit the case
to president i a1 arbitration. Huasteca had a1ready vol untar·i 1y
offereo tr1ese concessions, and this was seen as a ploy by ttw
\Norkers for more concess10ns, which could then be demanded,
in turn, by the El

.A, 1~u11a

workers.12

~Jonetr1eless,

on October 2,

Ro(jriguez was accepted as arbiter, and his decision on OctotJer
1~\~/as that there vvas an inequity and the labor contract
vvoul1j tie modified benefiting the workers of the Huasteca
Pi::tr('.-1i::1Jm ,-nmpar111::
,_J
11.
~-V~

1

1Jc1:·,r, F.V.'.Dul1es, Yes.terdai :n i1exico A Chronicle of the Re'-1oiut1on
1913-1 ?3t· ( Austm University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p. 601
1:=:r ~.t-.u::;. 8 12. '.:/J45/ 185, Jo1·1r1 S Lit te 11, .Ameri car1 Vice Cor1::.u 1,
~Jo.-ember 12, 1934, Reel 58
13John F1 t/Dulles. Yesterday In Mexico ,A, Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-193'6 (,A,ust1r,: University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 601.
14~i.A.US 812.S04S/ 185, John S Lit tel 1, American Vice Consul,
~!0vember 1'.:'.'., 1934, Reel 58.
15 I ti 1rJ
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Toward the end of 1934 which also marked the end of
the Rodriguez aamrnistration, a number of strikes wer·e

1jec la red void by the Central or Federal Boards of Cone i l i at ion
ano Arbitration in Me:<i co City as a reaction against continual
1ab or agitation. In 1i ne with continued government interest in
the danger of strikes- a number which were to be general
strikes- \Alas the appointment, in several cases, of the chief of
the Department of Labor and in one case of President Rodriguez
as arbiter. Practica11y a11 of the strikes appeared to have been
averted or terminated, at least for the time being, although the
1ong st and mg disputes on the important Nati ona 1 and Mexican
Pa: 1wa;/s r1a•j not been sett ·1 e·j

14

Tr1e

·~overnment

owned

Nati ona 1 Ra i 1ways and its workers had signed an agreement on
Octot;er 6, and on October 17, the President designated an
arb lter to preside over a spec i a 1 commission to so 1ve pend mg
rn sputes

~. jevertr.e 1ess,

a strike was st i 11 tr1reatene j
1

1:.

President Rodriguez, recognized that the future wou 1d
·:ee 1mpGrtant labor problems in the field of public services,
(jue in part to professional agitators, and personally favored
ot)1igatory arbitration. In a meeting with Vasconcelos, Michel,
Gil, Saenz, BorJ 6rquez, Gaxiola, the pres1 dents of the Boards of
A.rt-itration and Conciliation, and a consulting labor la\Nyer it
was decided that obligatory arbitration was constitutional. It
was. felt that obligatory arbitration would not limit the

110

const i tut i ona 1 right to strike but wou 1d f o 11 ow the strike
aec 1aration. 1e:. Tri is a 11 owe J the federal government to contra l
1

both capital and labor and above all promote profitability, the
primary ob Ject i ve of the Rodriguez adm i ni strati on.

i"'lini mum v/age: Centerpiece of Development

Estab1 ishing a minimum wage was the centerpiece of
Pres, 1 dent Rodriguez's economic deve 1opment for Mexico as he
be 11 eved generalized consumption vvas the only means capab 1e
of assuring the success of production, thus harm on i zing lab or
and capital. "The success of the entire economic process now
depends, in the f ina1 analysis, on the capacity of consumption
of the great masses of trie people

"11

.Address mg the need for a hi gr1er standard of 1iv mg,
Rodriguez stated on August 18, 1933 in his circular to trie
QOvernors:
"As the Executive of the Nati on, I have been deep 1y and
constantly preoccupied by the impoverished condition of
our working c 1asses. It is on the nat i ona 1 conscience,
that the peasant masses main 1y, 1ack the most essentl a 1
e1em en t s of cont em po r ary c i v i l i zat i on s, as the i r 1eve 1 of
living can be considered inferior to the one enjoyed in
the maJ or1 ty of the educated nations. The fie 1d and town
1

'\Jc,t-ir, F \'/.Dulle;:., Ye;:,terda/ In Mexico. A Chronicle of trie Revolution
1919-: 936 (Aust1r1 University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 602

17r,MUS 812.5041 /58, Circular to Governors, August 18, 1933, Reel
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vvorkers continue to be underfed; the qua1ity of the
c. l ot r1 rn g used does not eve r1 ans w er c l i rn at i c needs; v e 1~y
rare 1y is there a sma 11 surplus for modest diversions,
vvr1i1e the sum vvh1ch should be had for emergencies,
savings and culture does not even exist. .. Our
people have bare1y emerged from the 1amentable position
to wr1ich they were relegated during the colonial
per1od."1 E
President Rodriguez linked the standard of living to the
need for more purchasing pow·er in order to stimulate
pro duet ion:
"A.t the present time it is not possible to accept the
ttwory of the separation of capital and labor ... The
impoverished state of the work mg masses re-echoes
throughout bus mess, making it sma 11 and reducing its
volume to such a degree that techn i ca 1 organization of
t:us iness 1s rendered i mposs i b 1e; thus i so 1at ing
pros,perity wh1cr1 is the result of large scale production."

By exp 1o it ing man and pay 1ng a wage of 0.25 centavos or even
iess so tr1at peas,ants could compete with tractors, and mule
(jr1vers vv1th railroads, only then was less technology seen as
rnore prcf1tab1e19
In Rodriguez's appeai a fevv' days later to all
industrialists and agr1 cul turi sts through the press, he pointed
out that by increasing worker's purchasing power, industries
in Mex 1co would increase production and bring these industries
~ nt o

further techni ca 1 advancement. If Mex 1co can improve

12>1 bid
191b1d.
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technology, the increased wages would be compensated for by
better pr·oduct iv i ty b;1 tr1e workers.20 "Tri is Executive does not
lijnore the complexity of the problem and the innumerable
factors thereof which must be considered if we are to solve it
... but we must resolutely attack the problem." 21 The wage
increase was to be compensated for by an increase in the
productivity of the laborer through rationalization of industry,

oeve 1opment of technique, rotation of crops, use of machinery,
anci scientific fertilizat1on.22

Minimum Wage: .Aggressive Legislation

A.s governor of the northern part of Baj a California,
Podr1 guez had succeeded in having municipal commissions
there set a four peso daily minimum wage. Because minimum
·/age

\1

vva~

successful for the economy in the Northern District,

Roar1guez wanted to implement it nationwide as President
One of his first steps as President of Mexico was to create a
commission to study Mexican wages. The President then
carried on a personal campaign to establish minimum vvages in
the entire country, virtually dictating legislation to the State
governors. Opposition to minimum wage was not an option.
1

c: 0

2 ~lJAU5e12.5041 /57, i·Jo. 541, J. Daniels, September 1933, Reel 58.
2 1iJAUS 312.5041/6i, Letter to Industrialists, August 2e, 1933, Ree1
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The Commission determined that in accordance with the
Federa 1 Latior La\AJ, at the end of 1932, the mini mum wage

shou1d r1ave t)een f1x.ed in the 2,664 municipa1lties of the
country, but according to information from the Department of
Labor, on1y 197 Commissions had rendered their decisions. The
r\Jorthern Territory of Lower Cal lf orn1a, where Rodriguez r1ad
initiated the minimum wage as governor, led with a minimum
\.vage of 3.00 pe=.os and the State of Sonora with one of 1.50
pesos.

This r1igher wage kept northern Mexico more

competitive

\~nth

their

~~orth

.American counterparts.

Podr guez 010 not vvant to wait until 1934, the date on which,
1

in

compliance with .Article 415 of the law cited, the

comm1·ss1on entrusted \Nlth the fixing of the minimum vvage
vvas suppose,j to ho 1d another meet i ng.23 He proposed to amend
.Article 415 of the Labor Lavv' to enable special committees in
eacr1 State vvr1ich study the question of salaries to revise their
minimum saiary sca1e every year, instead of every two years,
as provided for

in

the Labor· Law.24

PocJr1 Juez sent a circu1ar to the governors urging triem to
1

enact 1eg1slation immediately and simultaneous1y authorizing
a minimum vvage in their districts. The President provided a
table showing the minimum salary to be fixed in each State
and Territory.

~~ineteen

s.tates were to have a minimum salary

~:::r-~AUS 812 5041 /58, Circular to Go·.;ernors, Augu::.t 13, 1933, Reel

Sc
='L11~AUS 81250411'.:»7, r~c' 541, .J Danie ls, Septeml)er 1933, Reel 58
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of 1.00 peso, eleven states of 1.50 pesos and the Northern
District of 3 00 pesos.2::.

Tr1is was quite a distance frorn tr·1e

4.00 peso rninirnurn wage Rodriguez r1acJ envisioned but he saw
it on 1>' as a first step. The next step in the seal e should be
fixed at a rn in i mum of 2.00, the next at 3.00, and the next at
4.00 pesos vvlth the firm conviction that wages shou1d never
be stationary and much less, shou1 d never be reduced. The
Comm1·ss10n could a1so fix the minimum wage for 1arger
amounts in any municipalities where economic or geographic
cond1t1ons indicated a need for higher wages. He also
indicated that the actual minimum wage should be for
unc 1ass if i ed peasants and work rngmen, a 11 owing a speedy rise
in tr1e fix.mg of wages for classified workingmen, miners,
etc.=c Rodriguez wanted to fix a minimum wage
simultaneously, as any omission would cause an economic 1ack
of equi 11t;riurn which couid be taken advantage of by certain
enterprises in order to make disloyal competition

27

On .August 29, 1933, the .American Vice Consul, William
P. Cochran vvrote
"Tr1e enormous unofficial power of the Mexican
President, and the assurance that so important a step
\A/as taken only after approval by General Calles and other
povvers. in the dominant National Revolutionary Party,

251t1 id.

2GrJAUS 8125041/58, Circular to Governors, August 18, 1933, Reel
C: C•
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271b1d.

rnd1cate a fairly high probab11ity that tr1e wage scales
1~ecommended will t)e made effective." 20
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On September 7, 1933 Rodriguez issued an acuerdo
express mg h 1s sat 1sf action that consi derab 1e approva 1 had
backed the idea of establishing 1.50 pesos and 1.00 peso as
minimum wages in different states. He formed a special
commission to coordinate all efforts to establish minimum
·salaries. On September 12, 1933 Congress amended the Labor
Law so as to include minimum wages.29
In accordance with the reform of the Mexican Labor Law
reported on November 3, 1933, the Central Boards of
Cone 111 at ion and .Arbitration tried to convene the employers
and vvorkers of the municipalities under their Jurisdiction to
designate their representatives on the Special Mini mum Wage
Commissions in order to begin their duties on November 10.
Fai 1i ng to do so, the Boards were to appoint the miss mg
members \Nlthin five days and were to complete their studies
within t1.Nenty days. The Central Boards 1.Nere to fix the
minimum 1Nages lf the Special Commissions failed to do so,
and \111ages were to go into effect on January 1, 1934. The
Board stated only unionized workers could participate in
elect 1on of Spec i a 1 Commissions. President Rodriguez had
covered all of the bases in order that minimum wages would be

22., bid.

2·;iJor1r1 F.W.Dul1es, Yesterday In f1exico A Chronicle of trie Revolutwn
1919-1936 (Austir1 University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 553.
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set 1N i thout fail by January. When neither the emp 1oyers or the
workers appeared for regi strati on, back up procedures were
put in place and the Special Commissions were formed. The
Organization of Emp 1oyers recommended among other th in gs
that trie minimum wage be based on farming not industrial
v11a·~es

but this was not trie criteria used.30

After the Federal Department of Labor received
mformat1on from nearly a majority of the States that the
Special Minimum Wage Commissions had been insta11ed, the
National Minimum \'/age Commission formed by the President
sent a circular directing them to establish a single minimum
\·vage rn each municipai 1ty. They were instructed to conform
as much as possible to the rates suggested by the President.
The est ab 1i sried rates cou 1d not 1ead to a reduction by the
employers of wages now above the minimum. In addition,
·vvorkers were expected to put in a full day's work, and they
were directed to strengthen their organ i zat 1ons, especially on

tr1e farms, so as to obtain the benefits granted to them by
minimum wage legislation.31 For the municipalities in most of
the s.tates minimums higher than the 1.50 pesos were
est ab 11 sr1ec1 :::: Tr1e Fe jera 1 Government a 1so put into effect tr1e
1

3C 1r·JAUS 812.5041 /68, John S. Lit tell, American Vice Consul, ~Jovemt1 er
27, 1933 . R<:-el 58
3 1Ibid.
32Jot-ir1 F.W.Dulles, Vester-day In Mexico A Chronicle of H1e Revolutwn
1919-1936 (Austm University of Texas Press, 1961), p 554
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President ·s rn i ni mum wage suggestions as regarded its own
emp 1oyees wr1 i ch effected 2,032 emp 1oyees. ::::::
Eight rnontr1s later on August 17, 1934 President
Podriguez addressed a nationwide chain of Mexican
broadcasting stations in which he urged the observance of the
mini mum wage 1avv. The message was f avorab 1y commented
upon in the press, but it \Vas the general be 1i ef in we 11inf ormed c ire 1es that because of the divergence of the daily
1.1/age scale rn trie various States of the Republic, its
app 1i cation on such a sea 1e as the President proposed
trwougrwut the entire country' would be quite aifficult to
real 1ze.::4 There was strong resistance by Mexican Capital
influenced by regional competition in spite of Ro\jiguez's
attempts to tie consumption to increased productivity.
Nonetr1eless, Po\jriguez rnade national minimum wage laws a
rea 11 ty

in

rviex i co before the rad i ca 1 and pro-1 ab or President

Car-<Jenas used the State to support workers.

Genera1 Economic Plan for Mexico

In addition to minimum wage to increase consumption,
President Rodr1 guez supported soci a 1 reforms which inc 1uded

::,e
c ,,

_:·c

3:3~1,.;u;:. 812.5041 /58, Circular to Governors, Augu:.t 18. 1933, Reel
34~j,AUS 81 :?.~·041 /88, ~~o 1726, J. Daniels, September 1934, Reel
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public education and an aggressive land distribution policy,
modern i zat 10n of agri cul tu re and an expanded industr1a1 base
to provide the underlying economic base. He believed increased
·::tandard of J 1ving, increased purchasing power to st i mu 1ate
production, improved techno 1ogy to increase prof it ab i 1ity of
production and expanded industry to increase exports and
decrease imports were a 11 i nterre 1ated.
In a speecr, to r,is industrialists, President Rodriguez
e.xpandecJ upon his economic plan for Mexico. He cited
stat1st1cs showing the capital invested in the various
moustr1 es of Mexico ana po mted out the ab i 1i ty of Mexico to
become an export instead of an import country. He showed
comr=:arative tables of imports into Mexico during 1929
compared to those of 1932, which declined from 382 million
pes.os to 180 m1111on pesos, the largest single import being
ma ch mery. Imports dropped in text i 1es, canned fish, fruits,
corn ana eijgs, and advancements vvere made m agriculture in
cotton, tobacco, wheat and vegetab 1e production. 3'.::·
Rodriguez pointed out that the value of the industrial and
agri cu 1tura1 productions offered a marked contrast. The
ma Jorlty of the economy Vv'as based in agri cul tura 1 production
Four-fifths of the population were agriculturists, and only a
t er, th vvere in industry. However, tr1e gross amount of the
aijri cul tura 1 production barely reached a figure of 722,500,000
3Sr·~.AUS 812.5041 /61, Letter to Industrialists. Auqu::.t 28, 1933, Reel
c~
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pesos, vvhereas the so 1e gross production of the
transformation industries reached a figure of 900,332,923
pe:;os. Subtracting the sum of 351 ,222,521 pesos, the amount
u=ed for ravv materials, plus fuel and electricity, from the
value of the industrial production, the sum in industry's favor
\N as 549,

1 10,402 pesos, equ iva 1ent to 76% of tr1e agri cu 1tura1

production. ::c
But rn=tea1j of trying to rapidly become an industrial
nation to improve the economic situation, Rodriguez knew it
'..·'- 1

2= more f ea= i C· 1e to i mpro\1e the techni ca 1 organization of

es tab 11 she1j industries, inst a 11 new ones and introduce the
=c i ent ! f i c method to secure greater agri cu 1tura1 production
throu1;:ih se 1ect ion of seed, use of fertilizers, and a rotating

S/= t em of crops, and system at 1zed exper1menta1 p 1ant in gs in

tr1e tr op i ca 1 and sem i-trop i ca 1 reg1 ons. Rodriguez believed tr1e
'.:::tate needed to cooperate in the solution by' =:upporting
a1~ir1 cult ura 1 experiments

and agri cultura 1 credit. The

go\1ernment also needed to give protection to agricultural
e:xport2. to increase tr1e annua 1 amounts exported

37

President

Rocw1 Juez imp 1emented this po 1icy and Cardenas acce 1erated it
1

vvr·:en he took off ice.

361bEJ
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National Economic Development: Mixed Economy

The ne\v rv1rnistry of National Economy devoted its attention to
the ideas of State economic intervention.36 As a result of the
Ca11es-Morro\v accord, there were more U.S. investments rn
1926 in Mexico than at the end of the Porf iriato.39 However,

the World Depression had caused foreign investments to dry up
ard rnt ernat i ona 1 trade to contract w 1th in the i nternat i ona 1
economic system. Mexican economic development could
cortinue only lf the State took up the slack by regulating and
st i mu 1at ing nat i ona 1 deve 1opment. This State intervent l on i st
pr11 losophy \A/as in sharp contrast to Calles' laissez-faire
economic 1ibera1 ism and represented the very foundation of
Carden1smo.
In his f i gr1t for mini mum wages, Rodriguez pointed out
that natura 1 resources should be rat i ona 11 y exp 1oited to 1eave
an equitable profit to the country, not giving prosperit}1 to the
absentee capita 11 st and poverty for the 1aborers because of
mi serab 1e

wa·~es

earned. 40 "Tr1e Federa 1 Executive is disposed

to lend a11 its moral support to negotiations exploiting the
subsoil, endeavoring mere 1y to have this exp 1oltat ion 1eave to

32'.John F.V/.Dulles, Yesterday In Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 (Austin University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 600
:::;iLorenzo ['lever, Historia De La Revolucion Mexicana 1928-1934 Vol.
12 Los inicios De La lnstitucionalizacion La Polit1ca Del Ma.x1mato. (Mexico
Citv El Colegio De 1·1ex1co, 1978), p 265.
4
D~JAUS 812 5041 /58, Circular to Governors, August 18, 1933, Reel
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our people at least the fair wages which people employed in
sucr1 r1ar j 1abors sr1ould receive. "41 Rodriguez put this
1

phi 1osophy to practice when he acted as arbiter in 1ab or
disputes w ltr1 the oi 1 industry in 1934 But he wanted more
tr1an higher wages for Mexican 1abor from the petro1eum
companies; r1e wanted gains for national economic development
as \·Ve1 l.
In October 1932, President Rodriguez dictated an accord

vvr1 i ch 1jec 1ared the nat i ona 1 reserves of the free 1ands to form
part of the inheritance of the State and estatl1ished the
poss i b1 l lty to cr·eate nat i ona 1 petroleum reserves.42
".Attention must be given, in my opinion, to the fomenting
of i ndustr1 es re 1at mg to raw materi a 1s and to the
uti1ization of the natura1 resources of the country.
Especia1 ly mining is one of our sources of wealth \A/hi ch
has not attained the development or the technical
aovance it should have, working a1so, toward the
coordination of a 11 the factors contributing to the
proouct1on of Mexico, in order duly to organize the
nat i ona 1 econonw "43
f

Pedri gu1 zmo was most evident in economic po 1icy.
President Rodriguez adopted his own policy which was unlike
t1oth Cardenas' co 11 ect ive vision and Ca 11 es' nonintervention i st
mode 1: the mixed economy. Pep lacing the predominant be 1ief
41
co
.._1'.,,,.:

r·jAUS 812 5041 /61, Letter to Industriaii sts, August 28, 1933, Reel
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2~:av1er F Ga><iola, El Presidente Rodrigue? ( 1932-34) (Mexico
E,j 1t01- 1a i Cui ti_Wa, 1 938), p 242-246.
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in the interests of the co 11 ect i ve over the rights of the
ind1vi dual, he promoted the inlt i at ive of the ind iv i dua 1 under
tr1e vigilance and regulation of the State.4.::i He modlf ied his
i\mer1 can capita 1i st phi 1osophy to fit the 1i mi ted amount of
private Mexican capital available as a resource.
President Rodriguez used the pr inc i p 1e of mixed economy
to increase national production. He implemented two diverse
proceijures: the development of cooperatives and the direct
organization of production under the control and subs 1dy of the
5 tate. In ttw second s1 tu at 1on, organizations were deve 1oped
reg i ona 11 y to distribute products and they 11 mi ted production
to serve the consumers in each zone.4:.
In August 1933 Rodr1 guez stated to the press that the
exploitation of extractive industries must be carried on by
nat i ona 1 enterprise and capital, and again posed the question of
\Vr:at is the best method, if by "the State in Joint contracts
with private individuals, or by means of labor cooperatives
f 1nanced by 1oans "
"The most expedient form of exploitation must be
determ med and therefore, the Commission must study
the different systems used in other countries. There
should be included in the Budget of Expenditures an item
de st med exclusively for the exp l oi tat ion of the nat i ona 1
min era 1 reserves with shared ownership between the
5 tate and the shareholders. It is expedient al so that

44.Ja·,ier F. Gaxiola, El Presider1te Rodriquez ( 1932-34) (Mexico

Editorial Cultura, 1938), p 238.
4:·1t1 id, p 250.
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triis Commission study whether the system inf orce at
es en t, i n w 1-1 i c 1-1 c onces s i on s ar e granted to pr 1vat e
individuals or stock companies organized for the
purpose of exploiting the mineral resources, should be
continued, or whether the est ab 1i shment of cooperative
societies of miners on a small scale should be
est ab l 1sr1ed, under the superv 1s ion of the State and w 1th
subsidies decreed by the State to render possible the
exploitation of our mineral resources. I consider of vital
importance the solution of the problems which I have set
forth with respect to the mining industry of Mexico. "46

rw

Ttw Pres 1dent then ref erred to the nat i ona 11zat1 on of

e 1ectr1ca1 energy, stating that a p 1an for the nat 1ona11 zat ion of
al 1 free resources of electrical energy was now before the
Mexican Senate for approval.47 He resolved U-1e problem by
creating the Federal Commission of Electricity which had two
basic goa 1s: that e 1ectri city cou 1d be supp 1i ed at an af f ordab 1e
rate to promote industrial activity, and that the system of
distribution was in such a manner as to develop new regional
production centers. In a letter written to Josephus Dan1eis
cJated A.ugust 30, 1933 Rodriguez said he was "seeking U-1e
soi ut 1on of tr1e economic and 1ab or prob 1ems which I have
devoted my greatest attention and thought. "4E
On December 20, 1933, President Rodriguez asked
Congress to authorize a society of mixed economy to assure
the supplying of the country in general and especi a 11 y meet the
necessities of the Government and the Nati ona 1 Ra i 1roads of
4F.,1,uc
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Mexico. He tried to organize the Compania Petroleos de Mexico,
S.A (Petromex), witr1 private investments and it constituted
an important step in the nationalization of the subsoil and
exp101tation by a semiofficia1 business.49 Mexico first sougr1t
a partnership with foreign companies for their techno1ogy and
capt i al but there were no takers. Petro 1eos de Mexico then
tried to organize exc 1us i ve 1y with Mexican investors but on a
much smaller scale than first envisioned.

Because national

w,vestors did not come forward, a11 capita1 was subscribea by
gc.vernment 1nst1 tut ions :.c,
President Rodr\ guez al so sought protection for the
cc: nsumer, seek rn g to k eep pr i c es 1ow for necessary i t em s,
particu1ar1y e1ectricty, medicines and gaso1ine. He revised the
tariffs of thirty two e1ectrica1 companies that operated in the
country. On March 16, 1934 he ordered the creat 1on of the
Pegulatory Commission of the Meaica1 Market. The
Investigative Com1ssion of the Petro1eum Market and its
derivatives. made a study vvhich

in

1ater years 1ed to the

Federal Government fixing gaso 1me prices.::;, i

49Jav1er F. Gaxiola, El Presidente Rodriquez ( 1932-34) (11exico
Edi to1-ia l Cu 1tu1-a. 1938 ), p 248.
SDLorenzc Meyer, Historia De La RevoluciC>n Mexicana 1928-1934 Vol.
12 Los lnicios De La lnst1tucional1zac1on La Po11tica Del Maxirnato 1 (Me1.1co
C1ty El Colegio De rv1ex1co, 1978), p 233.
: 1Jav1er F. Gaxiola, El Pres1aente Rodriquez ( 1932-34) (l'1ex1co
Ed1tor1a1 Cultura, 1938), p 253-254
1
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Educ at mg the masses was a primary objective of
Pres 1dent Rodr1 guez 's soc 1a1 reform p 1atf orm. He favored 1ay
education and an emphasis on capitalist individualism modeled
after the U.S

In regard to religious issues, President

Roar1guez himself never demonstrated much interest in the
conf11 ct with the Church. The Church had never been an issue
in Baja Ca11fornia and he did not believe it needed to be an
issue at the f eijera 1 1eve1. i The Cr·i stero Rebe 11 ion had
cc;nciudea ana neither he nor Cardenas wanted to reopen it.
Hovvever, his r'1ln i st er of Education, Narciso Basso 1s, guided by
General Calles, vvho haa a pathoiogical hatred of the Catrwlic
CJ1urch, reignited the religious issue during the Rodriguez
/\1jmin1strat1on by stepping up restrictive legislation on the
Church and promoting educat i ona 1 reform using the 1abe1 s
soc i a ii sm ar:a se><Ua 1 education as inf 1ammatory rhetoric. The
rea 1 reason for the imp 1ementat ion of the reform was to
create a po 11tica1 cr1 sis at the precise moment that Genera 1
Car(jenas ·was to come to power, the instabi 1lty maneuvered by
Calles. This reform became a major political problem for
Rodriguez with a power struggle played out on three fronts in
pub 1i c education, the uni verslt i es and the Church.

1Lorenzo Meyer, H1~.toria De La Revoluci6n Mexicana 19~3-1934 \101.
Los 1r·1ic.ios De La lnstituc.ional1zacwn La Politic.a Del Max1mato (Mexico City
E1 Colegio De ~1e~\ico, 1978), p 181
1~
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Rodriguez made every effort to temper the movement
through moderation so as not to destab i 1i ze his government,
Jeopardize his economic and socia1 advances, and a11ow him to
provide Cardenas with a peacefu1 transition to power.
A1though Rodr1guez went along with Calles and his
co11aborators and endorsed restrictive 1egis1ation rnitia11y, by
May 1934 he had rid himself of Basso1s and sided with Gil and
Cardenas

in

an attempt to keep Ca 11 es in check. This was in

keeping \Nith his overa11 shift in a11egiance from Calles to
Cardenas during triis period of time.

Educ at i ona l Reform

Ca1les supported Basso1s in the ro1e of Secretary of
Education to carry out his brand of educat i ona 1 reform

in

1933.

E'as·::o is proposed to have a const i tut i ona 1 amendment proclaim
tr1at

in

all schools the point of view would be that of

soci211sm

~

Tr1e amendment would exc1ude from both pub1ic

and private schoo 1s any instruction of a religious nature and
give tr1e state ab so 1ute contro 1 over a11 of the educ at i ona 1
activities

3

In addition to federa1 rural schoo1s, schools which

r1ad been under the contro 1 of the states were p1aced under
2"John F.vl Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 ( A.ustin University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 5·61.
7
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federal control. Basso ls increased teacher's salaries but got
mto disfavor with their leaders when he sought to reduce
teacher inf 1uence in curriculum matters.
In response to the proposed reform, middle class
f am i 1i es, the press and the c 1ergy attacked Basso 1s
throughout 1933 and in the final months of the year the
conf 11 ct spread to inc 1ude the universities. The press gave
passionate opinions for and against educationa1 reform. El
1V3cional, organ of the PNR, admonished the newspapers
Exc~elsior.

El Universal, La Prensa, and La Palabra for

pub 1i ~h mg fa 1se reports regarding the educational program of
the Government. These newspapers responded by reaffirming
their campaign against the Secretary of Education.
A.rnbassador Josephus Daniels reported:" It would seem to me
tr·, at the educ at i ona l problems ana effects have been greatly
exag 1~erate 1j

1n the controversy carri e,j on by the press. "4

The attacks against Basso 1s became so vigorous that in
December 1933 the President 1ssued a statement def end mg the
Secretary an,j stat rng that Basso ls had his support.=·

A 1tr1ough

Poor i guez pub 11 c ly def ended E.asso ls and 11 ke him, wanted to
keep religious beliefs out of education, he was strongly
opposed tc soc 1a11 st education. At the precise moment he \A/as
4~MLJ'.::, 812.404/ 1263,No. 11 19, J. Daniels, February 16, 1934, Reel
4('1

St'1AUS 81200/29826, No 2293, General Pol 1t1 cal Report, February
16, 1934. Reel 2
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def ending Basso ls, Rodriguez was simultaneously involved in
formulating tr1e Six Year Plan

\l\1 here

he proposed a system of

i ay educ at 1on based on scientific reason. In opposition to his
'v' 18\·V,

according to Gaxiola, was the radical Veracruz

delegation who proposed instituting socialist education.
Ho1.vever, it \A/as. Calles' support of social ism, felt through
Basso ls and other collaborators, which was even more
influential. Within the PNR it was Rodriguez and Calles wr10
t1acJ opposing v1e1Npoints. The final outcome was a decision for
\·Vr;at 1Nas termed 's.c1ent1f1c socialism' in the Six Year P1an, a
compromise between the two sides.
President Rodriguez did not give up eas11y. On December
L 1, 1933

after~

tl1e Oueretaro Convention, he wrote to Carlos

P:va Palacio, Pr·es1dent of the PNR, and tried to change the
aec1s1c:r t·y expr·es:.ing r11s point of view in support of 1ay
eijucat ion. He stated triat pub 11 c education contr1 buted
strong 1/ to tr1e permanent system of po 1lt i cs, and therefore,
Mexico needed a more f lex1ble educational system with
f reeaom ana rn it 1at i ve ana room for spontaneous development
of cu1ture

c He sald tr1e institute of education interpreted all

a·3pects of 11fe and it must be based in reality, as scientific
principle. Then ind1v1duals could form their mvn ideas and
cone 1us ions in an atmosphere of liberty and tolerance. This
form of lay education corresponded to the educational system

'\)a·v'iff F Gaxiola, El Pres1dente Rodriquez ( 193:2-34) (Mexico
Cultui·a, 1938), p 309-311
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in tr1e U.S., a country ruled by a political constitution which
\A/3S

11t;era1 and democratic. Rodriguez opposed socialistic

education as a system abundant with sectarian and radical
aoctr·ine vvhich meant Mexico had only substituted religious
f anat1cism with another form of fanaticism.7
The first months of 1934fo11 owing the passage of the
Six Year Plan were relatively calm, until in April, Bassols
rntroouced a plan to include sexual education in the last two
years of primary school and al 1 of secondary school. Attacks
t;/ the press and the clergy accelerated and parents'
associations started a strike by their chi l dren.t· The public
aQ 1 tat1or became so great that on May 9, 1934, President
Rodriguez reassigned Basso ls to the higher ranking post of
r·-1in1ster of Gobernacion and Vasconcelos, a conservat1ve,
t)ecame the f''1rn1ster of Education. However, Bassols, after
conferrrng with Calles ana Cardenas who were both more antic l er-1 cal than Rodriguez, urged Rodriguez at a Cab met meet mg
to take rnore drastic measures against the clergy. Rodriguez
ref used because he felt that such strong steps advocated by
Bassols wouid provoke difficulties for the incoming President
Basso ls resigned, forced out by Rodriguez for his disloyalty.9
.An educational reform bill to amend Article 3 was
introduced during the September 1934 Congress i ona 1 session
/Ibid. p 314-316
3.Jc·l-1n F.\lv' Dul Jes, Yesterday ir1 !-1ex1cc·. A 0-1ror1icle of ti-1e Revc)lut ion
1 919-193c· i: .A.ustm
Univer·s1ty of Texas Press, 1961 ), p. 561
?toi.j. p 561
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as a result of the Six Year Plan. It stated that education was
to be s.ecuiar and sociaiistic. It immediately drew fire not
only from the Cathol 1cs, the non-government press, and by
various groups of parents, but aiso the university students, for
reasons dea 1rng

\IV' 1th

their autonomy. Pub 11 c demonstrations

agarns.t 1t took place in various parts of Mexico. A number of
these demonstrations were broken up by force and there were
~.ever·a 1 f ata 1lt i es

and a 1arge number of casua 1ti es.

Demonstrations by severa 1 student bod1 es resulted in, or were
used as a pretext for, the closing of the universities of
Monterrey and GuadalaJara, and of the Atheneum at Saltillo.10
Outside of dee 1arat ions by Government 1eaders, such as
General Calles, that the agitation was due exclusively to the
subversive activities of capitalists (Jews) and clerics, these
protests received 1itt1 e consideration by authorities. In
several states the local governments, notably Sonora and
Co 11ma, app 1ied further repressive measures closing more
churches an,j expe 111 n 1~ tr1e priests.ii In spite of the increasing
\/C ·: ume

of opposition t c the proposea amendment, the b111 to

amend Article 3 of the Constitution was approved by the
Chamber of Deputies on October 12, 1934, and by the Senate
one vveek 1at er.
V/r1y did the government risk amending Article 3 given
tr1e resistance of the Church, the universities, the middle

1

1': iJAUS 812.404/ 1301, Edward L. Reed, October 24, 1934, Ree 1 41
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c 1asses and otr1er conservative sectors? It was Ca 11 es who
pushed th 1s 1egis1at1 on rn oppos it i or to President Rodriguez
an1j Cardenas. In June 1934, President-elect Cardenas said his
Jovernrnent opposed c 1ergy intervention in popu 1ar education

1

but it was Calles who was most radical in his pronouncements
\"11th his famous "Grlto de Guadalajara" speech on July
20, 1934 and the demonstration he organized by tr1e 100 ,000
un1on V·/Orkers on October 28 to confirm the amendment was a
popular 1jec1s1on. Nonetr1eless, the riots rn Puebla, Jalisco,
1,.11 chc:acan,

11cwe 1os and Zacatecas,

\N 1th

many wounded and

oead indicated that it was not a popular refor·m.

Rumor~s

were

strong tr1at tr,e real reason for the implementation of the
reform was Calles' desire to create a political cr1s1s at the
precise moment triat Genera 1 Cardenas was to come to power. 1.?
f'leanwh1le, President Rodriguez was committed to keeprng
Ca 1 es in cr1eck and to avert a crisis.
·1

University Agitation

Issues of educat i ona 1 reform which had p1ayed center
stage througr1 much of 1933 spread to the universities rn
October where concerns revolved around issues of autonomy.
The autonomy of the Univer-slty of Mexico established rn 1929

12Lorenzo Meyer, Historia De La Revoluci6n Mexicana 192-5-1934, Vol.
1~

Los lnicios De La lnstitucionalizacion La Poiitica Del 1'1aximato (Mexico City
E1 Coleg10 De Me~.ico, 1978), p 180.
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w·as not absolute because it depended on financial support
f rem the federal government. There were al so internal
conflicts bet ween conservative faculty, the Rector Roberto
:'iede: 1 'n, and v1 cente Lombardo Toledano, the d1 rector of the
t~at

i ona l Preparatory School, who as a member of the more

racnca1 element of the university, favored socialism.1::
A. strike by the law students at the University grew to

inc 1ude most of the students of the other co 11 eges and tr1e
re·311;;nat1on of a large number of the faculty. The agitation and
disturbances, \"Jr11ch culminated wltr1 the expulsion of U-1e
Peet or from his office ana serious damages to build in gs,
~wovoked

President Rodriguez to issue a statement to the press

on Octot)er 14 stating triat tr1e magnitude of the disturbance
had caused him to step rn. He also sent a cir-cular to the
Federal Congress proposing an amendment to the present
orgar·.; c 1a\N of the A.utonomous National University. He stated
triat a1though his purpose was not to dimrnisr1 the autonomy of
the Un1versity, his goal was aimed at ridding the University of
a 11 po 1it1 cs, which ha1j been one of the main causes of the
j1fficuH1es of tr1e rnst1tut1on in tr1e past.14 The bottom 1rne

1

vvas if the University woul1j not follow the official political
stance then funding woul1j be cut to the minimum and the
government would create a new educational center, the

1

r
' 'lt'd
-·· ) l ·' 1-j

1--,r,
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1.cir·~.:...usc:12.414i 12:·2, J. Dar-11els, Pc·11tica1 Repoi-t, Octc1t1er- 1933 .
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t\Jat i ona l Pol itechn i c Institute to imp 1ement goverment
pro Jects; in education. This was in keeping with Rodriguez's
tielief in the U.S. form of lay education based on scientific
reason. Witr1 tr1ese threats, trie University gave in to the
government 1::. Nonetr1eless, Gomez Morin, a defender of
Cano l i c freedom, vvas elected Rector in October 1933 and
Tole1jano was expelled. However, later in August 1934, the
Fir-st Congress of Socia1 ist Studies voted to censure Gomez
i""1ori n and to imp 1ement soc la list education in the University. 1c
President Rodriguez tiecame involved again in October

1934, vvhen the Council of the National University appointed a
committee cr1arged with ascertaining the attitude of the
C3overnment toward the University whicr1 was seen in a
negative 1i grit In reply to this action, President Rodriguez
issued a statement that the council's action was strange since
tr1e President had on many occasions made clear his attitude to
the University through the generous f inane i al assistance
accorded it by the government at a ti me \Nhen the National
Treasury could i 11 afford it. He quoted letters written by
Rec tor Gc1mez l"'1orrn, expressing deep appreciation for tr1e
Government's generous off er of aid. 11

15Lorei-1Zc1 Meyer, Hi=,toria De La Revoluci6n Mex1cana 1928-193..:t Vol.
12 Los lnic1os De La 11-1st1tucionalizac1or1 La Politica Del 11aximato (11e\1co City
E~ Colegic, De llh ico, 1972>), p 174
l 61b1d' p. 17....J-75
1 7 :·~,A.LJ'.:, 81~4041 1298, No 1865, "1 Daniels, October 20, 1934, Reel
~l
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President Rodriguez ended his statement by dee 1arrng
tr·,at "it pained r11m deeply tr1at the attitude assumed by the
Council rn suspending the work of the University could only be
interpreted as a political move to support the clerical
agitation now going on against the amendment of Article 3,"
and trien 1iv arned the Faculties, the council and the Rector that
arast i c measures would be taken if they persisted in assuming
an att ituije of rebe 111 on against the Government, as had been
oemonstrate,j 1c: In response, on October 30, the Actin ;J Rector
1

of tr1e National University, (Gomez Morin had been granted a
leave of absence of thirty days), addressed the faculty and
stuijent s, and demanded a f u 11 comp 11 a nee by them of the
statues of the institution, declaring that the University would
function str·ictly within the law. 19

Church Rest r1 ct ions

In addition to minimizing Church participation in
nat i ona 1 education at every 1eve1, increased restr1 ct i ve
legislation involving all Church activity soon led to increasing
,j 1ff1 cult i es

and incidents during the Rodriguez Adm in i strati on.

E\ack rn July 1929 at the culmination of the Cristero Rebellion,
1 c'1 tJ1d

191,JAU=:· 812404/ 1329, l·Jc· 1903, J. Daniels, Novernt1er ::::, 193....f, Reel
1'
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President Portes Gi 1 had bas i ca 11 y reached a truce bet ween the
canw 1i c Church and the Me xi can government. However, by
September 29, 1932, shortly after Rodriguez took off ice, the
lawmakers read an encyclical letter issued by Pope Pius XI, the
A.cerba .Animi, which objected to the 11exican legislation
affecting the Catholic clergy. As a result, the Pope was
bitterly attacked in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies.
Pres 1dent Rodriguez made a statement rev ea 1i ng his surprise
at the Pope's remarks, which, he said, were f ul 1 of fa 1sehoods
ano wou 1d incite the c 1ergy to di so bey the Me xi can rul rngs.
Rodriguez said the clergy "cannot resign themselves to losing
dom mat ion of sou 1s and the possession of worldly properties,
by virtue of which the pro 1etari an c 1asses were he 1d

in

comp 1ete 1etriargy and were 1mp10us 1y exp 1olted. ":?O
The Church was not recognized by Mexican legislative
prrnc i p 1es vvr1 i ch provided for the comp 1ete separation of
Cr1urcr1 and State. President Rodriguez considered the Catholic
Cr1urch to be a foreign power since the clergy considered
themselves subjects of the Pope and not citizens of Mexico,
and r1e said tr1e government would not tolerate the dominion of
a foreign power to meddle in the affairs of the State. "I
r1ereby dee 1are that at the 1east sign of disorder the
Government wi 11 proceed with al 1 firmness and w111 bring
about a definite solution to this problem which has cost the
20John F.'vV. Dulle=,, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolutior1
1919-1936 ( Austir1. u1-1iver-sity of Texas Pr-ess, 1961 ), p 56'.2
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nation so much bloodshed. "21

Apostolic Delegate Leopoldo

Pu1z y Flores, who had forbidden criticism of the arrangement
made with Portes Gil and who had strongly forbidden the use of
arms on ber1alf of the Church now stated that the Pope's
message had been misunderstood by the Mexican government.
He was quickly expelle1j from the country on October 3_22
It was on Septmeber 9, 1933, a year later and Just prior
tc tr"1e Oueretaro Convention, that restrictive legislation
increased against the Catholic Church. The 11i n i st er of
1:Jot1ernac ion Vasconce 1os instructed the Cr1 i ef of the Federal
Cnstr1ct to see that there be permitted only the number of
priests and churches authorized by the existing law, and that
trie r11gh officials of the Church in turn were given instructions
that tr1e 1aw be complied with. Up to this point there had
existed marked tolerance of the law and corresponding
gov'ernment regulations issued on December 31, 1931, which
permitted twenty-five Catho 11 c priests for the twenty-five
Catr·10 I 1c churches author1 zed in the Federal District. Si nee the
passing of this re 11 g1 ous law, the Government had not enf arced
it to its f u 11 extent, but a 11 owed the Church to keep open many
more churches and many more pries ts to function than were
registered under the law.
2 l t·~AU5812,404/11SSn~o.1929, El Nacfonal, October 3, 193'.2, Reel
40.

22John F.W. Dulles. Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 (Austin University of Te><as Press, 1961 ), p 563.
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Subsequent to the opening of Congress on September 1,
1933, certarn memt ers fe1t that the provisions of ttw
1

relig10us. law were being violated. As a result of
representations made by these members, the 11inister of
Gobernac i 6n Vasconce 1os, with the approval of President
Rodriquez, issued tr1e instructions.23 On November 16, he
cal led Archbishop Pascual Diaz into conf erenceto carry out tr1e
regulations.24
This \Nas Just the beginning of the federal legislation
ai~a inst

the Church. The annual Presidential message to

Congress on September 1, 1933 contained the report of the
11 in i st er of Education in the f o 11 owing passage:
"The Executive under my charge is firmly determined to
further the campaign of compliance by private primary
scr1ools with the provisions of Article 3 of the
Constitution, which prescribes secular instruction. To
eliminate from the instruction all religous influence is a
task that requires tenacity and daily' watch. To marntain
it there has been organized a corps of inspectors to
assist in the definite extirpation from the primary
schoo 1s in the District of the 1ong continued cl eri ca 1
influence. "2'.:

23t·JAUS

s i 2 404/ i 249,

~~o. 587, J. Daniels, September 12, 1933, Reel

40
.24~JAUS 81:::: 404 / 1::::54, No. 81 3,

40
25!tJld.

J Danie ls, November 17, 1933, Ree 1
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The Chamber of Deputies gave speeches on November 21,
1933 in favor of action against the alleged political activities

of the clergy in tr1e student conflicts at Guada l aJ ara. The
Congress adopted resolutions to take immediate steps 1)
toward the amendment of Article 3 of the Constitution, 2) to
jemand the Ministries of Gobernaci 6n and Public Education, the

1

Governors of Stat es, and the Municipal Authorities the strict
comp ii anee of the l a1.N in matters of worship, the number of
priests to be permitted, lay instruction etc., 3) To off er to
Governor A. i l ende of the State of Jal i sco the absolute support
of the Chief Executive and a vote of applause of the Chamber of
Deputies for his bold attltute to\"lards the reactionary
elements in his State, 4) to uncover the maneuvers of the
clergy as instigators of disorder and conflict, precisely at the
ti me of the presidential elect i ons.2c These speeches wer·e
reported by El Nac10nal and in response the sympathetic
Cathol 1c nevvspapers La Prensa and La Palabra prominently
published a statement by the Uni vers lty Students Federation,
conaemning the speeches which implied they were being
melted by the clergy in Guadalajara, and stating that the only
des ire of the students was to eliminate the schools entirely
from politics, autonomy from the government being a main
issue.27

26t·JAUS 812 00/29956, No. 820, J. Daniels, ~~ovember 24, 1933, Reel
7
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In February 1934, the Attorney General Portes Gil filed
cr1arges with the Supreme Court against Judge Antonio
.Alcocer, of the Second Circuit Court, which included tr1e States
of GuanaJuato, M1choacan and Aguascalientes in which there
w·ere large Catho 11 c interests. The Judge's dee is ions on the
nat 1ona l i zat ion of re 11 g i ous property, favored the interests of
the Church in 28 actions brought by the Government for the
nationalization of religious owned property under provision of
.Art1c·1e 27 an,j 130 of the Constltut1on.2c.
Some of the state governors sided with the Ca 11 es
faction and persecuted the Church far more than President
Podr1guez and the federal legislators. In May 1934, the
authorities of the State of Sonora cance 11 ed a 11 author1 zat ions
given to Catholic priests to exercise their functions and the}1
were expelled from tr1e State. Such action was taken because
t~w

clergy r1ad aav1sed parents not to send their children to

nat rnr,a i

1~t1

c schools. General Ro do l pho Eli as Ca 11 es had sent

out a circular to a 11 State officers ask mg them to report tr1e i r
attitude on the State's program because Sonora wanted to be
purged of a 11 off i c i a 1s who were not in sympathy with the
1aeas

of tr1e Government. Governor Ca 11 es stated that his order

for al 1 priests to leave Sonora was only carrying out the
provisions of the Constitution; that no churches had been
c 1osed; and that the suspension of rel i g1 ous services was due
28~JAU'.': e, 12.40411264, ~~o 1124, J. Daniels, February 16, 1934, Reel
4(,
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to the fact the priests had refused to comply with the laws
\Nt"1 i ch state that they must not imp art doctrina 1 instruct i on.29

Basso ls, wr10 had resigned as Minister of Education on May 9
and was then appointed Minister of Gobernac16n stopped to see
General Calles on his way to the United States. Again, the
act 1on of Governor Ca 11 es may have been inf 1uenced by
conferences between General Calles and Minister Bassols.30
Be~ ides

Sonora, Cat ho 1i c serv 1ces were proh i ti ited in

Tabasco, Chiapas and Veracruz. The anticlerical excesses of
Te Jeda or .A 11 en de were never equa 1ed by the Rodriguez
Aomrn1stration. The state of Veracruz led the way, where
Governor Te Jeda had been fight mg the Catho 1i c Church for a
number of years in the name of socialism. In 1933, priests in
the state of Ja1isco were limited to one for every 25,000
persons, ano tr1e state government had turned over twentyseven church build rngs to non re 1i gi ous functions. Governor
Set)ast 1an A 11 enije p 1aced restrictions on students at the
University of Guadalajara. In addition, the police in
Guada 1aJ ara c 1osed a 11 the city's churches unt i 1 the Ca tho 1i cs
appealed to the President to resume some services. The
Governor of Nuevo Leon abo 1i shed a 11 aid to the University in
his state and the state of Chi apas reduced to four the number

29~J.t\US 812.404/ 1277, ~Jo 1443, R Henry Norweb, Charged' Affaires
ad rnteri m, May 22, 1934, Pee 1 40
30 Ibid
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of priests who could officiate in that state.31 In an update on
conditions in 1934, it was reported that on 11arch 24, tr1e state
of Cr1 i huahua enacted 1egis1 at ion authorizing one mini st er per

100,000 inhabitants, instead of one per 45,000 as formerly; on
1v1ay 3, 1934, the state of S ma 1oa authorized 20 ministers C10
Catha 11 c and 1O Protestant) for the entire State, instead of 45
ministers as formerly; and that on January 31, 1934, the
r1oldrng of rel ig1ous services was suspended in certain
municipalities in the state of Chiapas 32 The official opinion
espressed by Genera 1 Ca 11 es was to b 1ame tr1e c 1ergy and
reactionaries and congratu 1ate the governors for their
energies. '33
By October 1934, as trie Rodriguez term was coming to an
end, the re 1i gi ous issue had heated up at the f edera 1 1eve1 as
\Veil. Pr1 or to the session of the Senate which passed the
education reform amendment, the PNR b 1oc in the Lower House
he id a meeting on October 19, 1934 at which a bill was
discussed and passed by a vote of 36 to 13. The PNR b 1oc
session began "a systematic and concrete campaign against
the clergy, the principle exploiters of the forces and the riches

31Jc,hn F.'v'I. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolution
1919-1936 ( Austir1 University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 563.
32r\J.AUS 812404/1277, No 1443, R Henry Norweb, 0-1arge d' Affa1res
a1j 11-1ter-irn, r1ay 22, 1934, Reel 40.
77
.
.
.
JJLorenzo Meyer, H1stor1a De La Revoluc1on f1ex1cana 1928-1954 Vol
1:;:, Los ln1cios De La lnst1tucional1zacion La Politi ca Del Maximato O-leAico City
E1 Coleg10 De f1e.x:1co, 1978), p 174
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of f''lex1co from tr1e times of discovery and co1onizat1on to the
Revo ! ut ion." The Bloc passed six re so 1ut ions:
1. To expel def intely from the country a11 priests, bishops, and
archb 1shops.
2. To g 1ve a vote of sol i darlty and confidence to General Ca 11 es,
(mentioned f 1rsU, President Rodriguez, President-elect
Cardenas and the Governors of Tabasco, Sonora, Chiapas and
Colima.
3. To organize strong centers of works and peasants which, in

the City of Mexico, as \/\!ell as throughout the Republic, are to
combat the organizations formed by the clergy.
4 To form a Com i ttee of Public Safety to weed out employees
of the Federa1 and local Governments, members of the PNR, and
tr1e iists of pensioners of the State, among whom are persons
descending from ind iv i duals who opposed the Revolution.

s. :o sponsor and stimulate

the production of revolutionar;/

rntel lectuais.
6. To s.uppress the newspapers La Prensa, La Palabra, El
Hombre Libre, and Omega, as being beyond the guarantees

provided by the Constitution, and within the sanctions
established thereby. 34

34~MU5812.404/1298, No 1865, J. Dar1iels, October 20, 1934, Reel
41
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The Committee of Public Safety of the Chamber of
Deputies ca 11 ed on President Rodriguez on Oct ob er 29, to
rnf orm ri1m of its proposed procedures. El Nacfonal stated that
tr:e Government vvould have to risk being considered an
rnquisltioner in its efforts to rid itself of enemies who would
not resign even though their convictions were opposed to the
Government. Excelsior pointed out that more than half a
m 111 ion persons in Me xi co \A/ere f mane i ally dependent upon the
Government and that, if the Committee's work were legally and
imp art 1a11 y carried out, no pub 1i c servant from members of trie
Cabinet to the lowest Government employee would be free of
suspicion and 1iab1 e to di scr1arge. 35

A. 1so on October 31, the

f'ie><ican Senate had met in secret session and had passed a bi 11
~;rov1ding

for the 01sarming of all so-called "White Guards"

(po 1ice private 1y emp 1oyed to guard factories, p1antat ions,
etc. l t)ecause of the danger of their provoking encounters with
anned agrarians. 36
Tr1e increas mg 1y tense situation e 1i c lted this
ct1·::ervat~on

from .Ambassador Daniels:

"The s ltuat ion has deve 1oped cons i derab 1e heat in the
1ast few weeks. It 1oaks as lf the Government and the
PNP, which amount to the same thing, have determined to
have a f ma 1 "showdown" w 1th the Church. However, it
may be that tr1e Government (Calles) is merely
enaeavorrng, in a \Vay that has become traditional in
3'=r·~.t..U;=: 2124(14/1329, r·Jo. 1903, J. Daniels, ~~ovember 2. 1934, Reel
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Mexican politics, to divert public attention from other
t 1-1 in ~1 s w r1 os e i mp ort an c e i t w i s r1 es to m i n i rn i z e. wr1 at
these th in gs may be, I do not know, but there have been
persistent rumors of dissent ion between Genera 1
Calles and President-elect Cardenas and there r1as also
been a good deal of criticism directed against the
affluent condition of certain political leaders. "37

Calles got his wish when all of the restrictions finally
caused Puiz y Flores to speak out against the government and
called on all Catholics to organize. In October 1934,
President Roari guez received through Genera 1 Cardenas and
Colonel Carlos Riva Palacio, a message from General Calles
which suggested that Monsignor Ruiz y Flores and the
Arcr1bisrwp of Mexico, Pascual Diaz, be thrown out of the
country at once. But by this ti me, President Rodriguez was on
the offensive against Calles and he replied that he could not
act in sucr1 an arbitrary manner. Instead, he turned tr1e matter
over to ,AJtorney General Portes Gi 1.3C.
On October 31, the Mexico City press published the text
of a letter addressed by Presiaent Rodriguez to Attorney
General Portes Gi 1 which consigned him to prosecute the
Governmnent 's case of sedition charged against the Ca tho 1i c
c 1ergy of r1ex i co. The President stated that under pretext of
tr1e educ at i ona 1 reform approved by the Congress, the c 1ergy

e

37~J.AUS 12.404/ 1301, Edward L. Peed, October 24, 1934, Peel 41
38i·JAUS 812.404/ 1338, No. 1921, J. Daniels, November 13, 1934,
Ree 1 41.
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had initiated an open campaign of sedition clearly revealing
trie 1r purpose to go as far as rebe 11 ion. A 1though, it did not
menace tr1e stabi 1ity of his Government, he wanted the
A.ttorney General to investigate the case and to punish those
persons found respons i b1e. On the same day, La Prensa, quoted
lvions1gnor Puiz y Flores from San Antonio, Texas as having
asserte1J that the Catholic Church did not propose armed
r-e s i stance nor had lt so 1i c i t ed the int erv en ti on of the Uni t ed
States rn this regard.::9
Portes G1 l's moaerate response to the crisis was
f avorat ly report ea by a1i of the Me xi co City press. He a 11 owed
1

triat tr1e Mexican Episcopate had broken the law by counsel mg
dis.obedience to the 1v1ex i can 1aws, carrying on propaganda rn
the United States and inc it mg armed rebe 11 ion. At the 1east
sign of disorder, the government would firmly respond because
lt hao the rigr1t to demand that the Church comply fu11y with

tr"1e 1aws of tr1e

countrv'-1'~'
I

Tr1e E':<cels1or of November 11

stressed tr1e fact that the Government was not attempting to
persecute re 1i gi ous be 1i ef s nor to deny' peop 1e the right to
vvorship as they pleased, but it was demanding compliance
vv1tr1 tr1e laws of Mexico. It praised President Rodriguez for

r1 av in g ac t e1J in a 1e1J a1 manner by sub m i tt i ng the case to the
i~.ttorney

Genera 1, ana not having acted arbitrarily as had many

0

~ ~iAUS 812.404/ 13:::'9, ~io 1903, J Daniels, ~~o·;ernber 2, 1934, Reel
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other authorities who had expe 11 ed pries ts and c 1osed
churcr·1es. 41
Gi 1's report recommended the arrest of the two men, but
since they were a1ready outside of the country, he
recommended triat they be seized shou 1d they endeavor to enter
Mexico. Rodriguez authorized Gi 1 to take the 1ega1 steps
against the two pre 1ates.42 He a 1so authorized Gi 1 to read his
report to Ca 11 es. Thus Rodr1 guez and Gi 1 ended tr1e maJ ority of
the controversy without having to take any radica1 action
agarns t the c 1er·gy. More important 1y, President Rodriguez
accomp1ished his goa1 of keeping the re1igious issue
smo 1de ring despite Ca 11 es efforts to create a poi it i ca 1 crisis
for Caraenas.

4 1Ibid.

42Jotrn F.W. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico A Chronicle of the Revolutwn
1919-1936 ( Austm University of Texas Press, 1961 ), p 564
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Conclusion

Atle 1ardo Rodriguez rode to tr1e Mexican Presidency as a

protege of tr1e Sonoran Dynasty w i tr1 its goal of party
conso 11 dat ion and aggress 1ve soc 1a1 reform in Mexico f o11 owing
the Revolution. Rodriguez was chosen by Calles to be third
President of the Max 1ma to with the goal of providing party
unity and po 11t1ca1 stability leading the country into peacef u 1
elections

in

1934 He began his administration cautious1y in

1932, but with Ca11es frequent1y unavai1able because of hea1tr1
and farni 1y reasons and because Rodriguez had proven rie was
capab1e of administering w1tr1 1ess scrutiny, Rodriguez was
ab1e to take more and more contro1 of the government. In
addition, Ca11es ovvn institutionalization of politics through
trie format 1on of the PNR d1d not 1end i tse 1f to strong man
ccntro 1.
After Calles became reactionary and backpeddled on
soc i a1 reform, G11 and other agrarian 1eaders sought new
1eadersr11p in Caraenas to reignite the movement. By mid 1933,
Caraenas-G1l-G6mez became more of a factor within the PNR
and Cal 1es-Pan1 less so. While in office, Rodriguez gradually
shifted his allegiance, replacing Calles collaborators in his
adm in 1st rat 10n w itr1 Cardenas proponents. From that
perspective, the Rodriguez administration became a
trans1tiona1 government wh 1ch peacefu 1ly shifted power from
trie Max1mato to Carden1smo.
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The Rodriguez presidency, however, represented rnore
than a shlft from a puppet leader under Calles to a puppet
1eader under Cardenas. President Rodriguez was a very capab 1e
administrator in his own right with his own distinct political
ideology and his own brand of social reform. He was a Sonoran
capitalist educated in the A.meri can ways, adopt mg both
capitalism and Roosevelt's New Deal policies as his own
phi l osoph·y during his years as Governor and entrepreneur in
BaJa California and later as President.
Unlike Rubio 's adm in i strati on, which had been troub 1ed
by i nterna 1 po 1itica1 turmo i 1 and the World Depression,
Rodriguez achieved political stabi 1i ty in the aftermath of the
Depression and was able to move forward with the Country's
economic and soc i a 1 reconstruction-- something totally
creaitea to Cardenas, when Rodriguez initiated much of it
himself. The Six Year Plan, which became the basis for
reconstruction, reflected the new shift in power from the
Maxi ma to to Carden i smo. Rodriguez aggressive 1y pursued
implementing the Six Year Plan during 1934 but applied his
own interpretation. With his finance ministers, he put the
pub 1i c hacienda in order, ba 1anced the budget and estab 1i shed
internal credit, and then built his social reforms within fiscal
respons i bi l ty. He expanded the domestic market w 1th
programs to educate the masses and improve living standards
emphasizing minimum wage and labor arbitration yet
supported a mixed economy' and national capital. He tried to
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increase agri cul tura 1 and industri a1 production with 1and
reform, expanded credit, modern techno 1ogy, and an increased
infrastructure with in the country. He supported 1ay education
and separation of Cr1urch and State.
Rodriguez accomp 1i shed these feats through sheer
persona 1 force. He f ormu 1ated f i sea 1 po 1icy in c 1ose
conjunction with his finance ministers, first with Pani, until
tr1ey c 1asr1ed on po 1icy issues and then with Gomez who was
more agreeatiie to his economic plans. By 1934, Rodr1guez
dictated agrarian pol icy as head of the Autonomous Agrarian
Commission and regu1 ated 1ab or through persona 1 contro 1 of
tr1e Federa 1 Arbitration Board r1aving usurped authority from
the states and Congress. At the same time, he aggressively
pushed minimum wage 1egislation through Congress over
state's interests. In addition, he kept the mi 1i tary neutra 1i zed,
maintained favorable relations with the U.S. government whi1e
promoting Me xi can nat 1ona1 i st interests, and prevented Ca 11 es
from reigniting the religious issue and causing a crisis for
Cardenas. Rodriguezmo, far from being supplanted by the
Maximato, c1ear1y was a force unto itself, and precursor to the
Cardenas reforms in 1935.
Personal1y, Rodr1guez did not especia11y re1ish po1itics-He was first and foremost a businessman desirous of
accumu 1at ing vast wea 1th. He continuously expressed a desire
to retire from pub1ic 1ife ana confine himself to industria1
enterprises. He wanted to be President to impact nat i ona 1
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economic reform which could only enhance his own business
empire in Mexico. Otherwise he was ready to leave politics
behind and return to Baja California where he was "King."
With entrenched political patronage being what it was,
Rodrlguez played tr1e game as well as anyone. He was
e><treme1y loyal to Calles because Calles gave him his power
anCJ wealth. Yet as the power shifted toward Cardenas,
Rodriguez was aware of Cardenas' increasing influence and
\·Vanted to remain in favor vvlth the "powers that be." When he
returned to Baja Cal lf ornia he would need Cardenas' support to
maintain his local hegemony and protect his national economic
1nterest s.
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